(1) Robert Donald, the editor of the Daily Chronicle, had a meeting with Sir William Robertson and recorded their discussions in his diary (24th November, 1916)

Sir William Robertson lunched with me. He was quite against the Eastern effort, as he has always been, and now he considered that it had become quite impossible owing to the difficulty of transport. He thought that the effect of dragging in the Balkans was only to prolong the war and weaken our forces in the West. The only two Eastern countries which could have given us effective help were Bulgaria and Turkey, and we had them against us. He was equally opposed to our tactics in Greece.

He complained that there was far too much delay and no possibility of getting decisions out of the War Council. It was far too big and there was too much discussion. Something had to be done, in order to get a move on. He liked Mr. Asquith, but he was indecisive. Sir William said that the only man who could decide quickly, say "Yes" or "No" without hesitation, was Lloyd George. He might say the wrong "Yes" or the wrong "No" sometimes, but he much preferred that to no decision at all. He was in favour of some arrangement which gave Mr. Lloyd George greater power. He did not mean greater power to interfere with military operations, but greater power in the direction of war policy.

(2) After the war, Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, attempted to explain the strategy at the Battle of the Somme.

Remembering the dissatisfaction displayed by ministers at the end of 1915 because the operations had not come up to their expectations, the General Staff took the precaution to make quite clear beforehand the nature of the success which the Somme campaign might yield. The necessity of relieving pressure on the French Army at Verdun remains, and is more urgent than ever. This is, therefore, the first objective to be obtained by the combined British and French offensive. The second objective is to inflict as heavy losses as possible upon the German armies.