(1)
Jake
Esterline was interviewed by
Jack Pfeiffer about the Bay
of Pigs
operation (10th November, 1975)
Jack Pfeiffer:
Was the principal reason for your choice - or King's choice of
you - because you had been involved in the Guatemala thing?
Jack Esterline:
Yes, I was a headquarters officer in charge of Guatemala. I would
think that was one of the reasons, plus the fact that I had extensive
guerrilla warfare experience during the Second World War in OSS;
and the third thing, being that I think J. C. had pretty much
confidence in my judgment.
Jack Pfeiffer:
What about the selection of say, Dick Drain, and Droller... Were
these your choices or were these others that came out of the bag
and you were told, "here they are."
Jack Esterline:
It was obvious that as the operation began to increase in size
... it was obvious that the Division didn't have the personnel,
the senior personnel to staff out the organization; or if they
did have,them, they weren't about to release them from the things
they were doing, because they were considered indispensable, which
was probably correct. It was on that basis, I think that when
people like Dick Drain came back home from - in Dick's case I
think he came in from Greece - where he had a pretty good record
- but he was not returning to headquarters to go into an assignment,
and Dick Bissell put him in the operation with us. Gerry Droller
had been around headquarters for along time, had been quite a
bit of a replacement problem. He was very bright, he was a German
specialist, had a pretty good political background; and Gerry
and Howard Hunt, for whatever reason, were sort of... they were
selected, not by us, but they were told they were going to be
the people who would handle the political aspects of the operation...
Jack Pfeiffer:
What was your relation with Droller... were you directing Droller's
activities, or was Dave Phillips running Droller...
Jack Esterline:
Oh, I sort of ran Droller, except I never knew what Tracy Barnes
was going to do next, when I turned my back. Droller was such
an ambitious fellow trying to run in... trying to run circles
around everybody for his own aggrandizement that you never knew...
but Droller would never have had any continuing contact with Pawley,
because they had met only once, and I recall Pawley saying that
he never wanted to talk to that "you know what" again.
He was very unhappy that somebody like Gerry... he just didn't
like Gerry's looks, he didn't like his accent. He was very unfair
about Gerry, and I don't mean to be unfair about Gerry - the only
thing is that Gerry was insanely ambitious. He was his own worst
enemy, that was all....
(2)
Lieutenant Frank Kappel, Supervisor,
Criminal Intelligence, Cuban
Counter-Revolutionary Activities.
This document was later passed to Thomas J. Kelly, Metropolitan
Sheriff, Dade County on 9th March, 1961.
Recent
developments in the Cuban situation involving the anti-Castro
factions have prompted this Unit to investigate certain rumors
which could, if allowed to circulate, develop into a crisis with
catastrophic effects for the U.S. position in Latin America.
The origin
of these assertions is multiple and stems from the not so secret
struggle for power among the anti-Castro groups closely connected
with the Frente Revolucionario Democratico.
It is
also evident that the preparations for the ultimate effort to
overthrow the CASTRO regime have reached the final stages. The
only obstacle to this is the continuous bickering of the groups
over ideological and political trivialities.
The main
reason for this dissension is the formation of the provisional
government which will have to take actual possession of part of
the Cuban territory in order to gain support and recognition from
other governments. Several Latin American countries which have
broken diplomatic relations with CASTRO'S Cuba are willing to
recognize a provisional government opposed to CASTRO. Nationalist
China has agreed in principle to do the same.
At present
there are only three organizations which have enough support both
in exile and in Cuba to make their weight felt in the negotiations
that have been taking place in New York and Washington during
the past week. The Frente Revolucionario Democratico, M.R.P. and
the 30th of November Movement are the three organizations which
sent representatives to a preliminary meeting that took place
in Washington on March 4, 1961.
The Frente
Revolucionario Democratico is by far the best organized, with
an army, estimated to be 5,000 strong, trained in guerrilla warfare.
This organization is formed by six anti-Castro groups and has
received sanction and financial backing from the US Government
since its conception.
The power
behind the scenes in this political crisis is a C.I.A. agent known
to the majority of the Cubans as Mr. B., an abbreviation of his
name FRANK BENDER.
It is
the consensus of every leader connected with the counter-revolutionary
activities that Mr. BENDER is the only policy making contact they
have with the Central Intelligence Agency. Information received
from responsible leaders revealed that Mr. BENDER is a highly
qualified expert who is considered to have been responsible for
the reorganization of West Germany and the consequent strengthening
of German-American relations. After this successful mission, Mr.
BENDER was transferred to Formosa where he helped reorganize Chiang
Kai-Shek's government and army.
In June
1960, Mr. BENDER undertook the task of binding together a few
of the most eligible anti-CASTRO groups into an organization that
could not only oppose CASTRO politically, but count on a strong
nucleus of trained guerrillas for active opposition and sabotage.
On June
22, 1960 five groups, after a conference in Mexico City, formed
the F.R.D. Immediately afterward, Mr. BENDER met with representatives
of the Frente in New York to formulate plans for military training.
Mr. BENDER,
according to the Cuban sources, has a flair for cloak and dagger
meetings when dealing with emissaries from the Frente. Mexico
City was selected on purpose to avoid drawing attention and consequent
denunciations from the CASTRO regime.
One of
the Frente emissaries revealed that at the initial meeting for
the formulation of military plans, Mr. BENDER introduced himself
as an industrialist from Pittsburgh. The emissary had many contacts
in that particular city and was able to ascertain that Mr. BENDER
had no connections whatsoever with the firm he claimed to represent.
This is of course raised doubts as to Mr. B.'s intentions and
also irked the representative who felt somewhat slighted by this
approach.
Other
sources have criticized Mr. BENDER's furtive ways of calling for
meetings in motels and other places that, although safe security-wise,
appear unsuitable to the dignity of the Cubans.
It is
evident that Mr. BENDER has not yet mastered the complicated Latin
mind and often irks the Cubans with his no-nonsense attitude apparently
acquired from his experiences in West Germany. Most Cubans agree
though, that Mr. BENDER has been able, with the help of military
experts, to create one of the best trained guerrilla contingents
in the world.
(3)
Dr. Luis Aguilar Leon, memorandum,
sent to Lieutenant Frank
Kappel, Supervisor, Criminal Intelligence. This document was later
passed to Thomas J. Kelly, Metropolitan Sheriff, Dade County on
9th March, 1961.
Every
time that there was an attempt to talk or plan the unity, the
biggest worry of every representative of the groups has been the
personal position of every one of them, the possibilities that
the unity would open to their aspiration and the bigger or smaller
remuneration's and side benefits that they could obtain. In addition,
there is total absence of political vision. Representatives of
the groups in exile who should support and present the forces
that fight in Cuba have managed to become directors and guides
of those who daily risk everything in the fight against Communism.
From there they have adopted false positions of leaders that do
not exist outside the newspapers of Miami or plans for the future
which do not include the true voice of the popular aspirations
and last, there has been without doubt, a weakness in regard to
the promises or the reality of economical help from the U.S. This
help which was to be destined to strengthen and enlarge an apparatus
of fight, political and military, has been converted in arbiter
of disputes, in monopoly of wealth in lieu of aspirations. Many
a fighting group has been threatened openly to be left outside
of the American help if it did not accept this or that point.
And many worthy professional man has silenced his criticism and
censure for fear that his opinion would cause the cessation of
this help. In reality, there were cases like Anit VILLAREAL who
was fired from the offices of the Frente and left without any
means of livelihood because she happened to disagree with the
policies of the movement to whom she belonged.
The fault
of the Americans: Speaking of Americans, I have to clarify immediately
that I refer to those in charge of the Cuban situation - specifically,
Mr. Frank BENDER and his minor associates in Miami, like Mr. [Bernard]
BARKER. It is the personal opinion of the writer that the personal
intervention of Mr. BENDER in the conflict of the groups in exile
has been the cause of major dissension's and it has caused conflicts,
delays and obstacles that a serene and impartial performance would
have avoided. Far from utilizing his privileged position of donor
of material, of economic subsistence to unite and enlarge anti-CASTRO
forces, Mr. BENDER almost from the beginning, decided on a policy
of preferences through a system of not listening to anyone else
except those who for some reason he conceded his preference by
a method of supporting some against others or of encouraging those
more than these. The result of this erratic and incomprehensible
policy in a problem as serious as that of Cuba is well described
in the picture of the exiles in the first section of this report.
Not even Mr. BENDER's personal work, the instrument created by
him and through his mediation the organism which has received
the entire support and the backing of the powerful forces which
Mr. BENDER represents has succeeded, after nine months of existence,
according to the DIARIO DE LA MARINA last week, "Unite all
the Cubans against their own will". In the so-called "Frente
Democratico Revolucionario", the crises have followed upon
crises. The defections have disturbed them. The public arguments
have reduced it and nothing positive has been done so far as politics,
ideology, propaganda or unity, without mentioning military force,
about which we will speak later.
What
I have said above regarding Frank BENDER implies an indictment
that deserves to be clarified. Let's begin by saying that we consider
just as responsible for the errors and mistakes made by BENDER
those who accorded to just one man the destiny of the Cuban case,
turning him automatically into a supreme force and dreamier of
all problems. Having said this , let us go on to express some
personal of all problems. Having said this, let us go on to express
some personal experiences which need to sustain my thesis concerning
Mr. Frank Bender's actions.
In July
1960, the exile situation was very different. The Frente Revolucionario
Democratico had just been constituted and there were hardly any
persons or revolutionary organizations which were not within it,
or which, at least, did not expect to enter at the proper moment.
The "Frente" had announced that it was constituted by
a group intended to integrate all the forces that opposed Fidel
CASTRO. Within the Frente, the organization which appeared to
be more powerful because of its nucleus of young fighters having
come from the rebel army itself was the Movimiento de Recuperacion
Revolucionaria. In that same month of July, in an absurd and incomprehensible
form, the MRR entered into a crisis. Its delegate at the front,
Manuel ARTIME BUESA, decided to constitute his own organization
and expel the other three members of the executive committee,
the three commanders who had founded the Movimiento. In view of
the planed crisis, BENDER was consulted and he recommended that
nothing be done, that no public declaration be formulated, and
that he would take care of the ARTIME situation. On July 25, 1960,
ARTIME made a public statement revealing the expulsion of the
three commanders and setting himself up in a separate movement.
In trying to speak with BENDER to find out why ARTIME was permitted
to express his version of the situation, BENDER said that it was
a question of supporting ARTIME and leaving to Commandante LORIE.
These were his words to Commander Antonio Michel YABOR, and when
the latter reasoned that the movement was weakened, that the cause
against Fidel CASTRO was going to suffer a blow, that there was
no moral or principle for the expulsion of a companion like Comandante
LORIE, Mr. BENDER only replied, "In matters of politics,
there is no moral". The result of Mr. Bender's intervention
far from being conciliatory, far from attempting to avoid the
breakup of the Frente caused quite the contrary. Mr. BENDER encouraged
ARTIME in his attitude. He tried to split up even more the component
of the MRR and succeeded in separating from the Frente a strong
group of fighters against Fidel CASTRO who would fight on their
own. This action was backed simply by his personnel in Miami,
especially Mr. BARKER, about whom exists a declaration in the
MRR files signed by the person to whom Mr. BARKER tried to employ
for, according to his own phraseology, "the destruction of
commanders Antonio MICHEL and Nino DIAZ [HIGINIO "Nino"DIAZ
ANE]. Since then, and now I speak only by references made, Mr.
Bender's partiality for Mr. ARTIME, his refusal to receive or
hear the reasons of other revolutionary groups which were becoming
cohesive in exile, his imposition of the Frente at all costs and
without alternative, his lack of political sense in hampering
the Frente, are well known by all those in exile. Three months
after the division of the MRR, Dr. Aureliano SANCHEZ ARANGO withdrew
from the Frente Democratico Revolucionario. After this, the door
was closed to the group of Manolo RAY, important persons of political
prestige who might have strengthened the standing of the organism
were blackballed and lastly a month ago within the Frente itself
there has been a new division represented on one side by a group
calling themselves Grupo Generacional and on the other side by
Dr. Antonio de VARONA and Dr. Justo CARRILLO. The public argument,
harsh and bitter, has reduced even more, the prestige of the Frente
as an organism spearheading the fight against Communism. In the
meantime, we had an interview with Mr. BENDER. The only thing
that the MRR asked was armed aid and some economic backing destined
only and exclusively for sending money to Cuba to fully support
our clandestine apparatus to maintain here the necessary personnel
for communications and arms shipments. Mr. Bender's reply was
clear - his economic aid was exclusively for the Frente ("I
can disband the Frente in 10 minutes - all I need is to withdraw
my checkbook" were his words.) For the others, encouragement,
moral support, friendship and some arms were available only if
his military advisors approved the destination and reception of
said arms. In his words, the MRR, the Ray Movement and those others
outside the Frente would have to operate on their own and without
help. Unfortunately, we were unable to convince Mr. BENDER nor
were we able to have a valid explanation from him as to why a
group, whose only fault was trying with all its might to fight
the communist tyranny of Fidel CASTRO, was being abandoned and
weakened. The separation of Commander Nino DIAZ [HIGINIO "Nino"DIAZ
ANE] of the MRR was also encouraged and fomented by Mr. Bender's
assistants, especially Mr. BARKER, who according to Commandante
DIAZ, made him promises and offers to reach certain positions
or commands which would permit him to take the war to Cuba as
was his wish.
The Military
Apparatus: In the military aspect, one of the most fundamentals
in the fight against Fidel CASTRO, not only identical but even
greater errors have been committed. On the one hand, Mr. BENDER
has constantly affirmed that the military instrument did not depend
on the Frente, that the Frente did not mean, nor was it necessarily,
the future provisional government, and on the other that all the
declarations made by the components of the Frente, all its political
projections contradicted these affirmations and permitted the
support of the thesis that those who were going to fight and train
in the camp would do so in order to establish a provisional government
integrated by the directors of the Frente, which prospect was
certainly not very encouraging to many Cubans. To this is added
the news that in some camps the doors have been opened to certain
figures of the past regime who distinguished themselves by their
criminal "exploits" against those who fought BATISTA.
Naturally, this has also lessened the enthusiasm for fighting
by many compatriots. The general staff of this army, whose names
would throw some light upon the intentions of the military apparatus
to be formed, remain a mystery. By such action, the only thing
that has been accomplished is that within and outside of Cuba,
all kinds of rumors are being circulated about whom these military
figures are who will be charged to carry out the invasion plan,
and generally these rumors, encouraged by Fidel CASTRO propaganda,
have depicted an armed body charged more in punishing and avenging
the Fidelistas and the patriots than in carrying democracy and
justice to Cuba. The maneuvers, the conspiracies and the intrigue
within the Frente necessarily were reflected in the camps. We
know for a fact that some four weeks ago, several boys who escaped
from the camps in order to bring to the Frente direct information
about the arbitrariness and the attempts at control which had
developed in their own camp. I do not think it necessary to go
further into this matter in order to demonstrate the nefarious
effect which such news has produced in all sections. That which
appears even more serious is that said boys who brought this information
said they had proof that some of the leaders of the Frente itself
had much to do with the conspiracies in the camp.
Conclusion:
This is the ominous picture of the Cuban groups in exile. The
lack of patriotism, the personal ambitions and the nefarious influence
of Mr. BENDER, have given Fidel CASTRO the time necessary to increase
his strength and propaganda. Far from creating a united front,
far from uniting coherently the various groups, big or small,
that have something to bring to the fight, was the policy followed
was that of choosing a small handful and then trying to impose
them at all costs. Not even the publication and formulation of
a program of objectives has been made, one that could put a stop
to CASTRO's claim that those who were against him are only interested
in bringing back the past. This report has been compiled with
the intention of bringing to the attention of whomever might be
interested, the urgency and desperate necessity to bring forth
a policy of high ideals destined to fight CASTRO on all fronts
and to show new ways for Latin America, confused and weakened
by the formidable propaganda of the Communists and for the absence
of an ideology, firm and clean, that could attack Communism not
only in the defensive but in a vigorous offensive of material
and spiritual values.
(4)
Fabian
Escalante,
The Secret War: CIA Covert Operations Against Cuba, 1959-62
(1995)
One of
Howard Hunt's first jobs when he arrived in Miami was to find
an efficient assistant. His mission was to convince "prominent"
Cubans there to form a front to back-up the operational plans
of the CIA in the months ahead. He selected Bernard Baker, the
CIA agent who, months earlier, had helped Manuel Artime flee from
Cuba. He also talked with Batista supporters, organized into the
Anticommunist Crusade. They were a powerful force that could not
be ignored. Besides, Colonel King had instructed Hunt to give
preferential attention to this group, which was favorably disposed
to the United States, and with whom they could do business once
their cause triumphed.
Hunt had
risen as far as he could in the CIA and knew that he would never
be made division chief; therefore this mission suited him perfectly.
He would do his job for the Agency while preparing himself for
the new life he envisioned as a businessman after the fall of
"the Castro regime."
Meanwhile,
other plans were underway in Langley. Tracy Barnes and Frank Bender
knew that Batista and his supporters had lost all prestige in
Cuba and Latin America in general. The Agency was also looking
for its own candidates. Two men were particularly favored because
they represented two different generations of Cuban politicians:
one was Tony Varona, and the other Manuel Artime Buesa. Another
important candidate was the deserter Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz.
Personal
interests interfered with the work of the CIA operatives. Finally
a deal was struck: the political front would be represented by
all of the tendencies in exile, including the Batista supporters.
Howard Hunt heaved a sigh of relief; however, he still continued
to question the decision by Barnes and Bender not to give that
group the preferential treatment that Colonel King, the division
chief, had ordered.
(5)
Evan
Thomas, The Very Best Men:
The Early Days of the CIA (1995)
The two men chosen
by Barnes to act as political officers, charged with setting up
the Cuban government-in-exile, were unpromising. Gerry Droller,
a German who chain-smoked cheap cigars in closed rooms and dined
on liverwurst sandwiches, chose to be a steel tycoon as his cover
in Miami; he treated the Cubans like peons and bragged, "I
carry the counterrevolution in my checkbook." A former Swiss
desk officer, he could not speak a word of Spanish. His sidekick
was E. Howard Hunt. After the Guatemala operation Hunt had served
as station chief in Uruguay. Told that he was being sent back
to Washington, Hunt had enlisted the president of Uruguay to lobby
the president of the United States to let him stay on; Eisenhower
was embarrassed and Hunt was yanked back from Montevideo. As ever,
Hunt had a fertile, if not always practical imagination. One of
his schemes, never implemented, was to send a white-painted "flight
of truth" on a tour of Latin America bringing a "Billy
Graham-type operation the message of Castro's betrayal of the
Cuban Revolution."
(6)
David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Invisible Government
(1964)
Bender
said, "we've got lots to talk about. I am the man in charge
of the Cuban case." Bender repeated the explanation that
Artime had heard so often: the great company of wealthy people
he represented had directed a large part of its money and effort
toward the solution of the Cuban problem, and the defeat of communism
everywhere. They had nothing to do with the American government,
Bender told him, but they did have influence. Then he asked for
Artime's thoughts on the future of Cuba.
"I
told him that Cuba could not return to the old corrupt government,"
Artime said, "that a return to a military dictatorship would
lead once more down the road to communism. I told him I believed
we needed a genuinely democratic government. We needed social
justice. We had to fight unemployment and raise the standard of
living of the workers; we had to establish cooperatives to protect
the small farmer and the small land owner; and we had to enact
social laws to protect old people; we needed a progressive income
tax, as in the United States. I told him that if we didn't do
these things, we would go back to a corrupt democracy and then
again we would have a military dictator who would destroy democracy.
And, in the end, a reaction that would lead again to communism.
I also told him that I thought the propaganda being used against
Castro was wrong. When I went to South America, the people were
being warned against Castro because he had taken the land of the
rich people. The poor Indians said 'good' and applauded."
Bender
apparently was impressed. He listened quietly as Artime discussed
his ideas for a guerrilla uprising in Oriente Province, and then
Bender asked, "Why not an uprising all over the island?"
Artime said he didn't have enough men or weapons for that.
"Well,
Artime, what if I told you that we have men who will help you
to prepare for guerrilla warfare and others who will prepare men
to fight in a conventional war with army training?"
"And
you will give us the weapons?"
"All
the weapons you need," Bender replied. "And also we
will train radio operators so you can be in contact directly with
Cuba."
Bender
wanted to know if Artime could get men out of Cuba to be trained
for such an operation. Artime replied that he could.
"Fine,"
Bender said, as he got up and handed Artime a piece of paper.
"Call this number whenever you need me. Just say 'To Frank
Bender from Manolo' and I will come to the phone." He instructed
Artime to go to Miami where more friends would be in touch with
him, and said he had reserved a plane ticket for him; Artime could
pick it up at the hotel. "When you leave," the American
said, "don't bother about paying the hotel bill. Just throw
the key on the desk in the lobby."
As he
left the room, Bender shook hands and said, "Remember, Manolo,
I am not a member of the United States government. I have nothing
to do with the United States government. I am only working for
a powerful company that wants to fight communism."
(7)
Hayes Johnson and Manuel
Artime,
The Bay of Pigs (1964)
Then
it was Frank Bender's turn to speak. They were to hold the beach
for seventy-two hours, he said. And what were they supposed to
do after that? "We will be there with you for the next step,"
Frank said. "But you will be so strong, you will be getting
so many people to your side, that you won't want to wait for us.
You will go straight ahead. You will put your hands out, turn
left, and go straight into Havana."
Frank
made a sweeping gesture with his arm that no man present that
day will ever forget. There was a great shout from the Cubans.
Some had tears in their eyes.
When it
came to support, Frank was equally emphatic: there was no question
they would have air superiority. Nothing was said about United
States air support, or about jets. It was said that the enemy
would not be able to get to the Brigade; that it would be destroyed
from the air; that no trucks or troops would be able to get through
the roads because all the roads would be bombed; that "every
five minutes there will be a plane over all the major roads of
Cuba." The Brigade cargo ships were loaded with thirty to
forty thousand gallons of gasoline so its air force could begin
immediate missions once the field at Giron was seized. The air
missions were already planned for that moment: the operations
order called for them to destroy the main rail¬road and highway
bridges in "the zones of Havana, Matanzas, Jovellanos, Colon,
Santa Clara and Cienfuegos in order to iso¬late said areas
from enemy operations."
Operation
Pluto also included plans for a diversionary landing in Oriente
Province by a commando group of 168 men, led by Nino Diaz, and
a simulated attack, or "feint," in the vicinity of Pinar
del Rio. The "feint" would be accomplished with special
sound equipment that would make it sound as if a great battle
were being waged.
When Frank
had finished, there was a brief moment of silence and then a stir
as the Cubans realized it was over. The plan sounded so good,
the Cubans were so confident, that no one asked any questions.
As Pepe said, "We didn't want to ask these men we knew any
embarrassing questions."
Frank
had said earlier, in response to a question, that if anything
went wrong the Cubans should communicate with the rear base and
he would give them instructions. Nothing was said about an alternative
plan and as this is written, only one of the four leading Cubans
knows that such a plan existed; he learned of it two years after
the invasion. Later, in a secret toplevel administration investigation
that followed in the wake of the invasion, it was learned that
the CIA decided, on its own, not to give the Brigade the alternative
plan. The explanation was given that it might weaken the Brigade's
resolve to keep fighting, that they might choose the alternative
plan when the going became rough, even though the invasion still
had a chance of success. The most charitable explanation that
can be placed on this reckless action is that the CIA assumed
such terrible responsibility with the best of intentions: it was
convinced the Cubans would win and therefore in the classic sense
the end would justify the means.
It was
five o'clock in the afternoon on Friday, April 14 when the officers
left the briefing area for the pier. At the last moment Frank
took Pepe aside. He told him that if he were ordered to halt the
invasion while the ships were at sea he would send Pepe a radio
message saying: COME BACK, DON 'T GO AHEAD.
That meant
the opposite: it was really clear; they were to go ahead.
"But
if I send you a message in code that says the bird-the Guatemalan
bird, the quetzal - 'The quetzal is on the branches of the tree'-
that means Fidel is waiting for you so you will have to come back."
One of
Frank's assistants named Phillips handed Pepe a big briefcase,
locked and without a key, and told him to sign a receipt for it.
Inside, he said, was $35,000-$10,000 in American money and $25,000
in Cuban. It was for use as the need arose. Pepe rejoined his
staff and they prepared to board the ships.
(8)
John
Simkin, Gerry
Droller, International Education Forum (February, 2005)
Jake Esterline
revealed in an interview with Jack Pfeiffer on 10th November,
1975, that Droller upset William Pawley and E. Howard Hunt during
the planning for the Bay of Pigs operation. This mainly concerned
political issues. Pawley thought it was important to get a right-wing
government established in Cuba after the invasion. Droller, on
the other hand, wanted people like Manuel Ray to be involved in
the new administration (as did JFK). Hunt agreed with Pawley but
was Droller’s subordinate and could do nothing about it.
It could
be argued that Droller reflected the CIA thinking that encouraged
them to initially support Fidel Castro in Cuba. Wisner, Barnes
and Bissell held similar views. They believed it was in American
interests to establish liberal, reforming governments in Latin
America, rather than military dictatorships that were unpopular
with the people. They took the view that supporting tyrannical
and corrupt dictators was not in the long-term best interests
of America.
However,
it is possible that there is another explanation for Droller’s
behaviour. Is it possible he was a long-time Soviet mole. I say
this because of his background. If he fled from Nazi Germany in
the 1930s and ended up fighting up with the Marquis in France,
he almost certainly held left-wing views. It is possible that
his views changed after the war. Obviously, he must have given
that impression to the CIA otherwise they would not have recruited
him.
Luis Aguilar
Leon’s report suggests the possibility that Droller was creating
disunity in the anti-Castro exile community on purpose. If Droller
was a Soviet mole he would have been providing the Soviets (and
presumably Castro) with some very important information.
Droller
appears to disappear after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Was he sacked
for incompetence? Did he flee to the Soviet Union? Or was he dealt
with in some other way?
