In 1939,
a group of senior German Army officers,
including Erich von Manstein
and Franz
Halder, devised a plan to inflict a major defeat on the French
Army in northern France. The Manstein
Plan,
as it became known, included a attack through southern Belgium that
avoided the Maginot
Line. The
ultimate objective was to reach the Channel coast and to force the
French government to surrender.
Adolf
Hitler gave his approval to the Manstein
Plan on
17th February, 1940, but it was not activated until the 10th May,
when the Luftwaffe bombed Dutch and
Belgian airfields and the German Army captured Moerdijk and Rotterdam.
Fedor von Bock and
the 9th Panzer Division, using its Blitzkreig
strategy,
advanced quickly into the Netherlands. Belgium was also invaded and
the French 7th Army moved forward to help support the Dutch and Belgian
forces.
The 7th
Panzer Division under Erwin Rommel and
the 19th Corps commanded by Heinz Guderian
and the 6th and 8th Panzers led by Gerd
von Rundstedt, went through the heavily wooded and semi-mountainous
area of the Ardennes, an area, north of the Maginot
Line.
The French military had wrongly believed that the Ardennes was impassable
to tanks. Seven panzer divisions
reached
the Meuse River at Dinant on 12th May and the following day the French
government was forced to abandon Paris.
The defence
of Netherlands collapsed under threat
of massive area bombing on 14th May. Queen
Wilhelmina, along with members of her family and the government,
escaped to London.
German
forces led by Paul von Kliest, Erwin
Rommel, Heinz Guderian and Gerd
von Rundstedt advanced towards the Channel. Except for a counterattack
by 4th Armoured Division led by Charles
De Gaulle, at
Montcornet (17th May) and Laon (27th-29th May) the German forces encountered
very little resistance.
In Belgium
the German Army captured Leige and Maastricht
and the home army was forced back from the Dyle River to the River
Lys. On 28th May, the Belgian government surrendered unconditionally.
Leopold III was arrested and interned
outside Brussels but most members of his government managed to escape
to England.
Winston
Churchill now ordered the implementation of Operation
Dynamo, a plan to evacuate of troops and equipment from the
French port of Dunkirk, that had been
drawn up by General John Gort, the Commander
in Chief of the British Expeditionary Force
(BEF). Between 27th May and 4th June, 1940, a total of 693 ships brought
back 338,226 people back to Britain. Of these 140,000 were members
of the French Army.
All heavy equipment was abandoned and left in France.
General Maxime
Weygand, the Supreme Allied Commander, tried to hold the line
along the Somme and the Aisne. Now clearly outnumbered, the French
Army was forced to withdraw to the Loire. The Germans occupied
Paris on 14th June and two days later, Paul
Reynaud, the French prime minister, was replaced by Henri-Philippe
Petain, who quickly accepted German peace terms.
Under the terms of the
armistice northern France and the regions north of Vichy came under
German occupation. The French government, led by Henri-Philippe
Petain, moved to Vichy and remained
at liberty along with the French Navy
and an army of 100,000 men.
During the defence of France
nearly 2 million French soldiers were taken prisoner. An estimated
390,000 soldiers were killed defending France whereas around 35,000
German soldiers had lost their lives during the invasion.
(1)
Kurt Student was interviewed
by Basil
Liddell Hart, about the Western Offensive
for his book The Other Side of the Hill (1948)
On January 10th a major detailed by me as liaison officer
to the and Air Fleet flew from Munster to Bonn to discuss some unimportant
details of the plan with the Air Force. He carried with him, however,
the complete operational plan for the attack in the West. In icy weather
and a strong wind he lost his way over the frozen and snow-covered
Rhine, and flew into Belgium, where he had to make a forced landing.
He was unable to burn completely the vital document. Important parts
of it fell into the hands of the Belgians, and consequently the outline
of the whole German plan for the Western offensive. The German Air
Attaché in the Hague reported that on the same evening the
King of the Belgians had a long telephone conversation with the Queen
of Holland.
It was interesting to watch
the reactions of this incident on Germany's leading men. While Goering
was in a rage. Hitler remained quite calm and self-possessed. At first
he wanted to strike immediately, but fortunately refrained and decided
to drop the original operational plan entire. This was replaced by
the Manstein plan.
(2)
Heinz
Guderian was interviewed
by Basil
Liddell Hart about Erich von Manstein
after the war for his book The Other Side of the Hill (1948)
Manstein asked me if tank movements would be possible through the
Ardennes in the direction of Sedan. He explained his plan of breaking
through the extension of the Maginot Line near Sedan, in order to
avoid the old-fashioned Schliefien plan, familiar to the enemy and
likely to be expected once more. I knew the terrain from World War
I, and, after studying the map, confirmed his view. Manstein then
convinced General von Rundstedt and a memorandum was sent to O.K.H.
(on December 4th). O.K.H. refused to accept Manstein's idea. But the
latter succeeded in bringing his idea to Hitler's knowledge.
On February 7th, a war-game
took place at Coblenz under the direction of General Halder, in order
to discuss the Manstein plan. My proposal to attack as soon as possible
over the Meuse with the panzer corps alone, and without waiting for
the infantry, was heavily criticized by Halder. He judged an organized
attack over the Meuse impossible before the 9th or loth day of the
campaign.
A second war-game at General
List's headquarters (12th Army) had the same negative results. General
List examined the question of stopping the panzers after the arrival
on the Meuse and waiting for the infantry to cross the river. General
von Wietersheim (XIV Corps) and I protested against this solution.
But in the end General von Rundstedt laid down that the panzer divisions
should only gain bridge-heads over the Meuse and that no further aims
should be aspired to. That was on March 6th. It became clear that
General von Rundstedt had no clear conception of the capability of
panzer forces. Manstein was needed there!
(3)
William Stephenson went with Winston
Churchill to France in May to meet Paul
Reynaud. He wrote about the meeting in his book, A Man Called
Intrepid (1976)
Churchill stumped up and down Reynaud's bedroom. There was "the
great probability that Hitler will rule the world," he said.
We must think together of how to strike and strike again, no matter
what the cost nor how long the trials ahead." He faced the French
Premier and then sat down heavily. His changing moods raced like clouds
across his baby face. He was in turn sulky, tearful, and violent.
None of it did any good. Reynaud in reply chanted the pace of Hitler's
victories: Poland in twenty-six days, Norway in twenty-eight days,
Denmark in twenty-four hours, Holland in five days, and Luxembourg
in twelve hours. He turned sad luminous eyes on Churchill. "Belgium
is finished. Now France."
(4)
German sergeant described the Ju 87 Stukas
in action during the Western Offensive in May 1940.
Three, six, nine, oh, behind them still more, and further to the right,
aircraft and still more aircraft, a quick look in the binoculars -
Stukas! And what we are about to see during the next twenty minutes
is one of the most powerful impressions of this war. Squadron upon
squadron rise to a great height, break into line ahead and there,
there the first machines hurtle perpendicularly down, followed by
the second, third - ten, twelve aeroplanes are there. Simultaneously,
like some bird of prey, they fall upon their victim and release their
load of bombs on the target.
Each time the explosion
is overwhelming, the noise deafening. Everything becomes blended together;
along with the howling sirens of the Stukas in their dives, the bombs
whistle and crack and burst. A huge blow of annihilation strikes the
enemy, and still more squadrons arrive, rise to a great height, and
then come down on the same target. We stand and watch what is happening
as if hypnotized.
(5)
Erwin Rommel, led the 7th Panzer Division
that broke through French defences in May, 1940.
The way to the west was now open. The moon was up and for the time
being we could expect no real darkness. I had already given orders,
in the plan for the breakthrough, for the leading tanks to scatter
the road and verges with machine and anti-tank gunfire at intervals
during the drive to Avesnes, which I hoped would prevent the enemy
from laying mines.
The tanks now rolled in
a long column through the line of fortifications and on towards the
first houses, which had been set alight by our fire. Occasionally
an enemy machine-gun or antitank gun fired, but none of their shots
came anywhere near us.
Troops lay bivouacked beside
the road, military vehicles stood parked in farmyards and in some
places on the road itself. Civilians and French troops, their faces
distorted with terror, lay huddled in the ditches, alongside hedges
and in every hollow beside the road. We passed refugee columns, the
carts abandoned by their owners, who had fled in panic into the fields.
On we went, at a steady
speed, toward our objective. Every so often a quick glance at the
map by a shaded light and a short wireless message to Divisional HQ
to report the position and thus the success of 25th Panzer Regiment.
Every so often a look out of the hatch to assure myself that there
was still no resistance and the contact was being maintained to the
rear. The flat countryside lay spread out around us under the cold
light of the moon.
We were through the Maginot
Line! It was hardly conceivable. Twenty-two years before we had stood
for four and a half years before this selfsame enemy and had won victory
after victory and yet finally lost the war. And now we had broken
through the renowned Maginot Line and were driving deep into enemy
territory.
(6)
After the war General Paul
von Kliest wrote about the French defences during the Western
Offensive.
Along the Meuse there was a moderate amount of fortification, in the
way of pillboxes, but these were not properly armed. If the French
troops here had been adequately equipped with anti-tank guns we should
certainly have noticed it, as the majority of our tanks were of the
early Mark I type, and thus very vulnerable! The French divisions
in the sector were poorly armed, and of low quality. Their troops,
as we repeatedly found, gave up the fight very soon after being subjected
to air bombing or gunfire.
(7)
Basil
Embry was a member of
Royal Air Force who attempted to give support
the the British Expeditionary Force during
Germany's Western Offensive in May 1940.
In the late afternoon of the i4th May I was called upon to lead two
squadrons of Blenheims in an attack against the German bridgehead
at Sedan. The French had asked the R.A.F. for a supreme effort at
Sedan where their army was massing for a counter-attack against the
Germans in an attempt to restore the catastrophic situation in that
area. In the afternoon the remaining Battle and Blenheim squadrons
based in France had been thrown into the attack with disastrous results:
forty out of a total of seventy-one aircraft taking part were destroyed,
mostly by enemy fighters.
(8)
Hugh Downing, letter to the Air Ministry
(16th May 1940)
I would remind the Air
Council that the last estimate which they made as to the force necessary
to defend this country was fifty-two squadrons, and my strength has
now been reduced to the equivalent of thirty-six squadrons.
I must therefore request
that as a matter of paramount urgency the Air Ministry will consider
and decide what level of strength is to be left to the Fighter Command
for the defence of this country, and will assure me that when the
level has been reached, not one fighter will be sent across the Channel
however urgent and insistent the appeals for help may be.
I believe that if an adequate
fighter force is kept in this country, if the Fleet remains in being,
and if Home Forces are suitably organized to resist invasion, we should
be able to carry on the war single-handed for some time, if not indefinitely.
But, if the Home Defence Force is drained away in desperate attempts
to remedy the situation in France, defeat in France will involve the
final, complete and irremediable defeat of this country.
(9)
In his book, Their Finest Hour, Winston
Churchill, reported on how he
heard from Paul Reynaud how France had
been defeated during the Western Offensive.
About half-past seven in the morning of the 15th (May 1940)
I was woken up with the news that Paul Reynaud was on the telephone
at my bedside. He spoke in English, and evidently under stress. "We
have been defeated." As I did not immediately respond he said
again: "We are beaten; we have lost the battle." I said:
"Surely it can't have happened so soon?" But he replied:
"The front is broken near Sedan."
(10)
General Harold
Alexander
served under
General John Gort who gave him the task
of planning the rear guard action that enabled the British
Expeditionary Force to be evacuated from Dunkirk.
At Charleville, on 24
May, when the B.E.F. was absolutely ripe for the plucking, Hitler
informed his astonished generals that Britain was 'indispensable'
to the world and that he had therefore resolved to respect her integrity
and, if possible, ally himself with her. Perhaps a less fanciful explanation
of Hitler's attitude is supplied by Ribbentrop's representative at
the Fuhrer's headquarters, who has left on record the comment: "Hitler
personally intervened to allow the British to escape. He was convinced
that to destroy their army would be to force them to fight to the
bitter end."
On the military side the
facts are clearer. On 23 May Field-Marshal von Rundstedt, commanding
Army Group A, halted
General Guderian's XIX Army Corps when two of its panzer divisions
were heading for Dunkirk, not twenty miles distant and with little
or no opposition ahead. The British counter-attack at Arras on 21
May, though undertaken by no more than two mixed columns, each comprising
a tank battalion, an infantry battalion, a field battery, an anti-tank
battery, and a machine-gun company, had caused him some concern. He
therefore called the halt in order to "allow the situation to
clarify itself and keep our forces concentrated". The panzers
had just reached the Channel, and the success of this British counterattack
engendered the fear of a larger operation that would cut them off
from their supporting infantry. The next morning he received a visit
from the Fuhrer, who confirmed the stop order. The panzers were not
to be risked in a possibly flooded area but preserved for future operations-presumably
against the French Army. On the other hand, the Luftwaffe's 'field
of action' was not to be restricted.
Actually, on the available
evidence, there can be little doubt that it was at the particular
instance of the Luftwaffe's commander-in-chief, Field-Marshal Goering,
that in the upshot the B.E.F. Was "left to the Luftwaffe".
Guderian was to write, bitterly, of the first day of the evacuation,
26 May: "We watched the Luftwaffe attack. We saw also the armada
of great and little ships, by means of which the British were evacuating
their forces." Guderian's bitterness was shared by the whole
of the German Army High Command.
(11)
Sonia Tomara, New
York Tribune (14th
June, 1940)
For four days and four nights I have shared the appalling hardship
of 5,000,000 French refugees who are now fleeing down all the roads
of France leading to the south. My story is the typical story of nine-tenths
of these refugees.
I left Paris Monday night,
June 10, in a big car which was to take me, my sister, Irene Tomara,
and a Canadian doctor, William Douglas, who has been working with
the American and civilian refugees. We loaded our car with whatever
we could carry. We had enough gasoline to take us at least to Bordeaux.
It was quite dark when we left. All days cars had been going toward
the southern gates of Paris. Just as we departed dark clouds rose
above the town, obscuring the rising crescent of the moon. I thought
at first it was a storm. Then I understood it was a smoke screen the
French had laid down to save the city from bombing.
We drove across the Seine
bridge and in complete darkness past the Montparnasse station, in
which a desperate crowd was camping. We found the so-called Italian
Gate and drove past it, risking all the time the chance of being hit
by trucks. But all went well for about fifteen miles. Then, as we
started up the first hill, the gears of our car refused to work and
the car would not move.
We managed to pull off
the road and park. We were in a small suburb of Paris. As nothing
could be done during the dark hours, we rolled into our sleeping bags
in a ditch alongside the road and tried to sleep. But cars roared
by us incessantly. Then came an air-raid alarm. Then the cars started
again.
When dawn came we tried
to get the car going. It would not start. We waited for hours for
a mechanic, while cars passed at the rate of twenty a minute. Then
we learned there were no mechanics. They had all been called into
the army. But the driver of a truck stopped and inspected the car.
He said it could not be repaired on the road.
We tried to buy a little
truck that could take our luggage. Finally the gendarmes on the road
took pity on us and stopped a military truck, asking its driver to
tow us. Fortunately we had a chain. We started off at noon on the
road to Fontainebleau. At that time the road was a dense stream of
army and factory trucks carrying big machines. We drove all day, and
at 8 p.m. got into Fontainebleau.
In Fontainebleau we located
a garage. The mechanic looked at the car and said it could not be
repaired in less than two days. "We have no men to repair it,
anyway," the manager of the garage said. "We work only for
the army." We passed the night at a hotel and in the morning
started to look for a truck that could tow us. Douglas found a youngster
who had a country truck, but no gasoline. He was going back to Paris.
We promised him gasoline and he said he would take us to Orleans and
then drive to Paris.
We were abandoning our
car, which was worth at least 40,000 francs (approximately $875),
but money had ceased to have significance. We reloaded our bags on
the truck, which had no top, and sat on them. It was 5 p.m. We drove
five miles without difficulty and then got into a stream of refugees
and army cars. Refugees blocked the road by trying to get past the
main line of cars, thus interfering with oncoming traffic.
At 10 p.m. we had driven
less than fifteen miles from Fontainebleau. The boy driving our car
was in despair. He wanted to turn back to Paris, but we would not
let him. We saw thousands of cars by the roadsides, without gasoline
or broken down.
We drove on in the night.
Presently the road cleared, but we were off our route. Soldiers had
detoured traffic to permit movement of military cars. We were driving
south instead of toward Orleans. In a small village we turned off
and started at a good speed through the dead of night, with lights
turned off. It was fantastic. The clouds parted and the moon came
up. The country seemed phantom-like. There were piles of stones in
front of each village we passed, and peasants with rifles guarded
these barricades. They looked at our papers and let us pass.
We arrived before the Orleans
station at 3 a.m. on Thursday. After three nights and two days we
had made only seventy miles. The scene near the station was appalling.
People lay on the floor inside and the town square was filled. We
piled our baggage and waited until daylight.
There was nothing to eat
in the town, no rooms in the hotels, no cars for sale or hire, no
gasoline anywhere. Yet a steady stream of refugees was coming in,
men, women and children, all desperate, not knowing where to go or
how.
I walked around and found
a truck that was fairly empty. I talked to the driver, offering him
money to take me to Tours. He would take us near Tours. For food,
we had only a little wine, some stale bread and a can of ham.
The scene of the refugees
around the station was the most horrible I had ever seen, worse than
the refugees in Poland. Fortunately, there was no bombing. Had there
been any attacks it would have been too ghastly for words. Children
were crying. There was no milk, no bread. Yet social workers were
doing their best and groups were led away all the time, but new ones
continued to arrive.
All morning we sought means
of transportation. There was none. I decided to go to Tours. I started
to walk in the rain with my typewriter and sleeping bag, at last getting
a lift in a car which moved slowly through a mob of refugees moving
in the opposite direction. In Tours, I learned that the government
had left. Also gone were most newspapermen, but a press wireless operator
and the French censor were still there.
As I finish this story
there is a German air raid. The sound of bombs is terrific. I hope
the German bombers have not hit at the road which leads to the south,
for there refugees are packed in fleeing crowds.
The catastrophe that has
befallen France has no parallel in human history. Nobody knows how
or when it will end. Like the other refugees, and there are millions
of us, I do not know tonight when I shall sleep in a bed again, or
how I shall get out of this town.
(12)
Lieutenant-General Khozin, of the Red Army,
wrote about the German Army in
the book, Strategy and Tactics of the Soviet-German War (1943)
The claim that the German Army is "invincible" is a myth
invented by the Nazi rulers. The easy victories of 1939 and 1940,
on which the German militarists now preen themselves, were won not
so much by their own forces as by base treachery in the countries
against which they fought.
It is common knowledge
that some members of the former French government were connected with
German agents and deliberately led their army and people to defeat.
In the main drive against
the Allies in Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg on May 10, 1940, the
Germans used 107 infantry and 10 tank divisions, while the Allies
used 63 infantry divisions, 4 light mechanized and 6 cavalry divisions.
These Allies belonged to four different armies - the French, British,
Belgian and Dutch - which actually were not under one command. Moreover,
some of these armies were disunited by deep-rooted political friction
and conflicting opinions on operations and strategy.
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