The German
military strategy of using of fast-moving tanks, with motorized infantry
and artillery supported by dive-bombers, and concentrating on one
part of the enemy sector, became known as Blitzkrieg (lightning war).
The strategy was first put forward by Colonel John
Fuller, the chief of staff of the British Tank Corps. Fuller was
disappointed with the way tanks were used
during the First World War and afterwards produced
Plan 1919. This included a call for long-range mass tank attacks with
strong air, motorized and artillery support. These ideas were developed
in more detail in his books, Reformation
of War (1923) and Foundation of
the Science of War (1926).
Fuller's
ideas were ignored by the British Army
but was studied in Germany and in 1926 leaders
of the the German Army asked the government
to commission the production of new tanks that would enable them to
use Blitzkrieg tactics
in any future conflicts.
As a result
of the terms of the Versailles Treaty
these new experimental tanks were called tractors. The Light Tractor
weighed ten tons and carried a 37mm gun and the Heavy Tractor was
a 20-tonner with two turrets, one forward with a 77mm gun, and one
at the rear carrying a machine-gun.
The Versailles
Treaty limited the German
Army to a strength of 100,000 men and General Hans
von Seeckt, as Chief of Army Command he had the difficult task
of maintaining morale of the armed forces. Disliking traditional theories
of mass armies and trench warfare, he remolded the army as a mobile
shock force of thirty-five divisions.
In 1928
Seeckt published Thoughts of a Soldier
(1928). In the book Seeckt questioned the value of huge conscript
armies. He argued that it was technical science and tactical skill
that would win the wars of the future. He predicted that "the
whole future of warfare appears to me to lie in the employment of
mobile armies, relatively small but of high quality, and rendered
distinctly more effective by the addition of aircraft, and in the
simultaneous mobilization of the whole forces, either to feed the
attack or for home defence."
After Adolf
Hitler obtained power in 1933, the German government was open
about its tank production. In the spring of 1934 the German
Army began developing the Panzer tank.
Over the next few years the Panzer I, Panzer II, Panzer III and Panzer
IV were produced.
During
the invasion of Poland in
September, 1939, it became clear that the Panzer I was insufficiently
armed for battle conditions. Panzer II and Panzer III tanks were reliable
but were outgunned. The outstanding performer was the Panzer IV as
it had the perfect combination of speed, agility, firepower and reliability.
Over the next few years it became the backbone of Blitzkrieg and over
9,000 of these tanks were produced.
However,
the the successful resistance of the Red Army
in the Soviet Union in 1942 showed that the
Panzer IV was no longer invincible. This resulted in the production
of the Panther and
it eventually became the most popular tank used in Germany. The greatest
exponents of Blitzkrieg were the German commanders, Heinz
Guderian and Erwin Rommel.
The
Panzer IV Tank played an important role
in Blitzkrieg.
(1)
Tom Wintringham
fought against the German
Army during the Spanish
Civil War. He wrote about German military tactics
in his book New Ways of War (1940)
Blitzkrieg tactics and strategy are almost entirely developed
with the idea of escaping from the trench deadlock that held
the armies between August, 1914, and March, 1918, and held them again
from September, 1939, to April, 1940. We can only grasp the essence
of the Blitzkrieg if we realise that it is an opposite to, a reaction
against, the war of trenches that otherwise condemns armies to practical
uselessness.
From October,
1914, to March, 1917, on the Western Front, position warfare became
more and more rigid, immovable, and futile. To "attack"
meant to lose twice or three times as many men as your opponent, with
no considerable gain in ground, and no decisive effect on anything
except, your own cannon-fodder. The armies were locked in solid and
continuous lines of trenches, in which they were pounded and obliterated
by an even heavier hail of shells.
From March,
1917, to March, 1918, position warfare was in full flower, but some
of the factors that must lead to its partial decay, its change into
a new shape, became apparent. One factor was the tank; another, more
important, was a new method of defence - which inevitably developed
into its opposite, a new tactical method for infantry advance. The
defensive method was known as "elastic defence" or "defence
in depth"; the second developed from it, and adopted
because it was a success, was called the tactic of "infiltration
in attack."
(2)
General Hans von Seeckt, Thoughts of
a Soldier (1928)
In this way a military mass is constituted which, though unsuited
to take part in a war of movement and seek a decision in formal battle,
is well able to fulfill the duty of home defence, and at the same
time to provide from its best dements a continuous reinforcement of
the regular, combatant army in the field.
In brief,
the whole future of warfare appears to me to lie in the employment
of mobile armies, relatively small but of high quality, and rendered
distinctly more effective by the addition of aircraft, and in the
simultaneous mobilization of the whole forces, either to feed the
attack or for home defence.
(3)
Major General Sukhov was a tank commander in the Red
Army who fought against the German Army
during the invasion of the Soviet Union in
1941.
In their
war against the Soviet Union the Germans have applied the methods
of mobile attack - a method which has taken root in Fascist tactics.
Hitler relied on the crushing force of his tank divisions accompanied
by large numbers of motorized infantry. One hundred and seventy divisions
were concentrated in the east for this purpose, of which 60 divisions
were composed of mobile troops. The latter included as many as 25
tank divisions.
The fact
that the Nazi mobile troops were nearly three times the number put
in the field against France show that the Nazis intended to rout the
Red Army with a lightning blow and achieve a rapid victory. Taking
advantage of their surprise attack they gained certain territorial
successes, but their calculations on crushing force and the sweeping
movement of armoured groups have not been justified.
In subsequent
operations the movement of these groups was completely stopped in
certain directions, and in others it was retarded. During the first
days of the war the Red Army used skilful manoeuvre to destroy small
and large groups of German tank and motorized troops which had become
cut off from their infantry units. One such group of 300 tanks was
destroyed by the co-ordinated efforts of Soviet infantry and artillery.
It is significant that in this complex operation the destruction of
the Fascist tanks was accomplished without the participation of Soviet
aircraft or tanks.
Having
made a study of the enemy's tactics and knowing his vulnerable spots,
the Red Army is in each case using the weapons within its reach. The
39th German Tank Corps engaged in a decisive battle was routed by
a powerful blow from Soviet air and tank forces. Tanks, supported
by infantry and artillery, participated in the destruction of the
20th Tank
Division.
Usually
the enemy pushes forward large tank units in the directions of major
operations. This move is preceded by the operations of general infantry
troop formations or by tank troops jointly with motorized infantry,
supported by artillery and aircraft to make a breakthrough in the
defence lines. Tank divisions are followed by motorized formations.
Mobile groups of troops push ahead as far inland as possible, and
in their sweeping movement they neither look back nor
pay attention to their flanks, irrespective of whether the rest of
their troops are following along.
Lately
the German tank forces have adopted the following method : When the
tank units which have pushed on far ahead run short of fuel they dig
themselves into the ground, leaving only the gun turrets above the
surface. Thus while waiting for the arrival of fuel the tanks are
transformed into a kind of fortified post, and the district occupied
by the tank unit becomes something of a fortified district.
(4)
Hasso Manteuffel was interviewed by
Basil Liddell Hart about Heinz
Guderian after the war for his book The Other Side of the Hill
(1930)
Guderian favoured from the beginning the strategic use of panzer forces
- a deep thrust into the enemy, without worrying about a possible
threat to his own unprotected and far-extended flanks. That was why
he planned to transport all supporting elements of the panzer forces
(infantry, artillery and engineers) in a similar way - that is, on
tracks - and why the supply services (petrol, ammunition, food) were
organically incorporated with the fighting troops. This enabled them
to accompany, and keep up with the tank core until fused with it -
at the same tune assuring Guderian's own supplies for three to five
days.
It was
Guderian - and at first he alone - who introduced the tank to the
Army and its use as an operative weapon. It was certainly not the
General Staff. During my term in the War Ministry (in the Inspectorate
of Panzer Forces) I was well acquainted with Guderian's struggle on
behalf of the use of this weapon. In the best sense of the word, this
new weapon bears the stamp of his personality. Its successes during
the war are due to him.
In peacetime
he at first stood alone when he insisted that the 'break-through'
of tanks should be pressed long and deep, and at first without regard
to exposed flanks. On countless journeys and in countless conferences
he injected this idea - even into the actual tank commanders.
If Guderian
was not always successful in carrying out his theories everywhere
during the war, it was due to the struggle against the mistrust of
so many elderly officers who knew nothing, or little, about tanks.
He was
the creator and master-teacher of our Armoured Forces - and I lay
particular stress on the word 'master'.
(5)
Wilhelm von Thoma, commander of 2nd Panzer
Division, claimed that there were five main reasons why German tactics
were so successful at the beginning of the Second
World War.
1. The concentration of all forces on the point of penetration in
co-operation with bombers.
2. Exploiting
the success of this movement on the roads during the night - as a
result, we often gained success by surprise deep in, and behind, the
enemy's front.
3. Insufficient
anti-tank defence on the enemy's part, and our own superiority in
the air.
4. The
fact that the armoured division itself carried enough petrol for 150-200
kilometres - supplemented, if necessary, with supply of petrol to
the armoured spearheads by air, dropped in containers by parachute.
5. Carrying
rations sufficient for three days in the tanks, for three more days
in the regimental supply column, and three more days in the divisional
supply column.
(6)
Tom Wintringham,
New Ways of War (1940)
One thing admitted by all observers of the German attacks
is that they use most of their bombers as a flying artillery. The
second thing that enters into the German formula of warfare, all observers
agree, is the use of heavy tanks, so powerfully armoured that they
are not vulnerable to light anti-tank weapons.
The third
main factor in the success of the German tactics and strategy is that
they have employed and developed the tactics known as "deep infiltration."
This means that their army does not attack strung but in a line, and
maintaining contact all the time between its advanced units and its
main forces. It does not hit like a fist, but like long probing fingers
with armoured finger-nails. Each separate claw seeks a weak spot;
if it can drive through this weak spot, it does not worry about its
flanks, or about continuous communications with the forces following
it. It relies for safety upon surprise, upon the disorganisation of
its opponents due to the fact that it has broken through to the rear
of their position.
(7)
Arthur Harris, Bomber Command (1947)
The Germans had won their victories in circumstances entirely different
from any that we could contemplate for our own forces; they had used
their air force against armies which had scarcely any air protection
or air support and were very ill-provided with anti-aircraft guns,
but this would not be the case if we encountered the German army in
the future.
Admittedly
the specialised army co-operation types of aircraft might be rather
more suitable on special occasions than the general-purpose bombers
and fighters we were proposing to build, but they could not by themselves
gain or maintain air superiority. The German dive-bombers were a case
in point. They were no doubt accurate and alarming when used against
undefended troops, but they were so easily shot down by efficient
anti-aircraft fire, or, of course, by any normal fighter.
(8)
Colonel Korotkov of the Red Army, wrote about
the German Army and its Blitzkreig tactics
in the book, Strategy and Tactics of the Soviet-German War
(1943)
The Soviet Command is countering the German tactic of wedges and pincers
by the tactic of flank blows. It is applying the method of crushing
one side of the wedge as a result of which the other side loses its
force. This is vividly demonstrated in the counter-blow delivered
by the Soviet forces on the German 39th Tank Corps. The Nazi corps
suffered a defeat and the operation of the German 3rd Tank Group,
of which this corps was a part, was deprived of its striking force.
Compared
with the fighting in France in 1940, what we see here is the reverse
process. French resistance weakened as the enemy advanced, whereas
the resistance of Soviet troops grows continuously, and their counter-blows
become more effective. The result is that the Germans suffer tremendous
losses. In the fighting in the western direction alone over 20 German
infantry, panzer and motorized divisions have been smashed or have
suffered considerable losses up to August.
As the
war develops. Soviet troops devise new and successful methods of combating
the Fascist tank wedges. A brilliant example of this is provided by
the defeat and complete annihilation of some 300 enemy tanks by one
Soviet rifle division. Having studied the enemy's tactics, the commander
of the division ordered a sham retreat on one sector of the front,
boldly allowed the German tank column to advance through his lines
and then surrounded and destroyed it by concentrated artillery fire.
(9)
Lieutenant-General Mishulin of the Red Army
fought against the German Army during
the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.
During recent attacks the German tanks have been attempting to operate
mainly in small groups: in forces ranging from a company to a battalion,
and very rarely in large numbers. This allows them greater flexibility
in their operations, permits them to manoeuvre and ensures the possibility
of passing rapidly from one form of fighting to another.
At the
same time, however, this weakens the blows of their tank troops. Only
rarely now does the German Command concentrate larger forces in a
frontal attack for a decisive thrust with a large number of mobile
forces (several tank divisions) as was the case, for instance, in
the Briansk direction.
The speed
of German tanks has also slowed down. The former tactics of deep "wedges"
are practically no longer practised. This is explained by the fact
that German tank units now forge ahead of their infantry less resolutely
than they did in the early part of the war. They prefer to operate
in closer co-operation with the infantry, supported by strong artillery
and mine-thrower fire and aircraft.
| The
German Blitzkrieg brought the rampaging German forces within 22
miles of the British coast, across most of mainland Western Europe,
into Poland and to the North African desert. Its combination of
fast-moving armoured land units and fearsome air power carried
all before it and swept aside opposition with disdain. Blitzkrieg
is avidly studied as a strategy that advanced land warfare and
as a means used by Hitler to forward his political and national
ambitions. Now this remarkable collection of vivid images, drawn
from many personal and unused national archives presents the visual
reference that endorses existing knowledge and aids further study
of the subject. (Ian Baxter, Blitzkrieg, ISBN 1 85753 371 2) |
Ian
Baxter, Blitzkrieg (Brassey's)
Available
from Amazon Books (order below)
