Jack Hawkins was born in
Roxton, Texas in 1920. His family moved to Fort Worth and was a student at the local high school. After graduating from the United States Naval Academy as a second lieutenant he joined the U.S. Marines in 1939. He spent time at the Marine Corps Basic School for Officers before being sent to China where he served with the Fourth Marines in Shanghai.
During the Second
World War he was captured by the Japanese at Corregidor in the
Philippines and spent 11 months as
a prisoner of war. He escaped with several other Americans and two
Filipino convicts who served as guides, and joined a guerrilla unit
for seven months before getting to Australia via submarine in November
1943. In 1945 Hawkins was involved
in the invasion of Okinawa.
After the war Hawkins served three years in Venezuela as adviser to the Venezuelan Marine Corps before returning to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Hawkins also took
part in the Korean War and helped plan
the battalion landing plan at Inchon. He then served for three years as an instructor on amphibious
landings in Marine Corps schools. This was followed by a post at
the Marine Corps school in Quantico.
Promoted to full colonel in 1955, he became commander of the Amphibious Forces at Little Creek, Virginia. In September, 1960, Colonel
Hawkins was assigned to the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA).
He joined the Cuba Task Force and was given direct responsibility for military training operations.
Hawkins was told "that the CIA was planning to land some exile troops in Cuba
and they wanted a Marine officer with background in amphibious warfare
to help them out with this project.''
Hawkins served under Jake
Esterline as Chief of Paramilitary Staff. Richard
Bissell, the head of the Directorate of Plans, had appointed Esterline
as Task Force Chief for the Bay of Pigs
invasion. Esterline was also involved in the plot to assassinate Fidel
Castro. In an interview he gave to Don
Bohning of the The
Miami Herald just before his death, Esterline admitted
that Juan Orta, who functioned as Castro's private secretary, had
been recruited to slip a poisoned pill into a drink. However, a few
days before the invasion Orta changed his mind and fled to the Venezuelan
Embassy.
When Esterline discovered
that the assassination plot against Castro had failed he had serious
doubts about whether the Bay of Pigs operation would be a success.
Hawkins and Jake Esterline were also
unhappy about the decision to change the landing site from Trinidad
to the Bay of Pigs. On 8th April, Esterline and Hawkins went to see
Richard Bissell and told him they wanted
to resign. Bissell persuaded them to stay and be "good soldiers".
Forum Debate on the Kennedy Assassination
Don Bohning led Discussion on The Castro Obsession
Forum Debate on Jack Hawkins
Forum Debate on Watergate
(1)
Jake
Esterline was interviewed by Jack
Pfeiffer about the Bay
of Pigs
operation (10th November, 1975)
We had no
military. The military people I think came in consideration, when
we realized that we were going into a fairly sizeable operation, one
in which people available - or there weren't people available around
- the agency necessarily - but everybody was getting a little older
at that time and what not, so they had to look for people and a very
special hunt was made for Jack Hawkins. I don't recall whether it
was Dick Bissell, probably J. C. King or others that went to the Commandant
of the Marine Corps, and said, look, we want a man on detail, but
we don't want you to just send somebody to us that you don't have
a spot for, we really want a guy with eminent qualifications in this
regard, and to the best of my knowledge, that is the reason that Jack
Hawkins was selected, because of the experience he had during the
Second World War, plus his rather distinguished Marine Corps record
up to that point - I guess that it is only fair to say that that assignment
cost him his General's Star and a good many other things in terms
of his record.
(2)
Jack Hawkins, Policy Decisions Required for Conduct of Strike Operations
Against Government of Cuba (4th September, 1960)
1. Purpose:
The purpose of this memorandum
is to outline the current status of our preparations for the conduct
of amphibious/ airborne and tactical air operations against the Government
of Cuba and to set forth certain requirements for policy decisions
which must be reached and implemented if these operations are to be
carried out.
2. Concept:
As a basis for the policy
requirements to be presented below, it would appear appropriate to
review briefly the concept of the strike operations contemplated and
outline the objectives which these operations are designed to accomplish.
The concept envisages the
seizure of a small lodgement on Cuban soil by an all-Cuban amphibious/airborne
force of about 750 men. The landings in Cuba will be preceded by a
tactical air preparation, beginning at dawn of D-1 Day. The primary
purpose of the air preparation will be to destroy or neutralize all
Cuban military aircraft and naval vessels constituting a threat to
the invasion force. When this task is accomplished, attacks will then
be directed against other military targets, including artillery parks,
tank parks, military vehicles, supply dumps, etc. Close air support
will be provided to the invasion force on D-Day and thereafter as
long as the force is engaged in combat. The primary targets during
this time will be opposing military formations in the field. Particular
efforts will be made to interdict opposing troop movements against
the lodgement.
The initial mission of
the invasion force will be to seize and defend a small area, which
under ideal conditions will include an airfield and access to the
sea for logistic support. Plans must provide, however, for the eventuality
that the force will be driven into a tight defensive formation which
will preclude supply by sea or control of an airfield. Under such
circumstances supply would have to be provided entirely by air drop.
The primary objective of the force will be to survive and maintain
its integrity on Cuban soil. There will be no early attempt to break
out of the lodgement for further offensive operations unless and until
there is a general uprising against the Castro regime or overt military
intervention by United States forces has taken place.
It is expected that these
operations will precipitate a general uprising throughout Cuba and
cause the revolt of large segments of the Cuban Army and Militia.
The lodgement, it is hoped, will serve as a rallying point for the
thousands who are ready for overt resistance to Castro but who hesitate
to act until they can feel some assurance of success. A general revolt
in Cuba, if one is successfully triggered by our operations, may serve
to topple the Castro regime within a period of weeks.
If matters do not eventuate
as predicted above, the lodgement established by our force can be
used as the site for establishment of a provisional government which
can be recognized by the United States, and hopefully by other American
states, and given overt military assistance. The way will then be
paved for United States military intervention aimed at pacification
of Cuba, and this will result in the prompt overthrow of the Castro
Government.
While this paper is directed
to the subject of strike operations, it should not be presumed that
other paramilitary programs will be suspended or abandoned. These
are being intensified and accelerated. They include the supply by
air and sea of guerrilla elements in Cuba, the conduct of sabotage
operations, the introduction of specially trained paramilitary teams,
and the expansion of our agent networks throughout the island.
3. Status of Forces:
a. Air. The Project tactical
air force includes ten B-28 aircraft currently based in Guatamala
and at Eglin Air Force Base. However, there are only five Cuban B-26
pilots available at this time who are considered to be of highly technical
competence. Six additional Cuban pilots are available, but their proficiency
is questionable.
It is planned that seven
C-54 and four C-46 transports will be available for strike operations.
Here again, the number of qualified Cuban crews is insufficient. There
is one qualified C-54 crew on hand at this time, and three C-46 crews.
Aviation ordnance for conduct
of strike operations is yet to be positioned at the strike base in
Nicaragua. Necessary construction and repairs at this base are now
scheduled to commence, and there appears to be no obstacle to placing
this facility in a state of readiness in time for operations as planned.
Conclusions:
(1) The number of qualified
Cuban B-26 crews available is inadequate for conduct of strike operations.
(2) The number of qualified
Cuban transport crews is grossly inadequate for supply operations
which will be required in support of the invasion forces and other
friendly forces which are expected to join or operate in conjunction
with it in many parts of Cuba. It is anticipated that multiple sorties
will be required on a daily basis.
Maritime. Amphibious craft
for the operation, including three LOU's and four LCVP's are now at
Viaques, Puerto Rico, where Cuban crew training is progressing satisfactorily.
These craft with their crews will soon be ready for operations.
The Barbara J (LCI), now
enroute to the United States from Puerto Rico, requires repairs which
may take up to two weeks for completion. The sister ship, the Blagar,
is outfitting in Miami, and its crew is being assembled. It is expected
that both vessels will be fully operational by mid-January at the
latest.
In view of the difficulty
and delay encountered in purchasing, outfitting and readying for sea
the two LCI's, the decision has been reached to purchase no more major
vessels, but to charter them instead. The motor ship, Rio Escondido
(converted LCT) will be chartered this week and one additional steam
ship, somewhat larger, will be chartered early in February. Both ships
belong to a Panamanian Corporation controlled by the Garcia family
of Cuba, who are actively cooperating with this Project. These two
ships will provide sufficient lift for troops and supplies in the
invasion operation.
Conclusion:
Maritime assets required
will be available in ample time for strike operations in late February.
Ground. There are approximately
500 Cuban personnel now in training in Guatemala. Results being achieved
in the FRD recruiting drive now underway in Miami indicate that extraordinary
measures may be required if the ranks of the Assault Brigade are to
be filled to its planned strength of 750 by mid-January. Special recruiting
teams comprised of members of the Assault Brigade are being brought
to Miami to assist in recruiting efforts in that city and possibly
in other countries, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
All recruits should be available by mid-January to allow at least
four to six weeks of training prior to commitment.
The Assault Brigade has
been formed into its basic organization (a quadrangular infantry battalion,
including four rifle companies, and a weapons company). Training is
proceeding to the extent possible with the limited number of military
instructors available. This force cannot be adequately trained for
combat unless additional military trainers are provided.
Conclusion:
(1) It is probable that
the Assault Brigade can reach its planned strength of 750 prior to
commitment, but it is possible that upwards of 100 of these men will
be recruited too late for adequate training.
(2) Unless U.S. Army Special
Forces training teams as requested are sent promptly to Guatemala,
the Assault Brigade cannot be readied for combat by late February
as planned and desired.
(3) The Assault Brigade
should not be committed to action until it has received at least four
and preferably six weeks of training under supervision of the U.S.
Army team. This means that the latter half of February is the earliest
satisfactory time for the strike operation.
4. Major Policy Questions
Requiring Resolution:
In order that planning
and preparation for the strike operation may proceed in an orderly
manner and correct positioning of hundreds of tons of supplies and
equipment can be effected, a number of firm decisions concerning major
questions or policy are required. These are discussed below.
a. The Concept Itself.
Discussion. The question
of whether the incoming administration of President-Elect Kennedy
will concur in the conduct of the strike operations outlined above
needs to be resolved at the earlist possible time. If these operations
are not to be conducted, then preparations for them should cease forthwith
in order to avoid the needless waste of great human effort and many
millions of dollars. Recruitment of additional Cuban personnel should
be stopped, for every new recruit who is not employed in operations
as intended presents an additional problem of eventual disposition.
Recommendation. That the
Director of Central Intelligence attempt to determine the position
of the President-Elect and his Secretary of State-Designate in regard
to this question as soon as possible.
b. Timing of the Operation.
If Army Special Forces
training teams are made available and dispatched to Guatemala by mid-January,
the Assault Brigade can achieve acceptable readiness for combat during
the latter half of February, 1961. All other required preparations
can be made by that same time. The operation should be launched during
this period. Any delay beyond 1 March, 1961, would be inadvisable
for the following reasons:
(1) It is doubtful that
Cuban forces can be maintained at our Guatemalan training base beyond
1 March, 1961. Pressures upon the Government of Guatemala may become
unmanageable if Cuban ground troops are not removed by that date.
(2) Cuban trainees cannot
be held in training for much longer. Many have been in the camp for
months under most austere and restrictive conditions. They are becoming
restive and if not committed to action soon there will probably be
a general lowering of morale. Large-scale desertions could occur with
attendant possibilities of surfacing the entire program.
(3) While the support of
the Castro Government by the Cuban populace is deteriorating rapidly
and time is working in our favor in that sense, it is working to our
disadvantage in a military sense. Cuban jet pilots are being trained
in Czechoslovakia and the appearance of modern radar throughout Cuba
indicates a strong possibility that Castro may soon have an all-weather
jet intercept capability. His ground forces have received vast quantities
of military equipment from the Bloc countries, including medium and
heavy tanks, field artillery, heavy mortars and anti-aircraft artillery.
Bloc technicians are training his forces in the use of this formidable
equipment. Undoubtedly, within the near future Castro's hard core
of loyal armed forces will achieve technical proficiency in the use
of available modern weapons.
(4) Castro is making rapid
progress in establishing a Communist-style police state which will
be difficult to unseat by any means short of overt intervention by
U.S. military forces.
Recommendation. That the
strike operation be conducted in the latter half of February, and
not later than 1 March, 1961.
c. Air Strike.
The question has been raised
in some quarters as to whether amphibious/airborne operation could
not be mounted without tactical air preparation or support or with
minimal air support. It is axiomatic in amphibious operations that
control of air and sea in the objective area is absolutely required.
The Cuban Air Force and naval vessels capable of opposing our landing
must be knocked out or neutralized before our amphibious shipping
makes its final run into the beach. If this is not done, we will be
courting disaster. Also, since our invasion force is very small in
comparison to forces which may be thrown against it, we must compensate
for numerical inferiority by effective tactical air support not only
during the landing but thereafter as long as the force remains in
combat. It is essential that opposing military targets such as artillery
parks, tank parks, supply dumps, military convoys and troops in the
field be brought under effective and continuing air attack. Psychological
considerations also make such attacks essential. The spectacular aspects
of air operations will go far toward producing the uprising in Cuba
that we seek.
Recommendations.
(1) That the air preparation
commence not later than dawn of D minus 1 day.
(2) That any move to curtail
the number of aircraft to be employed from those available be firmly
resisted.
(3) That the operation
be abandoned if policy does not provide for use of adequate tactical
air support.
d. Use of American Contract
Pilots.
The paragraph above outlines
the requirement for precise and effective air strikes, while an earlier
paragraph points up the shortage of qualified Cuban pilots. It is
very questionable that the limited number of Cuban B-26 pilots available
to us can produce the desired results unless augmented by highly skillful
American contract pilots to serve as section and flight leaders in
attacks against the more critical targets. The Cuban pilots are inexperienced
in war and of limited technical competence in navigation and gunnery.
There is reason also to suspect that they may lack the motivation
to take the stern measures required against targets in their own country.
It is considered that the success of the operation will be jeopardized
unless a few American contract B-26 pilots are employed.
With regard to logistical
air operations, the shortage of Cuban crews has already been mentioned.
There is no prospect of producing sufficient Cuban C-54 crews to run
the seven C-54 aircraft to be used in the operation. Our experience
to date with the Cuban transport crews has left much to be desired.
It is concluded that the only satisfactory solution to the problem
of air logistical support of the strike force and other forces joining
it will be to employ a number of American contract crews.
Recommendation:
That policy approval be
obtained for use of American contract crews for tactical and transport
aircraft in augmentation of the inadequate number of Cuban crews available.
e. Use of Puerto Cabezas,
Nicaragua.
The airfield at Puerto
Cabezas is essential for conduct of the air strike operation unless
a base is made available in the United States. Our air lease [base?]
in Guatemala is 800 miles from central Cuba--too distant for B-26
operations and for air supply operations of the magnitude required,
using the C-46 and C-54 aircraft. Puerto Cabezas is only 500 miles
from central Cuba--acceptable, although too distant to be completely
desirable, for B-26 and transport operations.
Puerto Cabezas will also
serve as the staging area for loading assault troops into transports
much more satisfactorily than Puerto Barries, Guatemala which is exposed
to hostile observation and lacks security. It is planned that troops
will be flown in from Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas, placed in covered
trucks, loaded over the docks at night into amphibious shipping, which
will then immediately retire to sea.
Conclusion.
The strike operation cannot
be conducted unless the Puerto Cabezas air facility is available for
our use, or unless an air base in the United States is made available.
Recommendation. That firm
policy be obtained for use of Puerto Cabezas as an air strike base
and staging area.
f. Use of U.S. Air Base
for Logistical Flights.
An air base in southern
Florida would be roughly twice as close to central Cuba as Puerto
Cabezas. This means that the logistical capability of our limited
number of transport aircraft would be almost doubled if operated from
Florida rather than Puerto Cabezas. Logistical support of the strike
force in the target would be much more certain and efficient if flown
from Florida.
There is also a possibility
that once the strike operations commence, conditions would develop
which would force us out of the Nicaraguan air base. Without some
flexibility of air base with pre-positioned supplies in the United
States, we could conceivably be confronted with a situation wherein
the Assault Brigade would be left entirely without logistical air
support. Supply by sea cannot be relied upon, for the Brigade may
be driven by superior forces from the beach area. Such a situation
could lead to complete defeat of the Brigade and failure of the mission.
It seems obvious that the
only real estate which the United States can, without question, continue
to employ once the operation commences is its own soil. Therefore,
an air base for logistical support should be provided in the United
States. This will offer the possibility of continued, flexible operations,
if one or both of our bases in Guatemala and/or Nicaragua are lost
to our use.
Recommendation.
That policy be established
to permit use of an air base in southern Florida (preferably Opa Locka
which is now available to us and has storage facilities for supplies)
for logistical support flights to Cuba.
(3)
Don
Bohning,
Bay
of Pigs, The Miami Herald (5th January, 1997)
Breaking a 35-year silence, the chief of the CIA's planning staff
for military aspects of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion says the effort
was doomed from the day, a month before the operation, when President
Kennedy ordered the landing site changed to one that would attract
less attention.
Jack Hawkins, a retired
Marine Corps colonel, said in an interview that after he and his staff
drafted the new plan, shifting the landing from the city of Trinidad,
on Cuba's south coast, about 80 miles westward to the Bay of Pigs,
he had "decided this plan has no chance. It is going to fail.''
He said efforts to convince superiors of that were of no avail.
What eventually became
known as the Bay of Pigs began in January 1960 when the Eisenhower
administration decided that Cuban leader Fidel Castro should be ousted,
an effort Kennedy continued after becoming president. It evolved from
sending in teams of agents to develop resistance, into a small guerrilla-type
infiltration of 200 to 300 men to join existing guerrillas, and, finally,
into a full-scale landing at the Bay of Pigs by a CIA-sponsored Cuban
exile brigade of about 1,500 on April 15, 1961.
The hope was not for Castro's
immediate overthrow but to seize a beachhead, generate morale problems
and defections within the Castro forces and eventually provoke a general
uprising.
Instead, the landing ended
in disaster when B-26 air strikes reduced by Kennedy failed to knock
out Castro's air force. Castro forces captured 1,189 exile invaders,
114 others died and 150 were unable to land or never shipped out.
The captured invaders were ransomed by the Kennedy administration
for $53 million in food and medicine. They returned to Miami on Dec.
23, 1962.
The paramilitary staff,
which Hawkins headed, was responsible for organizing, training and
equipping the Cuban exile brigade and preparing the plans for its
landing in Cuba. Although staff personnel changed at times, said Hawkins,
they averaged six U.S military and 18 CIA officers. Hawkins reported
directly to Jake Esterline, the CIA's project chief for the invasion.
The interview with The
Herald was the first Hawkins has given to a daily newspaper journalist
since the Bay of Pigs, although he wrote a first-person article in
the year-end edition of The National Review, a conservative journal
published by William Buckley.
In the wide-ranging December
interview at his home in Fredericksburg, Va., Hawkins also:
* Questioned Kennedy's
commitment to the Cuba project initiated under President Eisenhower,
based in part on Hawkins' own observations at Oval Office meetings.
* Speculated that the
lack of commitment may have been partially due to parallel assassination
plots against Castro, utilizing the Mafia, that had been undertaken
by the CIA in 1960 separately from the Bay of Pigs and accelerated
by the Kennedy administration. Bay of Pigs planners - with the exception
of the late Richard Bissell, the CIA's director of clandestine services
and the man in charge of the invasion - were unaware of the plots
until they became public knowledge years later.
* Said that he and project
director Esterline learned only recently from declassified documents
that Bissell had agreed with Kennedy to cut the number of CIA-supplied
B-26 planes from 16 - considered the minimum necessary to knock out
Castro's air force on the ground - to eight, but he did not tell them
of the decision until days later, on the eve of the first air attack
before the landing.
* Placed the primary fault
for the effort's failure "at Bissell's door.... It was really
Bissell's operation.''
* Said that the State
Department and Secretary of State Dean Rusk never received their share
of the blame for failure of the operation by its continued obstruction.
* Noted that he wrote
a still-classified May 1961 "after-action'' report on the Bay
of Pigs failure in which he recommended against any further covert
efforts against Castro because the Cuban leader was "now already
too strong to be overthrown by paramilitary operations.''
Hawkins said he had remained
silent all these years in part because "I was obligated by my
oath of secrecy to the Defense Department and the CIA,'' and also
out of concern about Castro retaliation against him.
"I didn't know what
Castro's attitude might be, and I was wary of that,'' he said.
In addition, said Hawkins,
"I was really disgusted. I thought the United States had acted
in an almost contemptible way about this whole thing..I just sort
of washed my hands of it and put it behind me, went on with my life
and tried not to think about it. It was one of the most disappointing
things that I ever had to do with in my life, professionally.''
He said he decided to speak
out when the CIA's Esterline "got in touch with me (early last
year) and said he thought it was time that we told the truth about
some of these things''...
There were, he said, several
"critical junctures'' in the operation when a "change of
course by the decision-making authority at the CIA was called for
if the Bay of Pigs disaster was to be avoided.''
Among them, he cites the
change in the landing site and the reduction in the number of B-26
aircraft participating in the initial attack in advance of the landing
- intended to knock out Castro's planes on the ground - either of
which should have aborted the operation.
Hawkins has praise, however,
for the brigade members, who he says "fought hard and well and
inflicted terrible casualties on their opponents. They were not defeated.
They simply ran out of ammunition and had no choice but to surrender.
And that was not their fault.''
While Hawkins considers
the air support critical to any chance of success at the Bay of Pigs,
he believes failure became virtually inevitable a month earlier when
Kennedy, acting on the advice of Secretary of State Rusk, rejected
the Trinidad landing as too "noisy,'' one that would attract
too much attention to the United States.
The initial plan, beginning
in 1960, had been to introduce trained paramilitary teams, of a few
men with special capabilities, into every Cuban province, which was
done. Their purpose was to develop armed resistance wherever they
could and engage in sabotage and propaganda operations.
Simultaneously, it was
planned to organize a small infantry force of 200 to 300 men to be
infiltrated in and join 800 to 1,000 guerrillas already operating
in the Escambray Mountains of Central Cuba above Trinidad.
But, said Hawkins, as the
Soviets increased their shipments of arms and military equipment and
Castro began to create a large militia force, Bissell decided in the
fall of 1960 "that he should have a larger force to get in there,
and he hit on the figure of 1,500.''
It was not until early
spring of 1961 that the brigade got up to 1,500 men, according to
Hawkins, with Trinidad still the targeted landing site.
Word came March 11 that
the president wanted a new, less "noisy'' landing site and a
night instead of a dawn landing, as originally planned.
"We were very surprised
when we got word that the president had vetoed the Trinidad plan,
which we thought was the best and probably only place in Cuba where
we had a chance to pull this thing off,'' Hawkins said. "It was
a good plan, I thought, and we had no idea that it was going to be
rejected because it had been discussed right on up to that time.''
Bissell, he said, advised
him as they were standing in the corridor that the president had given
four days to come up with a "quieter operation. He said this
one is too noisy, too much like an invasion. Of course, it was an
invasion.''
Working around the clock,
Hawkins and the paramilitary staff pored over maps and intelligence
reports, determining that the Bay of Pigs was the only alternate place
an airfield could be seized that would support B-26s, a requirement.
Hawkins said he reported
this verbally to Bissell, at the same time telling him what was wrong
with the site, including its isolation and relative inaccessibility.
"Bissell said right
then and there on the spot, without consulting anybody else, since
this is the only place that satisfies the president's requirements,
then we'll go ahead with it on that basis. You draw up a plan immediately,
and we'll present it to the president.''
A sketch of the new plan
was drafted, presented to Kennedy and approved March 15, a month before
the landing took place.
"After we got to drawing
the detailed plan,'' Hawkins said, ``I had time to do some careful
thinking about the thing. Before, I had just been doing what I was
told - get a plan. So we got it. But then I decided this plan has
no chance. It's going to fail.''
Hawkins said he discussed
his concerns with Esterline, the CIA's project director for the invasion,
who said, "That's exactly what I think. It can't work. It's not
going to work.''
He said they met with Bissell
at his home in Georgetown the following Sunday and expressed their
reservations.
Hawkins said the main purpose
of the meeting was to insist that "if you want to go ahead with
this operation at the Bay of Pigs, we want out. We just don't want
to be part of a disaster, and that's just what it's going to be."
"We told him in no
uncertain terms... He didn't give any indication at all that he
was willing to give up the landing at the Bay of Pigs. He says, 'Look,
you just can't desert me at this point. I won't be able to carry on
without you.' Well, we di dn't like it, but we agreed.. we won't quit
- not now, anyway. We left there thinking that we were headed for
trouble, headed for disaster.
"But,'' said Hawkins,
"it's a difficult thing for a Marine officer or a CIA officer
to ask to be relieved of his duty. It's a serious thing to do and
you don't like to do it, so we stuck with him, and the results you
know.''
"The change of site
was the critical thing that made it unlikely of causing the overthrow
of Castro,'' Hawkins believes. "I always thought that it was
going to take some time. If we got the brigade up into the Escambray
(Mountains) and they could coordinate the other guerrillas up there
and maybe get new forces, new people, out of Trinidad into the Escambray
and then continue the air operations with Castro having no air, they
could stay up there a long time.''
Hawkins' account differs
somewhat from Bissell's, as recounted in his memoirs, Reflections
of a Cold Warrior, published posthumously last year.
Bissell wrote that he remembered
"meeting with Hawkins at the headquarters after a long weekend
and his saying, Well, we have developed an alternative plan to meet
the president's desire for a quieter landing and we think that you
will like it and approve of it. We do, and I think in some ways it's
better than the original.''
Hawkins says "that's
a lie, absolutely false. Jake and I told him that the plan could not
succeed, landing at the Bay of Pigs could not possibly succeed and
was going to end in disaster. That's the word I used.'' Esterline
recalls the meeting the same way.
Bissell did not mention
the Sunday afternoon meeting at his home with Hawkins and Esterline,
which most Bay of Pigs historians now consider a key event.
Bissell acknowledged in
his memoirs, however, that ``there is no doubt that failure to question
the viability of the move (from Trinidad) had serious repercussions.''
"They had no chance
to escape out of the Bay of Pigs,'' Hawkins said. "We told Bissell
that. I told him that. They can't get out of there. Maybe a handful
or a few individuals could get out of there and sneak away, but the
bulk of them were trapped there. They can't get out.''
As for Hawkins, the change
in landing sites was just one more indication of Kennedy's lack of
commitment to the entire project.
"I felt that he was
not strongly committed to the operation at all. When he first was
briefed about it and I began to observe him when I went to these meetings,
he didn't seem enthusiastic about it, but he seemed interested.''
Hawkins describes the weekly
White House meetings with Kennedy on the Bay of Pigs as "essentially
discussions'' that "did not resolve questions of policy... As
policy questions arise, they should be resolved decisively and quickly.
This was not done for the Cuba Project.''
Much later, Hawkins said,
when he learned "about the efforts that (Kennedy) and his brother
(Attorney General Robert Kennedy) were making to assassinate Castro... it has occurred to me
that Kennedy thought he was going to solve the problem by this method, disposing of Castro through the Mafia. And
that would make the Cuban operation unnecessary, he thought.
"That's just a surmise
on my part. That could have influenced him to delay. In fact, I have
heard since, I don't know how reliable the information is, that the assassination was supposed to
come off not long before the invasion.''
He also believes that Kennedy
was unduly influenced by Rusk and the State Department.
"The first time I
ever saw him (Rusk) at one of the presidential meetings, he made it
abundantly clear that he was opposed to the operation completely.
And he didn't want any air operations whatsoever.''
"I always felt that
the Department of State came away from this thing without being blamed
as much as they should have been blamed for what happened,'' Hawkins
says now.
All of that said, Hawkins
still places primary responsibility for failure with Bissell.
"I think that the
primary fault must be placed at Bissell's door. It really was Bissell's
operation. Mr. Dulles was just sort of on the fringes of this thing.
He gave Bissell free hand to do what he wanted throughout this operation.''
The landing went ahead,
and the invasion failed. Hawkins went back to the Marine Corps, but
not before drafting an "after-action'' report on the operation that remains classified.
"It was very comprehensive,
included everything that I knew about that was done, and drew some
conclusions about it,'' Hawkins remembers. "I recommended among many other things that
no further effort should be made to overthrow Castro in this manner,
by these covert means, because he is now already too strong to be
overthrown by paramilitary operations.''
(4)
Don
Bohning,
Troubling
questions still haunt legacy of Bay of Pigs, The Miami
Herald (17th April, 1998)
Thirty-seven years later, as the Bay of Pigs fades into history, many
questions have been answered by the release of long-secret documents
and the increasing willingness of the few remaining central participants
to talk.
But many of the answers
raise other questions surrounding the ill-fated invasion of Cuba on
April 17, 1961, by a brigade of 1,500 Cuban exiles trained and supported
by the CIA.
Two of the most troubling,
according to participants and analysts:
Was a failed Mafia assassination
plot against Fidel Castro directly linked to the invasion? And, if
so, did that detract from the invasion planning and execution?
Did a combination of ego
and ambition cause the late Richard Bissell -- the man most directly
responsible for the invasion as the CIA's chief of clandestine and
covert operations -- to mislead both President Kennedy and Bissell's
own planners?
Author Seymour Hersh, in
his recent book The Dark Side of Camelot, a critical look at
the Kennedy presidency, most persuasively raises the linkage between
the invasion and an assassination plot that began under the Eisenhower
administration.
Why was mission canceled?
" One of Kennedy's most controversial and least understood decisions
during the Bay of Pigs was the cancellation of the second bombing
mission'' Hersh writes. "The assumption that Castro would be
dead when the first Cuban exiles went ashore, and the fact that he
was not, may explain Kennedy's decision to cut his losses. The Mafia
had failed and a very much alive Castro was rallying his troops.''
Hersh quotes Robert Maheu,
a former FBI agent and the link between administration officials and
the Mafia for the assassination plot code-named ZR/Rifle, as telling
him that "Taking out Castro was part of the invasion plan.''
Castro's murder, said Maheu, was to take place "before - but
preferably at the time of - the invasion.''
The plot fell apart when
Juan Orta, who functioned as Castro's private secretary and was to
slip a poisoned pill into a drink, apparently got cold feet and took
refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy a few days before the invasion. Orta
died several years ago.
Kennedy, Hersh said in
an interview, must have known by April 15 - two days before the invasion
- and perhaps earlier, that the assassination plot had fallen apart
and "he was in real trouble with the operation.''
The question then became,
Hersh said, whether Kennedy should "take a bath by going ahead
with it or take a bigger bath politically if he stops it. If he stops
it he takes a tremendous hit from the right.''
Peter Kornbluh, senior
analyst at the National Security Archive, a nonprofit documentation
center in Washington responsible for the recent declassification of
hundreds of Bay of Pigs-related CIA documents, concurs that the question
of linkage between the assassination and invasion is an intriguing
one.
"The degree to which
it (the assassination plot) was coordinated as part of the planning
and whether the President actually knew about it and factored it into
the decision-making process'' is a key question, Kornbluh says.
Historian Arthur Schlesinger
insisted in at least two appearances at the Miami Book Fair last November
that he did not believe Kennedy was even aware of an assassination
plot against Castro.
If there was a link, key
CIA planners for the Bay of Pigs invasion apparently were not aware
of it. Jake Esterline, the Bay of Pigs project director, says he learned
of the assassination plot by accident when he was asked to approve
an unexplained expenditure by the late J.C. King, then head of the
CIA's Western Hemisphere division.
"I really forced my
way in by refusing to pay unless I knew what I was paying for,'' Esterline
said in an interview. "That got me partially briefed.''
Esterline said he was sworn
to secrecy and didn't even tell Jack Hawkins, a retired Marine colonel
who headed the Bay of Pigs paramilitary planning staff. Hawkins did
not learn about it until long after the failed invasion.
Esterline now believes
there "is no question about it... if that whole specter of an
assassination attempt using the Mafia hadn't been on the horizon,
there would have been more preparation'' for the invasion.
He believes "Kennedy
and his group were not prepared to support the operation and if Bissell
and others hadn't felt they had that magic bullet (assassination),
I don't think we would have had all the hairsplitting over air support.''
Esterline has no doubt
that Kennedy knew of the assassination plot.
The questions surrounding
Bissell arose in the spring of 1996 at a conference on the Bay of
Pigs attended by former CIA officials, brigade members and academics,
following release of documents to the National Security Archive.
Those documents and later
information have convinced both Hawkins and Esterline, who worked
for Bissell on the Bay of Pigs, that Bissell was not leveling with
them and probably was not passing on their concerns to Kennedy over
such things as a change in the landing site and air cover.
Hawkins cites a recently
declassified briefing paper by Bissell to the President dated April
12, 1961, that he says "proves that Bissell had agreed with Kennedy
several days before the operation began to cut the air support in
half.''
Bissell didn't tell Esterline
and Hawkins about the decision until the invasion.
"I am sure Bissell
never made it clear to the President why it was necessary to eliminate
Castro's air force before the landing,'' Hawkins said. `"I gave
great emphasis to this... Bissell knew what the military staff's opinion
was about this need but . . . Bissell never pressed it.''
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