William Robertson, the son of Thomas Charles Robertson and his wife, Ann Dexter Beet, was born on 29th January 1860 at Welbourn, Lincolnshire. His father was village postmaster and it was a difficult struggle bringing up seven children.
Robertson left school at thirteen and worked as a domestic servant for Adeline, Countess of Cardigan, the wife of James Brudenell, the 7th Earl of Cardigan, at Deene Park, Northamptonshire. In November 1877 he enlisted in the British Army at Aldershot. His mother was furious when she heard and wrote to him claiming that "I would rather bury you than see you in a red coat".
His biographer, David R. Woodward, has pointed out: "Robertson's choice of an army career seemed an especially unfortunate one for someone without the advantages of birth, wealth, or education. The Victorian army was dominated by middle- and upper-class officers, and a ranker had little opportunity for self-improvement and advancement. But Robertson was not typical of his fellow troopers who devoted their free time to women and excessive drinking. Strong and athletic, he dominated troop competitions. But it was his intellect rather than his physical fitness that largely explains his extraordinary rise through the ranks."
At Aldershot, Robertson's progress was steady but not remarkable: lance-corporal (February 1879); corporal (April 1879); lance-sergeant (May 1881); sergeant (January 1882); and troop sergeant-major (March 1885). In 1888 he became second lieutenant in the 3rd Dragoon Guards. Robertson was always uncomfortable about taking his meals in the officers' mess and he told his mother that he did not want them to know about "my previous life".
Robertson was sent to India and was attached to the intelligence branch at army headquarters at Shimla. Especially good at languages, he qualified in six Indian ones: Urdu, Hindi, Persian, Pashto, Punjabi, and Gurkhali. He also mastered German and French. In 1895 he was assigned to the intelligence staff of the Chitral Expedition. He was mentioned in dispatches and made DSO after he was attacked and wounded by native guides who were accompanying him on intelligence work.
While in India he married Mildred Adelaide, the second daughter of Lieutenant-General Charles Thomas Palin of the Indian Army. Over the next few years they had four children, Brian, Hugh, Rosamund and Helen. Robertson, unlike other officers, drank water instead of alcohol and did not smoke.
In December 1896 Captain Robertson returned to England. Having passed the entrance exam for the Camberley Staff College, he joined Britain's emerging military élite. Robertson was the first person to have enlisted as a private to be accepted by Camberley. Other junior officers at the college at this time included Douglas Haig, Edmund Allenby, Archibald Murray and George Milne. David R. Woodward has argued: "Robertson's intellectual mentor, the military theorist George F. R. Henderson, emphasized the concentration of forces in the primary theatre of the enemy in order to overwhelm his main force in a decisive battle. These principles served as a bond between Robertson and Haig when the two men dominated British military policy."
In 1900 Robertson joined the intelligence branch of the War Office, joined the intelligence branch of the headquarters staff of Lord Frederick Roberts in South Africa. After only nine months he returned to the War Office as head of the foreign military intelligence section. Over the next six years he followed a policy where Germany was considered the greatest strategic threat to Britain and promoted the idea of an alliance with France was essential to the security of the empire.
In December 1907 he replaced Archibald Murray as chief of general staff to General Horace Smith-Dorrien at Aldershot. In June 1910 he was appointed as commandant of the Camberley Staff College, and in December he was promoted to the rank of major-general. According to his biographer: "Taking a common-sense approach to the art of war, Robertson trained officers at Camberley to conduct retreats as well as advances. Application took precedence over theory." During this period he became very close to Frederick Maurice, a staff instructor at Camberley.
Robertson became director of military training in the War Office in October, 1913. He was disappointed by this appointment because he had a strong desire to command troops. As a result, the chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) promised him his own command in 1914. However, the outbreak of the First World War changed this arrangement as it was felt that at 55 he was too old to lead troops in fighting situations. Instead, he was appointed quartermaster-general of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and organised their supply during its thirteen-day retreat from Mons to the Marne.
On 25th January, 1915 General Robertson became chief of staff to General John French, commander of the BEF. Soon afterwards Robertson selected Frederick Maurice to take charge of the operations section at general headquarters. According to Maurice's biographer, Trevor Wilson: "They worked well together and Maurice was further promoted. Then in December Robertson was transferred to London to become chief of the Imperial General Staff and principal military adviser to the government. Maurice went with him, to become director of military operations at the War Office with the rank of major-general. At the War Office, Robertson and Maurice worked in agreement. They endorsed a strategy of concentrating Britain's military resources and operations on the western front against the armed might of Germany, and they resisted policies which would have directed Britain's endeavours towards lesser adversaries in more extraneous theatres."
Robertson became convinced that the war would be won on the Western Front. Robertson wrote on 8th February, 1915: "If the Germans are to be defeated they must be beaten by a process of slow attrition, by a slow and gradual advance on our part, each step being prepared by a predominant artillery fire and great expenditure of ammunition". His long-term friend, General Douglas Haig, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, agreed with this strategy. He wrote in his autobiography, From Private to Field-Marshall (1926): "There was never, so far as I know, any material difference of opinion between us in regard to the main principles to be observed in order to win the war."
The military historian, Llewellyn Woodward, has argued that Haig and Robertson should never have followed this policy: "His (Haig) knowledge of his profession was sound and solid; he was a man of strong nerve, resolute, patient, somewhat cold and reserved in temper, unlikely to be thrown off his balance either by calamity or success. He reached opinions slowly, and held to them. He made up his mind in 1915 that the war could be won on the Western Front, and only on the Western Front. He acted on this view, and, at the last, he was right, though it is open to argument not only that victory could have been won sooner elsewhere but that Haig's method of winning it was clumsy, tragically expensive of life, and based for too long on a misreading of the facts." Woodward has also questioned the morality of the policy of attrition. He described it as the "killing Germans until the German army was worn down and exhausted". Woodward argued that it "was not only wasteful and, intellectually, a confession of impotence; it was also extremely dangerous. The Germans might counter Haig's plan by allowing him to wear down his own army in a series of unsuccessful attacks against a skilful defence."
David R. Woodward has argued: "Assisted by his handpicked director of military operations, Sir Frederick B. Maurice, Robertson in his new role as chief of general staff attempted to solve the riddle of static trench warfare which had replaced the war of movement of the first months of the war. The ever-expanding system of earthworks had the property of an elastic band. They bent rather than broke. Robertson concluded that a decisive battle was unlikely so long as Germany had reserves to bring forward. To prevent the Germans from gradually giving ground while inflicting heavy losses on the attacker, Robertson and Maurice hoped to nail the defenders to their trenches by choosing an objective which the enemy considered strategically vital."
Distressed by the heavy casualties on the Western Front, some politicians began to question Robertson's military strategy. This resulted in the unwillingness of the government to introduce conscription in 1915 and increasing the number of soldiers serving in France. David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, sought theatres where both political and military gains might be made without engaging the main body of the German Army. However, their views were undermined by failed Gallipoli and Dardanelles ventures.
Herbert Henry Asquith, the prime minister, lost faith in Lord Kitchener, and instead began to trust Robertson. His position as the sole military adviser to the government was subsequently given constitutional authority in January 1916 by an order of council issued by George V. Robertson was now based in the War Office. Other changes included Douglas Haig replacing John French as commander-in-chief.
Robertson eventually got approval for a major offensive on the Western Front in the summer of 1916. The Battle of the Somme was planned as a joint French and British operation. The idea originally came from the French Commander-in-Chief, Joseph Joffre and was accepted by General Douglas Haig, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) commander, despite his preference for a large attack in Flanders. Although Joffre was concerned with territorial gain, it was also an attempt to destroy German manpower.
At first Joffre intended for to use mainly French soldiers but the German attack on Verdun in February 1916 turned the Somme offensive into a large-scale British diversionary attack. General Haig now took over responsibility for the operation and with the help of General Henry Rawlinson, came up with his own plan of attack. Haig's strategy was for a eight-day preliminary bombardment that he believed would completely destroy the German forward defences.
General Rawlinson was was in charge of the main attack and his Fourth Army were expected to advance towards Bapaume. To the north of Rawlinson, General Edmund Allenby and the British Third Army were ordered to make a breakthrough with cavalry standing by to exploit the gap that was expected to appear in the German front-line. Further south, General Fayolle was to advance with the French Sixth Army towards Combles.
General Douglas Haig used 750,000 men (27 divisions) against the German front-line (16 divisions). However, the bombardment failed to destroy either the barbed-wire or the concrete bunkers protecting the German soldiers. This meant that the Germans were able to exploit their good defensive positions on higher ground when the British and French troops attacked at 7.30 on the morning of the 1st July. The BEF suffered 58,000 casualties (a third of them killed), therefore making it the worse day in the history of the British Army.
Haig was not disheartened by these heavy losses on the first day and ordered General Henry Rawlinson to continue making attacks on the German front-line. A night attack on 13th July did achieve a temporary breakthrough but German reinforcements arrived in time to close the gap. Haig believed that the Germans were close to the point of exhaustion and continued to order further attacks expected each one to achieve the necessary breakthrough. Although small victories were achieved, for example, the capture of Pozieres on 23rd July, these gains could not be successfully followed up.
Christopher Andrew, the author of Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (1985), has argued that Brigadier-General John Charteris, the Chief Intelligence Officer at GHQ. was partly responsible for this disaster: "Charteris's intelligence reports throughout the five-month battle were designed to maintain Haig's morale. Though one of the intelligence officer's duties may be to help maintain his commander's morale, Charteris crossed the frontier between optimism and delusion." As late as September 1916, Charteris was telling Haig: "It is possible that the Germans may collapse before the end of the year."
Robertson's biographer, David R. Woodward, has pointed out: "British losses on the first day of the Somme offensive - almost 60,000 casualties - shocked Robertson. Haig's one-step breakthrough attempt was the antithesis of Robertson's cautious approach of exhausting the enemy with artillery and limited advances. Although he secretly discussed more prudent tactics with Haig's subordinates he defended the BEF's operations in London. The British offensive, despite its limited results, was having a positive effect in conjunction with the other allied attacks under way against the central powers. The continuation of Haig's offensive into the autumn, however, was not so easy to justify."
With the winter weather deteriorating General Douglas Haig now brought an end to the Somme Offensive. Since the 1st July, the British has suffered 420,000 casualties. The French lost nearly 200,000 and it is estimated that German casualties were in the region of 500,000. Allied forces gained some land but it reached only 12km at its deepest points. Haig wrote at the time: "The results of the Somme fully justify confidence in our ability to master the enemy's power of resistance."
The consequences of the Battle of the Somme put further pressure on the government. Colin Matthew has commented: "The huge casualties of the Somme implied a further drain on manpower and further problems for an economy now struggling to meet the demands made of it... Shipping losses from the U-boats had begun to be significant... Early in November 1916 he (Asquith) called for all departments to write memoranda on how they saw the pattern of 1917, the prologue to a general reconsideration of the allies' position."
It has been suggested that Herbert Asquith and the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) was never able to get total control of the war effort. It has been argued by John F. Naylor: "Neither this flawed body - partly advisory, partly executive - nor its two successors, the Dardanelles committee (June - October 1915), and the war committee (November 1915 - November 1916) enabled the Asquith coalition to prevail over the military authorities in planning what remained an ineffective war effort."
Robertson, like most senior members of the military he believed Asquith was incapable of providing the dynamic and purposeful leadership required to see the war through to victory.
