Leonid Brezhnev, the son
of a steelworker, was born in Kamenskoye, in the Soviet
Union in 1906. He joined the Komsomol (Communist Youth Organization)
in 1923 and trained as an agricultural surveyor.
In 1931 Brezhnev joined
the Communist Party (CPSU). In 1938 he was
appointed party political chief at Dnepropetrovsk where he worked
under Nikita Khrushchev. During the
Second World War Brezhnev served as political
commissar to the Southern Army.
After the war Brezhnev
became party boss in Moldavia. He successfully brought the new republic
under the control of the Communist Party.
This impressed Joseph Stalin and in 1952
he was invited to join the Politburo.
The following year Stalin died and without his support Nikita
Khrushchev was able to send Brezhnev to Kazakhstan.
In 1964 Khrushchev was
ousted and Brezhnev was able to return to the Politburo.
By the early 1970s Brezhnev had emerged as the most important political
figure in the Soviet Union. As well as being First Party Secretary
of the Communist Party he was also President
of the Supreme Soviet.
During his period in power
the Soviet Union economy stagnated and
the much needed reforms had to wait until after Leonid Brezhnev's
death in 1982.
Leonid Brezhnev died in
1982.
(1)
Mikhail
Gorbachev, Memoirs (1995)
Brezhnev had come to power
in October 1964, as a result of a compromise between the groups which
ousted Khrushchev. He was then regarded as a rather insignificant
figure who could be easily manipulated. This was a miscalculation.
By the use of simple tactics he succeeded in strengthening his position
until he became practically invulnerable.
His forte consisted in
his ability to split rivals, fanning mutual suspicion and subsequently
acting as chief arbiter and peacemaker. In time I discerned another
of Brezhnev's characteristics: vindictiveness. He never forgot the
slightest disloyalty towards himself, but he was shrewd enough to
wait for an appropriate moment to replace the offender. He never resorted
to direct confrontation, proceeding cautiously, step by step, until
he gained the upper hand.
In a political sense, Brezhnevism
was nothing but a conservative reaction against Khrushchev's attempt
at reforming the authoritarian model of his time.
(2)
Alexander
Dubcek,
Hope
Dies Last (1992)
Like everyone else, I
often reflect on the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union. How
could this giant power crumble so quickly and so completely? There
are many learned theories about it, but I think that underlying all
of them is one elementary explanation: the system inhibited change.
It fed on dead doctrine and prevented a natural replacement of leaders.
When they finally tried to do something about it, it was too late
for remedies.
In 1968 we ran into this
dinosaur of a system still in working condition. The Politburo held
together the external empire that Stalin had grabbed and saw to it
that opposition arose nowhere. I had seen it in Dresden in March,
and then in Moscow in May. What we were trying to do was beyond their
comprehension.
The challenge was to maneuver
around them long enough to make them accept us on civilized terms.
I thought, optimistically, that we could prevail because their bullying
would not exceed certain limits. The 1956 crushing of Hungary was
way behind us: this was a different era. I think most of the world
agreed with me.
Beyond the Soviets' empty
phrases about "counterrevolution," the core of the dispute
was not our social system but our political reforms. We believed that
socialism - in our country at least - could not exist without democracy.
But the Soviets wanted us to reinstitute their model of one-party
dictatorship. Still, I did not believe that they would launch a war
against us just because of this disagreement. After all, we were bound
by a valid alliance treaty, and Czechoslovakia was avoiding anything
that might throw doubt on her loyalty. Moreover, the Soviets had for
years preached the principle of peaceful coexistence and noninterference
in the internal affairs of other countries. Was it rational to expect
that they would contradict all this by attacking us militarily? I
did not think so, and I do not think I was a dreamer. I did not expect
that they would commit an act that was bound to carry catastrophic
consequences for their own cause (which it did as no one today would
deny). And I simply did not expect the perfidy they were soon to display.
(3)
Discussion
that took place in Moscow between Alexander
Dubcek
and Leonid
Brezhnev in August 1992.
Leonid
Brezhnev: Lets agree
not to bury ourselves in the past, but to discuss calmly, proceeding
from the situation that has developed, in order to find a solution
that will work to the benefit of the Czechoslovak Communist Party
so that it can act, normally and independently along the lines laid
down by the Bratislava Declaration Let it be independent. We don't
want and we're not thinking of further intervention. And let the leadership
work according to the principles of the January and May plenary sessions
of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. We have
said this in our reports and we're prepared to affirm it again. Of
course, we can't say that you re in a good mood. But your moods aren't
the point. We must sensibly and soberly direct our talks toward the
search for a solution. It can be stated flatly that the failure to
carry out fixed obligations impelled five countries to extreme and
inevitable measures. The sequence of events that has materialized
confirms entirely that behind your back (by no means do we wish to
say that you were at the head of it) right-wing powers (we will simply
call them antisocialist) prepared both the congress and its actions.
Underground stations and arms caches have now come to light. All of
this has now come out. We don't want to raise claims against you personally,
that you're guilty. You might not even have been aware of it; the
right-wing powers are broad enough to have organized it all 'We would
like to find the most acceptable solutions that will serve to stabilize
the country, normalizing a workers' party without links to the right
and normalizing a workers' government free from those links.
We don't need to conceal
from each other that if we find the best solution we will still need
time for normalization. No one should have the illusion that everything
will all of a sudden become rosy. But if we do find the correct solution,
then time will pass and every day will bring us successes, material
talks and contacts will begin, the odor will dissipate, and propaganda
and ideology will start to work normally. The working class will understand
that, behind the backs of the Central Committee and the government
leadership, right-wingers were preparing to transform Czechoslovakia
from a socialist into a bourgeois republic. All that is clear now.
Talks on economic and other matters will begin. The departure of troops,
et cetera, will begin according to material principles. We have not
occupied Czechoslovakia, we do not intend to keep it under "occupation,"
but we hope for her to be free and to undertake the socialist cooperation
that was agreed upon in Bratislava. It is on that basis that we want
to talk with you and find a workable solution. If need be, with Comrade
Cernik as well. If we stay silent we will not improve the situation
and will not spare the Czech, Slovak, and Russian peoples from tension.
And with every passing day the right-wingers will fire up chauvinistic
emotions against every socialist country, and first of all against
the Soviet Union. Under such circumstances it would be impossible
to pull out the troops; it's not to our advantage. It is on these
grounds, on this basis, that we would like to conduct the talks, to
see what you think, what's the best way to act. We're ready to listen.
We have no diktat; let's look for another option together.
And we would be very grateful
to you if you freely expressed different options, not just to be contrary,
but to calmly find the proper option. We consider you an honorable
communist and socialist. In Cierna you were unlucky, and there was
a breakdown. Let's cast everything that happened aside. If we start
asking which one of us was right, it will lead nowhere. But let's
talk on the basis of what is, and under these conditions we must find
a way out of the situation, what you're thinking and what we must
do.
Alexander
Dubcek: It's hard for
me, given the trip and my bitter mood, to explain immediately my opinion
about why we must reach a solution about the real situation that has
arisen. Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, and Voronov, I don't know
what the situation is at home. In the first day of the Soviet Army's
arrival, I and the other comrades were isolated and then found ourselves
here, not knowing anything. ... I can only conjecture what could have
happened. In the first moments, the members of the Presidium who were
with me at the Secretariat were taken to the Party Central Committee
under the control of Soviet forces. Through the window I saw several
hundred people gathered around the building, and you could hear what
they were shouting: "We want to see Svoboda!" "We want
to see the president!" "We want Dubcek!" I heard a number
of slogans. After that there were shots. It was the last thing I saw.
From that point on I know nothing, and can't imagine what's happening
in the country and in the Party.
As a Communist who bears
a great responsibility for recent events, I am sure that - not only
in Czechoslovakia but in Europe, in the whole Communist movement -
this action will cause us the bitterest consequences in the breakdown
of, and bitter dissension within, the ranks of Communist parties in
foreign countries, in capitalist countries.
Thus the matters at hand
and the situation are, it seems to me very complex, although today
was the first time I read the newspapers. I can only say, think of
me what you will, I have worked for thirty years in the Party, and
my whole family has devoted everything to the affairs of the Party,
the affairs of socialism. Let whatever is going to happen to me happen.
I'm expecting the worst for myself and I'm resigned to it.
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