Edward
Grey, the son of Lieutenant-Colonel George Henry Grey, and grand-nephew
of Earl Grey, was born in 1862. Educated
at Winchester and Balliol
College, Oxford, he was a strong supporter of the Liberal
Party.
In the 1885 General Election Grey was elected
to represent Bereick-on-Tweed. Following the 1892
General Election William Gladstone
appointed Grey as Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
After the defeat of the Liberal Party in
the 1895 General Election, Grey sat on the
opposition benches until recalled to the post as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs in the government formed by Henry
Cambell-Bannerman in 1905.
Grey made the defence of France against Germany
aggression the central feature of British foreign policy through a
number of private pledges but reduced their deterrent value by not
making them public at the time. On the outbreak of the First
World War Grey believed that he had no alternative but to fulfill
Britain's "obligations to honour" by joining France in its
war with Germany.
Grey's secret diplomacy was strongly criticised by the Labour
Party and some members of his own party, including Charles
Trevelyan, Secretary of the Board of Education, for these private
promises made to the French government. Trevelyan resigned from the
government over this issue and joined with E.D.
Morel, George Cadbury, Ramsay
MacDonald, Arthur Ponsonby, Arnold
Rowntree and other critics of the Grey's foreign policy to form
the Union of Democratic Control (UDC).
Grey was also deeply shocked by how his policies had failed to prevent
war and prophesied that: "The lamps are going out all over Europe;
we shall not see them in our lifetime." Grey's Balkan diplomacy
was blamed for turning Turkey and Bulgaria against Britain and was
excluded by Herbert Asquith from his Inner
war cabinet.
Grey,
the longest serving Secretary of Foreign Affairs in British history,
was removed from office by David Lloyd George
in December, 1916. He was granted the title Viscount Grey of Fallodon
and became leader of the House of Lords.
In retirement, Grey wrote his autobiography, Twenty
Five Years (1925) and the best-selling, The
Charm of Birds (1927). Sir Edward Grey died 7th September
1933.
(1)
Edward Grey, letter to Chancellor Bethmann
Hollweg (30th July, 1914)
His Majesty's Government cannot for one moment entertain the
Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality
on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage and stand by
while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany
does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. From
the material point of view the proposal is unacceptable, for France,
without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be
so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate
to German policy. Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace
to us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France,
a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.
The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation
or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could
not entertain that bargain either.
(2)
Edward Grey, speech (1906)
The economic rivalry and all that do not give much offence
to our people, and they admire [Germany's] steady industry and genius
for organization. But they do resent mischief making. They suspect
the Emperor of aggressive plans of Weltpolitik, and they see
that Germany is forcing the pace in armaments in order to dominate
Europe and is thereby laying a horrible burden of wasteful expenditure
upon all the other powers.
(3)
Kaiser
Wilhelm II gave an interview to the
Daily Telegraph that was published
on 28th October 1908.
Germany is a young and growing empire. She has a world-wide
commerce which is rapidly expanding and to which the legitimate ambition
of patriotic Germans refuses to assign any bounds. Germany must have
a powerful fleet to protect that commerce and her manifold interests
in even the most distant seas. She expects those interests to go on
growing, and she must be able to champion them manfully in any quarter
of the globe. Her horizons stretch far away. She must be prepared
for any eventualities in the Far East. Who can foresee what may take
place in the Pacific in the days to come, days not so distant as some
believe, but days at any rate, for which all European powers with
Far Eastern interests ought steadily to prepare?
Look at
the accomplished rise of Japan; think of the possible national awakening
of China; and then judge of the vast problems of the Pacific. Only
those powers that have great navies will be listened to with respect
when the future of the Pacific comes to be solved; and if for that
reason only, Germany must have a powerful fleet. It may even be that
England herself will be glad that Germany has a fleet when they speak
together on the same side in the great debates of the future.
(4)
Sir Edward Grey, Britain's foreign
secretary, wrote an article in response to the comments made by Wilhelm
II in the Daily Telegraph
(November, 1908)
The German Emperor is ageing me; he is like a battleship with
steam up and screws going, but with no rudder, and he will run into
something some day and cause a catastrophe. He has the strongest army
in the world and the Germans don't like being laughed at and are looking
for somebody on whom to vent their temper and use their strength.
After a big war a nation doesn't want another for a generation or
more. Now it is 38 years since Germany had her last war, and she is
very strong and very restless, like a person whose boots are too small
for him. I don't think there will be war at present, but it will be
difficult to keep the peace of Europe for another five years.
(5)
George Buchanan, Britain's ambassador
in Russia, sent a report to
Sir Edward Grey about discussions he had with French and Russian officials
(July 1914)
As they
both continued to press me to declare our complete solidarity with
them, I said that I thought you might be prepared to represent strongly
at Vienna and Berlin danger to European peace of an Austrian attack
on Serbia. You might perhaps point out that it would in all probability
force Russia to intervene, that this would bring Germany and France
into the field, and that if war became general, it would be difficult
for England to remain neutral. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that
he hoped that we would in any case express strong reprobation of Austria's
action. If war did break out, we would sooner or later be dragged
into it, but if we did not make common cause with France and Russia
from the outset we should have rendered war more likely.
(6)
Sir Eyre Crowe, memo to Sir Edward Grey (27th July 1914)
I am afraid
that the real difficulty to be overcome will be found in the question
of mobilization. Austria is already mobilizing. This, if the war does
come, is a serious menace to Russia, who cannot be expected to delay
her own mobilization which, as it is, can only become effective in
something like double the time required by Austria and Germany. If
Russia mobilizes, we have been warned that Germany will do the same,
and as German mobilization is directed almost entirely against France,
the latter cannot possibly delay her own mobilization even for the
fraction of a day. This however means that within 24 hours His Majesty's
Government will be faced with the question whether, in a quarrel so
imposed by Austria on an unwilling France, Great Britain will stand
idly aside, or take sides.
(7)
Sir Edward Grey wrote down his thoughts on a possible war in July
1914. This was later published in his autobiography, Twenty-five
Years (1925).
1. A conviction
that a great European war under modem conditions would be a catastrophe
for which previous wars afforded no precedent. In old days nations
could collect only portions of their men and resources at a time and
dribble them out by degrees. Under modern conditions whole nations
could be mobilized at once and their whole life-blood and
resources poured out in a torrent. Instead of a few hundreds of thousands
of men meeting each other in war, millions would now meet, and modern
weapons would multiply manifold the power of destruction. The financial
strain and the expenditure of wealth would be incredible. I thought
this must be obvious to everyone else, as it seemed obvious to me
; and that, if once it became apparent that we were on the edge, all
the Great Powers would call a halt and recoil from the abyss.
2. That
Germany was so immensely strong and Austria so dependent upon German
strength that the word and will of Germany would at the critical moment
be decisive with Austria. It was therefore to Germany that we must
address ourselves.
3. That,
if war came, the interest of Britain required that we should not stand
aside, while France fought alone in the West, but must support her.
I knew it to be very doubtful whether the Cabinet, Parliament, and
the country would take this view on the outbreak of war, and through
the whole of this week I had in view the probable contingency that
we should not decide at the critical moment to support France. In
that event I should have to resign; but the decision of the country
could not be forced, and the contingency might not arise, and meanwhile
I must go on.
(8)
Sir Edward Grey, letter to George Buchanan,
Britain's ambassador in Russia (25th
July, 1914)
I said
to the German Ambassador that, as long as there was only a dispute
between Austria and Serbia alone, I did not feel entitled to intervene;
but that, directly it was a matter between Austria and Russia, it
became a question of the peace of Europe, which concerned us all.
I had furthermore spoken on the assumption that Russia would mobilize,
whereas the assumption of the German Government had hitherto been,
officially, that Serbia would receive no support; and what I had said
must influence the German Government to take the matter seriously.
In effect, I was asking that if Russia mobilized against Austria,
the German Government, who had been supporting the Austrian demand
on Serbia, should ask Austria to consider some modification of her
demands, under the threat of Russian mobilization. This was not an
easy thing for Germany to do, even though we should join at the same
time in asking Russia to suspend action. I was afraid, too, that Germany
would reply that mobilization with her was a question of hours, whereas
with Russia it was a question of days; and that, as a matter of fact,
I had asked that, if Russia mobilized against Austria, Germany, instead
of mobilizing against Russia, should suspend mobilization and join
with us in intervention with Austria, thereby throwing away the advantage
of time, for, if the diplomatic intervention failed, Russia would
meanwhile have gained time for her mobilization. It was true that
I had not said anything directly as to whether we would take any part
or not if there was a European conflict, and I could not say so; but
there was absolutely nothing for Russia to complain of in the suggestion
that I had made to the German Government and I was only afraid that
there might be difficulty in its acceptance by the German Government.
I had made it on my own responsibility, and I had no doubt it was
the best proposal to make in the interests of peace.
(9)
Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador to Germany,
letter to Sir Edward Grey (29th July, 1914)
I was
asked to call upon the Chancellor tonight. His Excellency had just
returned from Potsdam. He said that, should Austria be attacked by
Russia, a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable,
owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's Ally, in spite of his
continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the
following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear,
so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British
policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to
be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not
the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great
Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British
Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisition
at the expense of France, should they prove victorious in any war
that might ensue.
His Excellency
ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object
of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding
with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis
of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general
neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of
course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an
assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis
might possibly produce would enable him to look forward to realization
of his desire.
(10)
Sir Edward Grey, letter to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador
to Germany (30th July, 1914)
His Majesty's
Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal
that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.
What he
asks us, in effect, is to engage to stand by while French colonies
are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French
territory as distinct from the colonies.
From the
material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France,
without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be
so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate
to German policy.
Altogether
apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain
with Germany at the expense of France - a disgrace from which the
good name of this country would never recover.
The Chancellor
also, in effect, asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest
we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain
that bargain either.
Having
said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of
a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany
offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying
our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances
may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable
development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.
(11)
Sir Edward Grey, Twenty-five Years
(1925).
I really
felt angry with von Bethmann-Hollweg and von Jagow. They had given
us to understand that they had not seen the terms of the Austrian
ultimatum to Serbia before it was sent; they had been critical of
it when they saw it. Von Jagow had said that, as a diplomatic document,
it left something to be desired, and contained some demands that Serbia
could not comply with. By their own admission they had allowed their
weaker Ally to handle a situation on which the peace of Europe might
depend, without asking beforehand what she was going to say and without
apparently lifting a finger to moderate her, when she had delivered
an ultimatum of the terms of which they did not entirely approve.
Now they vetoed the only certain means of peaceful settlement without,
as far as I knew, even referring it to Austria at all. The complacency
with which they had let Austria launch the ultimatum on Serbia was
deplorable, and to me unaccountable; the blocking of a Conference
was still worse.
(12)
Frank Mumby, The Great World War (1915)
Even then (after the letter sent to Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg
on 30th July 1914) Sir Edward Grey did not abandon his role as peacemaker.
In the same carefully-guarded letter he held out a promise that if
the peace of Europe could be preserved, and the present crisis passed,
he would do his utmost to promote some new scheme - hitherto too Utopian
to form the subject of definite proposals - by which Germany could
be assured that no aggressive policy would be pursued against her
or her allies by the Triple Entente, severally or collectively. The
Foreign Secretary went further than this on the following day, when
he promised the German Ambassador that if Germany would only put forward
some reasonable proposal for settling the existing differences, he
would not only support it both at St. Petersburg and Paris, but go
the length of saying that if Russia and France declined to accept
it, Great Britain would have nothing more to do with the consequences.
(13)
Edward Grey, letter to the American
Ambassador in London (4th August
, 1914)
The issue for us is that, if Germany wins, she will dominate
France; the independence of Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and perhaps
of Norway and Sweden, will be a mere shadow; their separate existence
as nations will be fiction; all their harbours will be at Germany's
disposal; she will dominate the whole of Western Europe, and this
will make our position quite impossible. We could not exist as a first
class State under such circumstances.
(14)
Edward Grey, Twenty-five Years
(1925)
There is something more which I think any far-seeing English
statesman must have long desired, and that is that we should not remain
permanently isolated on the continent of Europe, and I think that
the moment that aspiration was formed it must have appeared evident
to everybody that the natural alliance is between ourselves and the
great German Empire.
I cannot
conceive any point which can arise in the immediate future which would
bring ourselves and the Germans into antagonism of interests. On the
contrary, I can see many things which must be a cause of anxiety to
the statesmen of Europe, but in which our interests are clearly the
same as the interests of Germany and in which that understanding of
which I have spoken in the case of America might, if extended to Germany,
do more, perhaps, than any combination of arms in order to preserve
the peace of the world.
If the
union between England and America is a powerful factor in the cause
of peace, a new Triple Alliance between the Teutonic race and the
two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race will be a still more potent influence
in the future of the world. I have used the word 'alliance', but again
I desire to make it clear that to me it seems to matter little whether
you have an alliance which is committed to paper, or whether you have
an understanding in the minds of the statesmen of the respective countries.
An understanding is perhaps better than an alliance, which may stereotype
arrangements which cannot be regarded as permanent in view of the
changing circumstances from day to day.
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