In
July, 1942, Franklin
D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill
decided
that the Allies should open a Second Front
to help the Red Army fighting in the Soviet
Union. Joseph Stalin favoured an invasion
of Europe but Roosevelt and Churchill opted for an invasion of northwest
Africa. Given the code-name Operation Torch, General Dwight
D. Eisenhower was appointed Allied commander of the invasion.
Over
100,000 Vichy troops were stationed in
Algeria, Morocco
and Tunisia. It was hoped that the French
troops not to resist the Allied invasion.On 7th November, Eisenhower
had a secret meeting with General Henri Giraud
in Gibraltar. Eisenhower told Giraud
about Operation Torch and persuaded him
to become commander of French forces in Algeria,
Morocco and Tunisia
after the invasion of North Africa.
The
following day Allied forces landed in Casablanca, Oran and Algiers.
The
French troops fought back at Oran and General Mark
Clark immediately began negotiations with Admiral Jean-Francois
Darlan, overall C-in-C of Vichy forces, in an attempt to negotiate
a ceasefire.
Adolf
Hitler threatened Henri-Philippe Petain
that the German Army
would invade Vichy if his troops did not resist. When Darlan surrendered
on the 11th November, Hitler carried out his threat and occupied the
rest of France. French troops in Morocco
stopped fighting but some joined the Germans in
Tunisia.
General
Dwight D. Eisenhower
now controversially appointed Jean-Francois
Darlan as the political head of the French North Africa. The decision
infuriated General Charles De Gaulle
and the French Resistance who claimed
that Darlan was a fascist and a Nazi collaborator.
However, the decision was endorsed by Winston
Churchill and Franklin
D. Roosevelt who both agreed with Eisenhower that the deal
with Darlan would assist military operations in the area.
Darlan
was assassinated by, Ferdinand Bonnier de la Chapelle, an anti-Nazi
royalist, on 24th December, 1942. Although he had been trained by
the SOE and had been a member of the resistance
group led by Emmanuel d'Astier, it is believed
he was acting as an individual rather than under the orders of any
particular group. Darlan was now replaced by the more acceptable Henri
Giraud.
Allied forces led by General
Kenneth Anderson advanced into Tunisia
and got to within 12 miles of Tunis before being attacked at Djedeida
by General Walther
Nehring and the Deutsches
Afrika Korps.
In January 1943, General
Jurgen von Arnium
took control of the German forces in Tunisia. Later that month he
was joined by General Erwin
Rommel and his army in southern Tunisia. Rommel was in
retreat from Egypt and was being chased
by General Bernard
Montgomery and the 8th Army.
Montgomery now spent several
weeks in Tripoli building up his supplies. Arnium and Rommel decided
to take this opportunity to attack Allied forces led by General Kenneth
Anderson at Faid Pass (14th February) and Kasserine Pass (19th
February). The Deutsches
Afrika Korps then headed for Thala but were forced
to retreat after meeting a large Allied force on 22nd February, 1943.
General
Harold Alexander
was now sent to oversee Allied operations in Tunisia
whereas General Erwin
Rommel was placed in command of the German forces. On 6th
March 1943, Rommel attacked the Allies at Medenine. General Bernard
Montgomery and the 8th Army fought off the attack and the
Germans were forced to withdraw. Rommel now favoured a full retreat
but this was rejected by Adolf Hitler.
On 9th March, Rommel left
Tunisia on health grounds and was replaced by General Jurgen
von Arnium as commander of the Deutsches
Afrika Korps. Arnium now concentrated in defending
a 100 mile arc across north-east Tunisia.
By April 1943 the Allies
had over 300,000 men in Tunisia.
This gave them a 6-to-1 advantage in troops and a 15-to-1 superiority
in tanks. The Allied blockade of the Mediterranean also made it difficult
for the German
Army to be supplied with adequate amounts of fuel, ammunition
and food.
The Allies now decided
to make another effort to take Tunis. General Omar
Bradley, who had replaced General George
Patton,
as commander of the 2nd Corps, joined General Bernard
Montgomery for the offensive. On 23rd April the 300,000
man force advanced along a 40 mile front. At the same time there was
a diversionary attack by the 8th Army at Enfidaville.
On 7th May 1943, British
forces took Tunis and the US Army captured
Bizerte. By 13th May all Axis forces in Tunisia surrendered and over
150,000 were taken prisoner.
(1)
Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Crusade in Europe (1948)
Fundamentally the expedition was conceived in the hope that the French
forces, officials, and population of northwest Africa would permit
our entry without fighting and would join with us in the common battle
against Germany. However, there was nothing in the political history
of the years 1940-42 to indicate that this would occur; it was a hope
rather than an expectation. Consequently we had to be prepared to
fight against forces which, in all, were estimated to number 200,000.
But our governments were clear in their instructions that we were
to strive to create an ally in North Africa; we were not to act as
if we were conquering a hostile territory unless this attitude should
be forced upon us by continued French resistance. Everything that
might induce the French forces in Africa to join us was incorporated
into our plans, including careful wording of pronouncements and proclamations
to be issued coincidentally with the beginning of the invasion.
(2)
General Dwight
D. Eisenhower,
message to General George
Marshall (1st
September, 1942)
The following are the particular factors that bear directly upon the
degree of hazard inherent in this operation:
(a) The sufficiency of
carrier-borne air support during initial stages. The operational strength
of the French Air Force in Africa is about 500 planes. Neither the
bombers nor the fighters are of the most modern type, but the fighters
are superior in performance to the naval types on carriers. Consequently,
if the French make determined and unified resistance to the initial
landing, particularly by concentrating the bulk of their air against
either of the major ports, they can seriously interfere with, if not
prevent, a landing at that point. The total carrier-borne fighter
strength (counting on 100 U.S. fighters on Ranger and auxiliary) will
apparently be about 166 planes in actual support of the landings.
Only twenty to thirty will be with the naval covering forces to the
eastward. These fighters will be under the usual handicaps of carrier-based
aircraft when operating against land-based planes.
(b) Efficiency of Gibraltar
as an erection point for fighter aircraft to be used after landing
fields have been secured. Since Gibraltar is the only port available
to Allies in that region, the rapid transfer of fighter craft to captured
airdromes will be largely dependent upon our ability to set up at
Gibraltar a reasonable number for immediate operations and a flow
thereafter of at least thirty planes per day. The vulnerability of
Gibraltar, especially to interference by Spanish forces, is obvious.
If the Spaniards should take hostile action against us immediately
upon the beginning of landing operations, it would be practically
impossible to secure any land-based fighter craft for use in northern
Africa for a period of some days.
(c) Another critical factor
affecting the air will be the state of the weather. It is planned
to transfer by flying to captured airdromes in North Africa the American
units now in Great Britain except the Spitfire groups. These last
will necessarily be shipped and set up at Gibraltar or captured airdromes.
A spell of bad weather would so weaken the anticipated air support
in the early stages of the operation as to constitute another definite
hazard to success.
(d) The character of resistance
of the French Army. In the region now are some fourteen French divisions
rather poorly equipped but presumably with a fair degree of training
and with the benefit of professional leadership. If this Army should
act as a unit in contesting the invasion, it could, in view of the
slowness with which Allied forces can be accumulated at the two main
ports, so delay and hamper operations that the real object of the
expedition could not be achieved, namely, the seizing control of the
north shore of Africa before it can be substantially reinforced by
the Axis.
(e) The attitude of the
Spanish Army. While there have been no indications to date that the
Spaniards would take sides in the war as a result of this particular
operation, this contingency must be looked on as a possibility, particularly
if Germany should make a definite move toward entering Spain. In any
event, Spain's entry would instantly entail the loss of Gibraltar
as a landing field and would prevent our use of the Strait of Gibraltar
until effective action could be taken by the Allies. In view of available
resources, it would appear doubtful that such effective action is
within our capabilities.
(f) The possibility that
the German air forces now in western Europe may rapidly enter Spain
and operate against our line of communications. This would not be
an easy operation for the Germans except with the full acquiescence
and support of Spain. Gasoline, bombs, and lubricants do not exist
at the Spanish airfields and the transfer to the country of ground
and maintenance crews and supplies would require considerable time.
Certain facts that bear upon the likelihood of such enemy action are,
first, that Germany already has excellent landing fields in Sicily,
from which their long-range aircraft can operate without going to
the trouble of establishing new bases. Secondly, the advantages to
Germany of occupying the Iberian Peninsula in force have always existed.
The fact that Germany has made no noticeable move in this direction,
even under the conditions lately existing when substantial parts of
the British naval strength have been inside the Mediterranean, is
at least some evidence that the enemy does not consider this an easy
operation.
(3)
Jean-Francois Darlan, broadcast (21st November,
1942)
Under German pressure the Marshal has just abandoned exercise of power
to the Head of Government only reserving for himself the signing of
constitutional laws. This means that the Marshal does not wish decisions
that the French Government may be impelled to make in the sole interest
of Germany to bear his signature. The Marshal declared yesterday (November
19) that he was the living embodiment of France. This is so and that
is why we have pledged ourselves to him.
We have not pledged ourselves
to the Head of Government. Our patriotic duty remains unchanged. Liberate
the homeland and the Empire and, I should add, liberate the Marshal,
the living embodiment of imperial France. In 1940 by signing the armistice
at a time when France was invaded and practically disarmed the Marshal
prevented France from disappearing as a nation and saved Africa from
destruction and occupation. Ever since and until lately France remained
alone.
If this policy had not
been followed the Germans and Italians would have been in Africa a
long time ago not as friends respectful of French sovereignty but
as oppressors. Their actions in occupied France serve to prove it.
And if this had happened it is probable that allied forces would not
be on our side today to help us recover our freedom.
Ever since June 16, 1940,
I have been a loyal collaborator of the Marshal who often confided
his feelings to me. I know his feelings of affection for the great
nation of the U.S. I know that, at the bottom of his heart, what matters
most to him is the friendship of the American people. By feeling thus
the Marshal is loyal to true French tradition.
Is it after all possible
for us to imagine that the victor of Verdun walks hand in hand with
the dictators who would deprive France of Alsace Lorraine, Flanders,
Savoy, Nice, Corsica, and part of North Africa-with the dictators
who keep 1,000,000 of our prisoners in Germany and who starve the
country? When he was free to act the Marshal always expressed his
confidence to me. He did it again on November 9 before the invasion
of the free zone.
It is, therefore, with
certainty of being a loyal interpreter of his real feeling that I
confirm to you my previous orders to fight at the side of American
and allied forces for defense and liberation of our territories and
integral restoration of French Sovereignty. I add-in agreement with
American authorities-that the African Army will never be placed in
the position of fighting against Frenchmen.
(4)
Joseph
Stalin, message to Franklin
D. Roosevelt (13th December 1942)
In view of all sorts of rumours about the attitude of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics towards the use made of Darlan or other
men like him, it may not be unnecessary for me to tell you that, in
my opinion, as well as that of my colleagues, Eisenhower's policy
with regard to Darlan, Boisson, Giraud and others is perfectly correct.
I think it is a great achievement that you succeeded in bringing Darlan
and others into the orbit of the Allies fighting Hitler.
(5)
Harold
Alexander,
Memoirs: 1940-1945 (1961)
The objectives of the British
First Army were the ports of Tunis and Bizerta, some 1,850 miles from
Alamein. The landings took place on 8 November; by the end of the
month the first dash to capture the ports had expired. Thereafter,
for more than four months, the only big movement was the American
retreat through the Kasserine Pass in the following February. Throughout
these months the Eighth Army was fighting a succession of hard battles
through Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. Tripoli itself was captured on
23 January 1943; but the Anglo-American forces were not to enter Tunis
and Bizerta until 7th May - and then only with the assistance of two
divisions and a Guards brigade from Eighth Army.
(6)
Bernard
Montgomery,
The Memoirs of
Field Marshal Montgomery
(1958)
The initial attempt of
the First Army to break through to Tunis was not successful. It took
place on the 23rd April. 5th Corps
attacked on a front of three divisions, each on a front of six miles,
and each division with all three infantry brigades up; it was more
of a partridge drive than an attack and had no hope of success. 9th
Corps with two armoured divisions tried to break through somewhere
else. I was in bed at the time with an attack of tonsillitis and influenza,
and so I asked Alexander if he would come and see me at my headquarters
near Sousse. He arrived on the 30th April. I said it was essential
to regroup the two armies, First and Eighth, so that the attack on
Tunis could be made with the maximum strength in the most suitable
area.
I suggested that I should
send First Army the 7th Armoured Division, 4th Indian Division, 201st
Guards Brigade, and some extra artillery, together with a very experienced
corps commander to handle the attack; I meant Horrocks.
I finally said we really
must finish off the war in Africa quickly. We were due to invade Sicily
in July and there was much to do before we could tackle that difficult
combined operation. Alexander thoroughly agreed.
Horrocks went over to the
First Army and staged the corps attack on Tunis on the 6th May; it
was made in great strength at the selected point and broke clean through
the enemy defences to the west of Tunis. Bizerta and Tunis were captured
on the 6th May and the enemy was then hemmed in to the Cap Bon peninsula.
The first troops to enter
Tunis were those of our own 7th Armoured Division. They had earned
this satisfaction. Organized enemy resistance ended on the 12th May,
some 248,000 being taken prisoner.
And so the war in Africa
came to a close. It ended in a major disaster for the Germans; all
their troops, stores, dumps, heavy weapons, and equipment were captured.
From a purely military point of view the holding out in North-Africa
once the Mareth Line had been broken through, could never be justified.
I suppose Hitler ordered it for political reasons. It is dangerous
to undertake tasks which are militarily quite unsound, just for political
reasons; it may sometimes be necessary, but they will generally end
in disaster.
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