(1) Samuel W. Mitcham, Hitler's Field Marshals (1988)

When Blomberg married a prostitute in January 1938, however, Keitel did nothing to protect him; on the contrary, when the incriminating evidence fell into his hands he did not destroy it, as he could have done, but rather forwarded it to Hermann Goering, who coveted Blomberg's job, as Keitel must have known. It was
Goering who engineered Blomberg's fall from power on January 24, 1938. In fact, Telford Taylor later wrote, Keitel "actually betrayed Blomberg, whether by design or ineptitude."

On January 27 Hitler took final leave of Blomberg at the Chancellery. The departing field marshal recommended that Hitler assume the post of Minister of War himself. Hitler did not reply to this suggestion, but asked who would be suitable to direct the Armed Forces staff under himself. Blomberg had no idea. Hitler then asked who was in charge of Blomberg's staff. Keitel, Blomberg answered, but there was no question of using him, because "he's nothing but the man who runs my office."

"That's exactly the man I am looking for!" Hitler exclaimed. He set up an appointment with Keitel for that very afternoon.

In Keitel, Hitler found exactly the type of officer he was seeking: someone who would carry out his commands to the letter and without question, a yes-man who would be content to be merely a glorified executive officer, without independent command prerogatives.

(2) Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (1970)

Hitler's entourage certainly bore a measure of the blame for his growing belief in his superhuman abilities. Early in the game, Field Marshal Blomberg, Hitler's first and last Minister of War, had been overfond of praising Hitler's surpassing strategic genius. Even a more restrained and modest personality than Hitler ever was would have been in danger of losing all standards of self-criticism under such a constant torrent of applause.

In keeping with his character. Hitler gladly sought advice from persons who saw the situation more optimistically
and delusively than he himself. Keitel was often one of those. When the majority of the officers would greet Hitler's decisions with marked silence, Keitel would frequently feel called upon to speak up in favour of the measure. Constantly in Hitler's presence, he had completely succumbed to his influence. From an honorable, solidly respectable general he had developed in the course of years into a servile flatterer with all the wrong instincts. Basically, Keitel hated his own weakness; but the hopelessness of any dispute with Hitler had ultimately brought him to the point of not even trying to form his own opinion. If, however, he had offered resistance and stubbornly insisted on a view of his own, he would merely have been replaced by another Keitel.

(3) Wilhelm Keitel, order issued to German Army (16th December, 1942)

This war no longer has anything to do with knightly conduct or with the agreements of the Geneva Convention. If this war is not fought with the greatest brutality against the bands both in the East and in the Balkans then in the foreseeable future the strength at our disposal will not be sufficient to be able to master this plague. The troops are therefore empowered and are in duty bound in this war to use without mitigation even against women and children any means that will lead to success. Consideration of any kind are a crime against the German people and the soldier at the front.

(4) Guenther Blumentritt was interviewed by Basil Liddell Hart about Operation Barbarossa in his book The Other Side of the Hill (1948)

The failure of Field-Marshal List in the Low Caucasus not only led to his dismissal, but to a serious personal crisis in Hitler's headquarters late in September, 1942. Sometime earlier List had received the order to push on over the Low Caucasus towards the Black Sea, using all suitable routes. When he did not succeed in reaching his goal. Hitler once more became utterly impatient and sent Jodl to List's headquarters. On his return Jodi reported to Hitler that List had acted exactly in conformity to Hitler's orders, but that the Russian resistance was equally strong everywhere, supported by a most difficult terrain. Hitler, however, kept on reproaching List with having split up his forces instead of breaking through with concentrated power, while Jodi pointed to the fact that Hitler by his own orders had induced List to advance on a widely stretched front.

This argument of Jodl's was followed by an unusual outburst of Hitler's. He was so taken aback by the recital of his own previous orders - which he now denied - that Jodl, and Keitel with him, fell in disgrace for a long time to come. Further consequences were that Hitler completely changed his daily customs. From that time on he stayed away from the common meals which he had taken twice a day with his entourage. Henceforth he hardly left his hut in daytime, not even for the daily reports on the military situation, which from now on had to be delivered to him in his own hut in the presence of a narrowly restricted circle. He refused ostentatiously to shake hands with any general of the O.K.W., and gave orders that Jodi was to be replaced by another officer.

(5) Wilhelm Keitel's autobiography, In the Service of the Reich, was published after his death.

Why did the generals who have been so ready to term me a complaisant and incompetent yes-man fail to secure my removal? Was that all that difficult? No, that wasn't it; the truth was that nobody would have been ready to replace me, because each one knew that he would end up just as much a wreck as I.

(6) Wilhelm Keitel, statement issued at Nuremberg (October 1946)

It is tragic to have to realize that the best I had to give us a soldier, obedience, and loyalty, was exploited for purposes which could not be recognized at the time, and that I did not see that there is a limit set even for a soldier's performance to his duty. That is my fate.