In February,
1945, Joseph Stalin, Winston
Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt
met again. This time the conference was held in Yalta in the Crimea.
With Soviet troops in most of Eastern Europe, Stalin was in a strong
negotiating position. Roosevelt and Churchill tried hard to restrict
post-war influence in this area but the only concession they could
obtain was a promise that free elections would be held in these countries.
Once again,
Poland was the main debating point. Stalin explained that throughout
history Poland had either attacked Russia
or had been used as a corridor through which other hostile countries
invaded her. Only a strong, pro-Communist government in Poland would
be able to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union.
At Yalta,
the decision at Teheran to form a United
Nations organization was confirmed. It was only on this issue
that all three leaders were enthusiastically in agreement.
At the
time of Yalta, Germany was close to defeat. British and USA troops
were advancing from the west and the Red Army
from the east. At the conference it was agreed to divide Germany up
amongst the Allies. However, all parties to that agreement were aware
that the country that actually took control of Germany would be in
the strongest position over the future of this territory.
The main
objective of Winston Churchill and
Stalin was the capture of Berlin, the capital of Germany. Franklin
D. Roosevelt did not agree and the decision of the USA Military
commander, General Dwight Eisenhower,
to head south-east to Dresden, ensured that Soviet forces would be
the first to reach Berlin.
Winston
Churchill, Franklin
D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin at
Yalta
(1)
William Leahy, chief of
staff to the commander in chief of the United States, wrote about
Yalta in his autobiography, I Was There (1950)
Stalin
then brought up the question of reparations in kind and in manpower,
but said he was not ready to discuss the manpower question. The latter,
of course, referred to forced labour. Since the Russians were using
many thousands of prisoners in what was reported to be virtual slave
camps, they had little to gain by discussing the matter. Stalin then
had Deputy Foreign Commissar Maisky elaborate on the Russian view
of the reparations question.
The proposal
in brief was: Reparations in kind should include factories, plants,
communication equipment, investments abroad, etc., and should be made
over a period of ten years, at the end of which time all reparations
would have been paid. The total value of the reparations in kind asked
by the Soviet was 10 billion dollars, to be spread over the ten-year
period.
The German
heavy industries should be cut down and 80 per cent. removed in a
period of two years after the surrender.
Allied
control should be established over German industry, and all German
industry that could be used in the production of war material should
be under international control for a long period.
Churchill
objected to the 10 billion-dollar figure, and he and Roosevelt agreed
that a reparations committee should be appointed to study the issue.
Roosevelt made it clear that the United States would not make the
financial mistakes that followed World War I. He added that America
would not want any manpower, any factories, or any machinery. It might
want to seize German property in the United States,
which at that time was estimated not to exceed 200 million dollars.
Reparations presented a very complicated problem, and the appointment
of a special commission seemed to be the only possible way to arrive
at any kind of recommendation that could be accepted.
(2)
James F. Byrnes, as Secretary
of State, attended the Yalta Conference on 4th February, 1945.
In the
fall of 1944 the Soviet Union and the Provisional Government of France
had entered into a treaty of friendship. It was immediately obvious
at Yalta, however, that the treaty and the friendly words exchanged
over it by the diplomats had not changed in any degree Marshal Stalin's
opinion on the contribution of France to the war. He thought France
should play little part in the control of Germany, and stated that
Yugoslavia and Poland were more entitled to consideration than France.
When Roosevelt
and Churchill proposed that France be allotted a zone of occupation,
Stalin agreed. But it was clear he agreed only because the French
zone was to be taken out of the territory allotted to the United States
and the United Kingdom. And he especially opposed giving France a
representative on the Allied Control Council for Germany. He undoubtedly
concurred in the opinion expressed to the President by Mr. Molotov
that this should be done "only as a kindness to France and not
because she is entitled to it."
"I
am in favor of France being given a zone," Stalin declared, "but
I cannot forget that in this war France opened the gates to the enemy."
He maintained it would create difficulties to give France a zone of
occupation and a representative on the Allied Control Council and
refuse the same treatment to others who had fought more than France.
He said France would soon demand that de Gaulle attend the Big
Three's Conferences.
Churchill
argued strongly in favor of France's being represented on the Council.
He said the British public would not understand if questions affecting
France and the French zone were settled without her participation
in the discussion. It did not follow, as Stalin had suggested, that
France would' demand de Gaulle's participation in the conferences
of the Big Three, he added. And, in his best humor, Mr. Churchill
said the conference was "a very exclusive club, the entrance
fee being at least five million soldiers or the equivalent."
(3)
Conversation between Winston Churchill
and Joseph Stalin at Yalta.
Winston
Churchill: "The peace of the world depends upon the lasting friendship
of the three great powers, but His Majesty's Government feel we should
be putting ourselves in a false position if we put ourselves in the
position of trying to rule the world when our desire is to serve the
world and preserve it from a renewal of the frightful horrors which
have fallen upon the mass of its inhabitants. We should make a broad
submission to the opinion of the world within the limits stated. We
should have the right to state our case against any case stated by
the Chinese, for instance, in the case of Hongkong. There is no question
that we could not be required to give back Hong Kong to the Chinese
if we did not feel that was the right thing to do. On the other hand,
I feel it would be wrong if China did not have an opportunity to state
its case fully. In the same way, if Egypt raises a question against
the British affecting the Suez Canal, as has been suggested, I would
submit to all the procedure outlined in this statement. colleagues
on the Security Council."
Joseph
Stalin: "I would like to have this document to study because
it is difficult on hearing it read to come to any conclusion. I think
that the Dumbarton Oaks decisions have, as an objective, not only
to secure to every nation the right to express its opinion, but if
any nation should raise a question about some important matter, it
raises the question in order to get a decision in the matter. I am
sure none of those present would dispute the right of every member
of the Assembly to express his opinion. "Mr. Churchill thinks
that China, if it raised the question of Hong Kong, would be content
only with expressing opinion here. He may be mistaken. China will
demand a decision in the matter and so would Egypt. Egypt will not
have much pleasure in expressing an opinion that the Suez Canal should
be returned to Egypt, but would demand a decision on the matter. Therefore,
the matter is much more serious than merely expressing an opinion.
Also, I would like to ask Mr. Churchill to name the power which may
intend to dominate the world. I am sure Great Britain does not want
to dominate the world. So one is removed from suspicion. I am sure
the United States does not wish to do so, so another is excluded from
the powers having intentions to dominate the world."
Winston
Churchill: "May I answer?"
Joseph
Stalin: "In a minute. When will the great powers accept the provisions
that would absolve them from the charge that they intend to dominate
the world ? I will study the document. At this
time it is not very clear to me. I think it is a more serious question
than the right of a power to express its intentions or the desire
of some power to dominate the world."
Winston
Churchill: "I know that under the leaders of the three powers
as represented here we may feel safe. But these leaders may not live
forever. In ten years' time we may disappear. A new generation will
come which did not experience the horrors of war and may probably
forget what we have gone through. We would like to secure the peace
for at least fifty years. We have now to build up such a status, such
a plan, that we can put as many obstacles as possible to the coming
generation quarreling among themselves."
(4)
Anthony Eden wrote about Yalta
in his autobiography, Memoirs: The Reckoning (1965)
Roosevelt
was, above all else, a consummate politician. Few men could see more
clearly their immediate objective, or show greater artistry in obtaining
it. As a price of these gifts, his long-range vision was not quite
so sure. The President shared a widespread American suspicion of the
British Empire as it had once been and, despite his knowledge of world
affairs, he was always anxious to make it plain to Stalin that the
United States was not 'ganging up' with Britain against Russia. The
outcome of this was some confusion in Anglo-American relations which
profited the Soviets.
Roosevelt
did not confine his dislike of colonialism to the British Empire alone,
for it was a principle with him, not the less cherished for its possible
advantages. He hoped that former colonial territories, once free of
their masters, would become politically and economically dependent
upon the United States, and had no fear that other powers might fill
that role.
Winston
Churchill's strength lay in his vigorous sense of purpose and his
courage, which carried him undismayed over obstacles daunting to lesser
men. He was also generous and impulsive, but this could be a handicap
at the conference table. Churchill liked to talk, he did not like
to listen, and he found it difficult to wait for, and seldom let pass,
his turn to speak. The spoils in the diplomatic game do not necessarily
go to the man most eager to debate.
Marshal
Stalin as a negotiator was the toughest proposition of all. Indeed,
after something like thirty years' experience of international conferences
of one kind and another, if I had to pick a team for going into a
conference room, Stalin would be my first choice. Of course the man
was ruthless and of course he knew his purpose. He never wasted a
word. He never stormed, he was seldom even irritated. Hooded, calm,
never raising his voice, he avoided the repeated negatives of Molotov
which were so exasperating to listen to. By more subtle methods he
got what he wanted without having seemed so obdurate.
There
was a confidence, even an intimacy, between Stalin and Molotov such
as I have never seen between any other two Soviet leaders, as if Stalin
knew that he had a valuable henchman and Molotov was confident because
he was so regarded. Stalin might tease Molotov occasionally, but he
was careful to uphold his authority. Only once did I hear Stalin speak
disparagingly of his judgment and that was not before witnesses.
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