Anthony
Eden, the son of Sir William Eden, was born
at Windlestone Hall, Bishop Auckland, in 1897. Eden, like his father
and grandfather, was educated at Eton. He
hoped to go to Sandhurst before joining
the British Army, but was rejected because
of his poor eyesight.
With the outbreak of the First World War the
British Army reduced its entry standards, and Eden was able to obtain
a commission in the King's Royal Rifle Corps. Soon after Lieutenant
Eden arrived in France in June 1916, he heard that his sixteen year
old brother, Nicholas Eden, had been killed when the Indefatigable
had been sunk at the Battle of Jutland.
Eden served on the Western Front and
won the Military Cross at the Battle
of the Somme in 1916. After one attack at at Delville Wood, Eden's
he battalion suffered 394 casualties, of whom 127 were killed. Nearly
all the junior officers were either dead or badly wounded and as a
result Eden was promoted to adjutant. By the time the war ended, Eden
had reached the rank of major.
After the war Eden was undecided about whether to stay in the army.
He eventually selected a career in politics and in the 1923
General Election won Warwick & Leamington for the Conservative
Party. Three years later he was appointed parliamentary private
secretary to Austin Chamberlain at
the Foreign Office. A post he held until the government lost power
at the 1929 General Election.
In the National Government formed by Ramsay
MacDonald in 1931, Eden became Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs
(1931-34). When Stanley Baldwin became
prime minister in 1935 he appointed Eden as his Foreign Secretary.
Eden disagreed with Neville Chamberlain
about the way to deal with fascism in Europe and in 1938 he resigned
from office. When Winston Churchill
took over from Chamberlain in 1940, Eden was reappointed as Foreign
Secretary.
After the Labour Party victory in the 1945
General Election, Eden became deputy leader of the opposition.
The 1951 General Election saw the return
of a Conservative government and once
more Eden became Foreign Secretary.
In 1951 Mohammed Mussadeq,
took power in Iran and nationalised the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Britain's largest overseas asset and the
world's biggest oil-producer. Eden approved a SIS plot to overthrow
Mussadeq. The following year MI6 agent George Young helped to organize
protests demonstrations against the government in Iran. In August
1953 over 300 people died during a riot in Teheran. Mussadeq resigned
and was replaced by the SIS candidate, the Shah of Iran.
Eden
replaced
Winston Churchill as prime minister
in April, 1955. Later that year he attended a summit conference at
Geneva with the heads of government of the USA, France and the Soviet
Union.
President Dwight
Eisenhower became
concerned about the close relationship developing between Egypt
and the Soviet
Union. In July 1956 Eisenhower cancelled a promised grant
of 56 million dollars towards the building of the Aswan Dam. Gamal
Abdel Nasser
was furious and on 26th
July he announced he intended to nationalize the Suez
Canal. The shareowners, the majority of whom were from Britain
and France,
were promised compensation. Nasser argued that the revenues from the
Suez Canal would help to finance the Aswan Dam.
Eden feared
that Nasser intended to form an Arab Alliance that would cut off oil
supplies to Europe. Secret negotiations took place between Britain,
France
and Israel and it was agreed to make a
joint attack on Egypt.
On 29th October 1956, the
Israeli Army invaded Egypt. Two days later British and French bombed
Egyptian airfields. British and French troops landed at Port Said
at the northern end of the Suez Canal on 5th November. By this time
the Israelis had captured the Sinai peninsula.
President Dwight
Eisenhower and
his secretary of state, John
Foster Dulles,
grew increasingly concerned about these developments and at the United
Nations the representatives from the United
States and the Soviet Union demanded
a cease-fire. When it was clear the rest of the world were opposed
to the attack on Egypt, and on the 7th November the governments of
Britain,
France
and Israel agreed
to withdraw. They were then replaced by UN troops who policed the
Egyptian frontier.
Gamal
Abdel Nasser
now blocked the Suez Canal.
He also used his new status to urge Arab nations to reduce oil exports
to Western Europe. As a result petrol rationing had to be introduced
in several countries in Europe.
In failing health, Eden resigned on 9th January, 1957.
Created Earl of Avon in 1961, Eden spent his later years writing his
Memoirs (3 volumes, 1960-65) and
Another World (1976), an account
of his war experiences. Anthony Eden died in
1977.
(1)
Henry
(Chips) Channon,
diary entry (23rd December, 1935)
Anthony Eden has been appointed Foreign Secretary by Mr
Baldwin. His appointment is a victory for 'The Left', for the pro-Leaguers.
He has had a meteoric rise, young Anthony. I knew him well at Oxford,
where he was mild, aesthetic, handsome, cultivated and interested
in the East - now at thirty-eight he is Foreign Secretary. There is
hardly a parallel in our history. I wish him luck; I like him; but
I have never had an exaggerated opinion of his brilliance, though
his appearance is magnificent.
(2) Anthony
Eden, speech in the House of Commons explaining why he had resigned
from the government as Foreign Secretary (21st February, 1938)
I do not believe that we can make progress in European appeasement
if we allow the impression to gain currency abroad that we yield to
constant pressure. I am certain in my own mind that progress depends
above all on the temper of the nation, and that tmper must find expression
in a firm spirit. This spirit I am confident is there. Not to give
voice it is I believe fair neither to this country nor to the world.
(3)
Duff
Cooper, Old Men Forget (1953)
I had been glad when Eden
had become Foreign Secretary and I had always given him my support
in Cabinet when he needed it. I believed that he was fundamentally
right on all the main problems of foreign policy, that he fully understood
how serious was the German menace and how hopeless the policy of appeasement.
Not being, however, a member of the Foreign Policy Committee, I was
ignorant of how deep the cleavage of opinion between him and the Prime
Minister had become. It is much to his credit that he abstained from
all lobbying of opinion and sought to gain no adherents either in
the Cabinet or the House of Commons.
Had he made an effort
to win my support at the time he would probably have succeeded, but
with regard to Italy I held strong opinions of my own. I felt, as
I have written earlier, that the Abyssinian business had been badly
bungled, that we should never have driven Mussolini into the arms
of Hitler, and that it might not be too late to regain him. The Italo-German
alliance was an anomaly. The Germans and Austrians were the traditional
enemies of the Italians; the English and the French, who had contributed
so much to their liberation, were their historic friends, and Garibaldi
had laid a curse upon any Italian Government that fought against them.
The size and strength of the Third Reich made her too formidable a
friend for the smallest of the Great Powers, who would soon find that
from an ally she had sunk to a satellite. These were the thoughts
that were in my mind during the long Cabinet meeting that took place
that Saturday afternoon.
(4) Winston
Churchill, speech in the House of Commons on the resignation
of Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary (22nd February, 1938)
The resignation of the late Foreign Secretary may well be a milestone
in history. Great quarrels, it has been well said, arise from small
occasions but seldom from small causes. The late Foreign Secretary
adhered to the old policy which we have all forgotten for so long.
The Prime Minister and his colleagues have entered upon another and
a new policy. The old policy was an effort to establish the rule of
law in Europe, and build up through the League of Nations effective
deterrents against the aggressor. Is it the new policy to come to
terms with the totalitarian Powers in the hope that by great and far-reaching
acts of submission, not merely in sentiment and pride, but in material
factors, peace may be preserved.
A
firm stand by France and Britain, under the authority of the League
of Nations, would have been followed by the immediate evacuation of
the Rhineland without the shedding of a drop of blood; and the effects
of that might have enabled the more prudent elements of the German
Army to gain their proper position, and would not have given to the
political head of Germany the enormous ascendancy which has enabled
him to move forward. Austria has now been laid in thrall, and we do
not know whether Czechoslovakia will not suffer a similar attack.
(5)
Clement
Attlee,
As It Happened (1954)
When Anthony Eden and Lord
Cranborne resigned from the Chamberlain Government early in 1938,
as a protest against the Prime Minister's decision to open conversations
with Mussolini whilst Italy was carrying on intervention in Spain
and anti-British propaganda, I told the House that the policy of the
Government was "an abject surrender to the dictators" and
that "the Government,
instead of trying to deal with the causes of war, had
always been trying in a feeble way to play off one dictator against
another. That is a policy which sooner or later leads to war."
(6)
Henry
(Chips) Channon,
diary entry (22nd February, 1938)
The Government has had a triumph: at the end of a long
day a majority of 161 against the Censure Vote is a victory indeed.
The atmosphere during Questions was excited and no-one listened, as
they never do, when a crisis is coming. Greenwood in an almost comic
speech attacked the Government. Chamberlain replied. More speeches.
At length Winston Churchill rose, and defended Eden, and attacked
the Government. It was yet another bid on his part to lead an Independent,
perhaps Centre, party. He was followed by Bob Boothby, who was clear,
sensible and brief, and sat down amid applause. Then Lloyd George,
looking mischievous and hearty, rose, and we knew we were in for fireworks.
And we were. At first he was interesting about the Treaty of Versailles,
and told the House how there had been arguments at the time for uniting
Austria to Germany. He then began a eulogy of Eden, who, to everyone's
surprise, was seated with Cranborne and Jim Thomas in the third row
behind the Government: people said that it would have been better
taste had he followed Sam Hoare's example, and stayed away. Lloyd
George ranted on, cheered by the Socialists. Now and then Anthony
nodded. Then Lloyd George deliberately accused the Prime Minister
of withholding important information, and for a terrible moment the
House stormed: the PM went scarlet with anger, but coolly denied the
charges. Lloyd George passionately repeated them. . The House shouted
'Withdraw', and a duel followed between the old ex-Prime Minister
and the present one and Chamberlain's position was not made easier
by an interruption from Eden. The battle hung on a telegram from Italy
on Sunday which, however, was only delivered by Count Grandi to the
Prime Minister on Monday. Suddenly it was clear, even to the prejudiced,
that Chamberlain had done nothing wrong and the atmosphere lightened.
My heart went out to the PM and I determined to support him always.
I feel loyal about him as I never did about old Farmer Baldwin.
(7)
Anthony Eden, Memoirs: The Reckoning (1965)
I had
resigned because I could not agree with the foreign policy which Mr.
Neville Chamberlain and his colleagues wished to pursue. The opinions,
especially of the senior among them, had become increasingly at odds
with my own, and these were the colleagues with whom I had to deal.
Every detail became a negotiation in the Cabinet before it could be
a factor in our foreign policy. This was an impossible situation.
My action had gained support
in the Liberal and Labour Parries as well
as in my own, and I had some encouragement to form a new party in
opposition to Mr. Chamberlain's foreign policy. I considered this
once or twice during
the next few months, only to reject it as not being practical
politics. Within the Conservative Party, I, and those who shared
my views, were a minority of about thirty Members of Parliament
out of nearly four hundred. Our number might be expected to grow
if events proved us right, but the more complete the break, the more
reluctant would the newly converted be to join us.
The Labour Party, though
anti-Chamberlain and ready to speak against the dictators, was not
yet prepared to face the consequences, especially in rearmament, which
it continued to oppose until the outbreak of war. Many Liberals were
also tangled in the same contradiction. Such disparate elements as
these could not form a party. On
the other hand, the call for national unity and for a corresponding
effort in armaments to meet the growing dangers was more likely to
be
heeded if voiced by men who believed in it with conviction, whatever
their party. Their numbers, as well as their authority, might then
influence events.
(8)
Anthony Eden, speech at Stratford-upon-Avon (23rd September,
1938)
Nobody
will quarrel with the Government's wish to bring about appeasement
in Europe. But if appeasement is to mean what it says, it must not
be at the expense either of our vital interests, or of our national
reputation, or of our sense of fair dealing.
For our own people the
issue becomes clarified. They see freedom of thought, of race, of
worship grow every week more restricted in Europe. The conviction
is growing that continued retreat can only lead to ever-widening confusion.
They know that a stand must be made. They pray that it be not made
too late.
(9)
Anthony
Eden, speech in the House of Commons (6th December, 1939)
Hitler
himself is not a phenomenon; he is a symptom; he is the Prussian spirit
of military domination come up again. National Socialism was originally
conceived in militarism, and it believes only in force. From the beginning,
it has organized its people for war. It is the most barren creed that
was ever put before mankind. Therefore, if it is allowed to triumph
there will be no future for civilization.
(10)
Anthony Eden, radio broadcast on the formation of the Home
Guard (14th May, 1940)
Since
the war began, the Government have received countless inquiries from
all over the Kingdom from men of all ages who are for one reason or
another not at present engaged in military service, and who wish to
do something for the defence of their country. Well, now is your opportunity.
We want large numbers
of such men in Great Britain, who are British subjects, between the
ages of seventeen and sixty-five, to come forward now and offer their
services in order to make assurance doubly sure. The name of the new
Force which is now to be raised will be ' The Local Defence Volunteers'.
This name describes its duties in three words. It must be understood
that this is, so to speak, a spare-time job, so there will be no need
for any volunteer to abandon his present occupation.
When on duty you will
form part of the armed forces, and your period of service will be
for the duration of the war. You will not be paid, but you will receive
uniform and will be armed. You will be entrusted with certain vital
duties for which reasonable fitness and a knowledge of firearms is
necessary. These duties will not require you to live away from your
homes.
In order to volunteer,
what you have to do is to give in your name at your local police station;
and then, as and when we want you, we will let you know. This appeal
is directed chiefly to those who live in country parishes, in small
towns, in villages and in less densely inhabited suburban areas. I
must warn you that for certain military reasons there will be some
localities where the numbers required will be small, and others where
your services will not be required at all.
Here, then, is the opportunity
for which so many of you have been waiting. Your loyal help, added
to the arrangements which already exist, will make and keep our country
safe.
(11)
Anthony Eden, Memoirs: The Reckoning (1965)
I
had expected the response to this appeal to be prompt. In fact it
was overwhelming, the first recruit arriving within four minutes of
the end of the broadcast. It was quite impossible to deal with the
number of volunteers who flocked to join, still less to provide them
with weapons. But this was only a beginning and the answer which mattered
had already been given. The Local Defence Volunteers acted as a catalyst,
giving point to the nation's will to resist. As the years passed,
the volunteers recorded long periods of service which were often dreary,
but always devoted, with only one reward, the knowledge that 'The
Home Guard', as it was re-christened, closed a gap in our defences
which must have been dangerous and could have been fatal.
(12)
Anthony Eden, radio broadcast after Dunkirk
(2nd June, 1940)
Our
duty in this country is plain. We must make good our losses and we
must win this war. To do that we must profit by the lessons of this
battle. Brave hearts alone cannot stand up against steel. We need
more planes, more tanks, more guns. The people of this country must
work as never before. We must show the same qualities, the same discipline,
and the same self-sacrifice at home as the British Expeditionary Force
have shown in the field.
The nation honours with
proud reverence those who fell that their comrades might win through.
The innumerable actions, the countless deeds of valour of the last
week, cannot all be recorded now. Each will have its place in history.
Soldiers, sailors, airmen, who gave their lives to help theirs is
an immortal memory. Their spirit must be our banner, their sacrifice
our spur.
(13)
Anthony Eden met Paul
Reynaud, Maxime
Weygand and Henri-Philippe
Petain on
10th June 1940. He wrote about it in his autobiography, Memoirs:
The Reckoning (1965)
Paul
Reynaud received us, firm and courteous despite the strain. We soon
got down to discussion across the dining-room table; Petain, Reynaud,
Weygand facing Churchill, Dill and me, with interpreters. General
Georges joined us later. We talked for almost three hours, the discussion
hardly advancing matters. The speakers were polite and correct, but
although at that time the Maginot Line had not been attacked, it was
soon evident that our French hosts had no hope.
Early in our talks, Weygand
described the military situation, explaining how he had attempted
to block a number of gaps in the line. He believed he had succeeded
and, for the moment, the line held, but he had no more reserves. Somebody
asked what would happen if another breach were made. 'No further military
action will then be possible,' Weygand replied. Reynaud at once intervened
sharply: 'That would be a political decision, Monsieur Ie General.'
Weygand bowed and said: 'Certainly.' Georges told us that the French
had altogether only some one hundred and ninety-five fighter aircraft
left on the northern front.
Despite all the difficulties,
our dinner, though simple, was admirably cooked and served. Reynaud
presided, with Churchill on his right, Weygand sat opposite and I
on his right. As we were taking our places, a tall and somewhat angular
figure in uniform walked by on my side of the table. This was General
Charles de Gaulle, Under-Secretary for Defence, whom I had met only
once before. Weygand invited him pleasantly to take a place on his
left. De Gaulle replied, curtly as I thought, that he had instructions
to sit next to the British Prime Minister. Weygand flushed up, but
made no comment, and so the meal began.
I had Marshal Petain on
my other side. Conversation was not easy. His refrain was the destruction
of France and the daily devastation of her cities, of which he mentioned
several by name. I was sympathetic, but added that there were even
worse fates than the destruction of cities. Petain rejoined that it
was all very well for Britain to say that, we did not have the war
in our country. When I said that we might have, I received an incredulous
grunt in reply.
With General Weygand my
talk was perfectly friendly and consisted mainly of a discussion about
our available forces in Britain and what we were doing to speed their
training. I had little cheer to give him. Weygand was something of
an enigma. He had a famous reputation, crowned by his victory with
Pilsudski over the Bolshevik forces in 1920. I had met him on several
occasions, most recently early that year in
the Middle East, and always found him friendly, quick and receptive,
a modest man carrying
his fame without affectation or conceit. He worked
well with General Wavell, for the two men understood each other.
I was glad when I heard that he had been called back to France to
take over the supreme command. He achieved little, but probably no
man could. At this stage, though always correct and courteous, he
gave the impression of resigned fatalism. He was certainly not a man
to fight the last desperate comer.
(14)
Anthony Eden, diary (1942)
7th
June: Winston rang up twice in morning. First about Libya battle,
as to which we agreed that reports were disappointing. We were both
depressed by extent to which Rommel appears able to retain offensive.
"I fear that we have not very good generals," said Winston.
14th June: Libyan battle
is raging fiercely. Rommel still seems to have
the initiative and either his resources are much greater than our
people judged, or
his losses have been considerably less than they estimated.
On their calculation he should have few tanks left, yet he always
comes up strong.
(15)
Anthony Eden, Memoirs: The Reckoning (1965)
On July 14th, 1942, Mr.
Mask told me that reports from the Russian front were very grave and
he wanted to know if there was any news of the latest convoy carrying
military supplies to Archangel. I said that I regretted to have to
tell him that the news was bad. Only five ships had got through out
of the forty which had sailed; it was possible that two more might
yet do so. The losses in shipping and material must have been very
heavy; so far as we knew, about a hundred tanks
out of six hundred had arrived and forty aircraft.
(16)
Anthony Eden, telegram to Winston Churchill
(March, 1943)
The first point raised
by the President was the structure of the United Nations organization
after the war. The general idea is that there should be three organizations.
The first would be a general assembly at which all the United Nations
would be represented. This assembly would only meet about once a year
and its purpose would be to enable representatives of all the smaller
powers to blow off steam. At the other end of the scale would be an
executive committee composed of representatives of the Four Powers.
This body would take all the more important decisions and wield police
powers of the United Nations. In between these two bodies would be
an advisory council composed of representatives of the Four Powers
and of, say, six or eight other representatives elected on a regional
basis, roughly on the basis of population. There might thus be one
representative from Scandinavia and Finland and one or two from groups
of Latin American states. This council would meet from time to time
as might be required to settle any international questions that might
be brought before it.
The President said it
was essential to include China among the Four Powers and to organize
all these United Nations organs on a worldwide and not on a regional
basis. He made it clear that the only appeal which would be likely
to carry weight with the United States public, if they were to undertake
international responsibilities, would be one based upon a worldwide
conception. They would be very suspicious of any organization that
was only regional. We have strong impression that it is through their
feeling for China
that the President is seeking to lead his people to accept international
responsibilities.
(17)
Anthony Eden, memorandum to Winston Churchill (12th July, 1943)
Our main problem after
the war will be to contain Germany. Our treaty with the Soviet Union,
which is designed to secure the collaboration of the Soviet Union
for this purpose on Germany's eastern flank, needs to be balanced
by an understanding with a powerful France in the west. These arrangements
will be indispensable for our security whether or not the United States
collaborate in the maintenance of peace on this side of the Atlantic.
Our whole policy towards
France and Frenchmen should therefore be governed by this consideration.
In dealing with European problems of the future we are likely to have
to work more closely with France even than with the United States,
and while we should naturally concert our French policy so far as
we can with Washington, there are limits beyond which we ought not
to allow our policy to be governed by theirs.
Europe expects us to have
a European policy of our own, and to state it. That policy must aim
at die restoration of the independence of the smaller European Allies
and of the greatness of France.
We have intimate dealings
with the French in Syria and Madagascar, and we have French forces
stationed in this country. We have to live and work with France in
the future. From both the political and the legal point of view it
is inconvenient not to have formal relations with the authority whom
we in fact recognize as responsible for all the French territories
and armed forces which are collaborating with us in the war.
(18)
Anthony
Eden wrote about Yalta in his autobiography,
Memoirs: The Reckoning (1965)
Roosevelt was, above all
else, a consummate politician. Few men could see more clearly their
immediate objective, or show greater artistry in obtaining it. As
a price of these gifts, his long-range vision was not quite so sure.
The President shared a widespread American suspicion of the British
Empire as it had once been and, despite his knowledge of world affairs,
he was always anxious to make it plain to Stalin that the United States
was not 'ganging up' with Britain against Russia. The outcome of this
was some confusion in Anglo-American relations which profited the
Soviets.
Roosevelt did not confine
his dislike of colonialism to the British Empire alone, for it was
a principle with him, not the less cherished for its possible advantages.
He hoped that former colonial territories, once free of their masters,
would become politically and economically dependent upon the United
States, and had no fear that other powers might
fill that role.
Winston Churchill's strength
lay in his vigorous sense of purpose and his courage, which carried
him undismayed over obstacles daunting to lesser men. He was also
generous and impulsive, but this could be a handicap at the conference
table. Churchill liked to talk, he did not like to listen, and he
found it difficult to wait for, and seldom let pass, his turn to speak.
The spoils in the diplomatic game do not necessarily go to the man
most eager to debate.
Marshal Stalin as a negotiator
was the toughest proposition of all. Indeed, after something like
thirty years' experience of international conferences of one kind
and another, if I had to pick a team for going into a conference room,
Stalin would be my first choice. Of course the man was ruthless and
of course he knew his purpose. He never wasted a word. He never stormed,
he was seldom even irritated. Hooded, calm, never raising his voice,
he avoided the repeated negatives of Molotov which were so exasperating
to listen to. By more subtle methods he got what he wanted without
having seemed so obdurate.
There was a confidence,
even an intimacy, between Stalin and Molotov such as I have never
seen between any other two Soviet leaders, as if Stalin knew that
he had a valuable henchman and Molotov was confident because he was
so regarded. Stalin might tease Molotov occasionally, but he was careful
to uphold his authority. Only once did I hear Stalin speak disparagingly
of his judgment and that was not before witnesses.
(19)
Hugh
Gaitskell, was at a dinner party
with Anthony
Eden
when the news of the nationalization of the
Suez Canal. His comments appeared in his diary on 26th July, 1956.
He (Eden) thought perhaps
they ought to take it to the Security Council.... I said 'Supposing
Nasser doesn't take any notice?' whereupon Selwyn Lloyd said 'Well,
I suppose in that case the old-fashioned ultimatum will be necessary.'
I said that I thought they ought to act quickly, whatever they did,
and that as far as Great Britain was concerned, public opinion would
almost certainly be behind them. But I also added that they must get
America into line.
(20)
The minutes of the cabinet meeting of the British government on 27th
July, 1956.
The Cabinet agreed that
we should be on weak ground in basing our resistance on the narrow
argument that Colonel Nasser had acted illegally. The Suez Canal Company
was registered as an Egyptian company under Egyptian law; and Colonel
Nasser had indicated that he intended to compensate the shareholders
at ruling market prices. From a narrow legal point of view, his action
amounted to no more than a decision to buy out the shareholders. Our
case must be presented on wider international grounds. Our argument
must be that the Canal was an important international asset and facility,
and that Egypt could not be allowed to exploit it for a purely internal
purpose. The Egyptians had not the technical ability to manage
it effectively; and their recent behaviour gave no confidence that
they would recognize their international obligations in respect of
it. It was a piece of Egyptian property but an international asset
of the highest importance and should be managed as an international
trust.
The Cabinet agreed that
for these reasons every effort must be made to restore effective international
control over the Canal. It was evident that the Egyptians would not
yield to economic pressures alone. They must be subjected to the maximum
political pressure which could only be applied by the maritime and
trading nations whose interests were most directly affected. And,
in the last resort, this political pressure must be backed by the
threat - and, if need be, the use of force.
(21)
Message sent by Anthony
Eden
to President
Dwight
Eisenhower
on 27th July, 1956.
(1) We are all agreed
that we cannot afford to allow Nasser to seize control of the Canal
in this way, in defiance of international agreements. If we take a
firm stand over this now, we shall have the support of all the maritime
Powers. If we do not, our influence and yours throughout the Middle
East will, we are convinced, be finally destroyed.
(2) The immediate threat
is to the oil supplies to Western Europe, a great part of which flows
through the Canal. We have reserves in the United Kingdom which would
last us for six weeks; and the countries of Western Europe have stocks,
rather smaller as we believe, on which they could draw for a time.
We are, however, at once considering means of limiting current consumption
so as to conserve our supplies. If the Canal were closed we should
have to ask you to help us by reducing the amount which you draw from
the pipeline terminals in the Eastern Mediterranean and possibly by
sending us supplementary supplies for a time from your side of the
world.
(3) It is, however, the
outlook for the longer term which is more threatening. The Canal is
an international asset and facility, which is vital to the free world.
The maritime Powers cannot afford to allow Egypt to expropriate it
and to exploit it by using the revenues for her own internal purposes
irrespective of the interests of the Canal and of the Canal users.
Apart from the Egyptians' complete lack of technical qualifications,
their past behaviour gives no confidence that they can be trusted
to manage it with any sense of international obligation. Nor are they
capable of providing the capital which will soon be needed to widen
and deepen it so that it may be capable of handling the increased
volume of traffic which it must carry in the years to come. We should,
I am convinced, take this opportunity to put its management on a firm
and lasting basis as an international trust.
(4) We should not allow
ourselves to become involved in legal quibbles about the rights of
the Egyptian Government to nationalize what is technically an Egyptian
company, or in financial arguments about their capacity to pay the
compensation which they have offered. I feel sure that we should take
issue with Nasser on the broader international grounds summarized
in the preceding paragraph.
(5) As we see it we are
unlikely to attain our objective by economic pressures alone. I gather
that Egypt is not due to receive any further aid from you. No large
payments from her sterling balances here are due before January. We
ought in the first instance to bring the maximum political pressure
to bear on Egypt. For this apart from our own action, we should invoke
the support of all the interested Powers. My colleagues and I are
convinced that we must be ready, in the last resort to use force to
bring Nasser to his senses. For our part we are prepared to do so.
I have this morning instructed our Chiefs of Staff to prepare a military
plan accordingly.
(6) However, the first
step must be for you and us and France to exchange views,
align our policies and concert together how we can best bring the
maximum pressure to bear on the Egyptian Government.
(22)
President
Dwight
Eisenhower
letter to Anthony Eden
on 1st August, 1956.
From the moment that Nasser
announced nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, my thoughts have
been constantly with you. Grave problems are placed before both our
governments, although for each of us they naturally differ in type
and character. Until this morning, I was happy to feel that we were
approaching decisions as to applicable procedures somewhat along parallel
lines, even though there were, as would be expected, important differences
as to detail. But early this morning I received the message, communicated
to me through Murphy from you and Harold Macmillan, telling me on
a most secret basis of your decision to employ force without delay
or attempting any intermediate and less drastic steps.
We recognize the transcendent
worth of the Canal to the free world and the possibility that eventually
the use of force might become necessary in order to protect international
rights. But we have been hopeful that through a Conference in which
would be represented the signatories to the Convention of 1888, as
well as other maritime nations, there would be brought about such
pressures on the Egyptian Government that the efficient operation
of the Canal could be assured for the future.
For my part, I cannot
over-emphasize the strength of my conviction that some such method
must be attempted before action such as you contemplate should be
undertaken. If unfortunately the situation can finally be resolved
only by drastic means, there should be no grounds for belief anywhere
that corrective measures were undertaken merely to protect national
or individual investors, or the legal rights of a sovereign nation
were ruthlessly flouted. A conference, at the very least, should have
a great education effort throughout the world. Public opinion here,
and I am convinced, in most of the world, would be outraged should
there be a failure to make such efforts. Moreover, initial military
successes might be easy, but the eventual price might become far too
heavy.
I have given you my own
personal conviction, as well as that of my associates, as to the unwisdom
even of contemplating the use of military force at this moment. Assuming,
however, that the whole situation continued to deteriorate to the
point where such action would seem the only recourse, there are certain
political facts to remember. As you realize, employment of United
States forces is possible only through positive action on the part
of the Congress, which is now adjourned but can be reconvened on my
call for special reasons. If those reasons should involve the issue
of employing United States military strength abroad, there would have
to be a showing that every peaceful means of resolving the difficulty
had previously been exhausted. Without such a showing, there would
be a reaction that could very seriously affect our peoples' feeling
toward our Western Allies. I do not want to exaggerate, but I assure
you that this could grow to such an intensity as to have the most
far-reaching consequences.
I realize that the messages
from both you and Harold stressed that the decision taken was already
approved by the government and was firm and irrevocable. But I personally
feel sure that the American reaction would be severe and that great
areas of the world would share that reaction. On the other hand, I
believe we can marshall that opinion in support of a reasonable and
conciliatory, but absolutely firm, position. So I hope that you will
consent to reviewing this matter once more in its broadest aspects.
It is for this reason that I have asked Foster to leave this afternoon
to meet with your people tomorrow in London.
I have given you here
only a few highlights in the chain of reasoning that compels us to
conclude that the step you contemplate should not be undertaken until
every peaceful means of protecting the rights and the livelihood of
great portions of the world had been thoroughly explored and exhausted.
Should these means fail, and I think it is erroneous to assume in
advance that they needs must fail,
then world opinion would understand how earnestly all of us had attempted
to be just, fair and considerate, but that we simply could not accept
a situation that would in the long run prove disastrous to the prosperity
and living standards of every nation whose economy depends directly
or indirectly upon East-West shipping.
With warm personal regard
- and with earnest assurance of my continuing respect and friendship.
(23)
