In Mein
Kampf and
in numerous speeches Adolf
Hitler claimed
that the German population
needed more living space. Hitler's Lebensraum
policy was mainly directed at the Soviet
Union. He
was especially interested in the Ukraine where he planned to
develop a German colony. The system would be based on the
British occupation of India: "What India was for England the
territories of Russia will be for us... The German colonists ought
to live on handsome, spacious farms. The German services
will be lodged in marvellous buildings, the governors in
palaces... The Germans - this is essential - will have to constitute
amongst themselves a closed society, like a fortress. The
least of our stable-lads will be superior to any native."
Hitler intended to force
Norwegians, Swedes and Danes to move
to these territories in the East. Hitler believed that the Blitzkrieg
tactics employed against
the other European countries
could not be used as successfully against the Soviet Union.
He conceded that due to its enormous size, the Soviet Union
would take longer than other countries to occupy. However
he was confident it could still be achieved during the summer
months of 1941.
Joseph
Stalin believed that Germany would not invade the Soviet Union
until Britain and France
had been conquered. From Stalin's own calculations, this would not
be until the summer of 1942. Some of his closest advisers began to
argue that 1941 would be a much more likely date. The surrender of
France in June, 1940, cast doubts on Stalin's calculations.
Stalin's
response to France's defeat was to send Vyacheslav
Molotov
to Berlin for more discussions. Molotov was instructed to draw out
these talks for as long as possible. Stalin knew that if Adolf
Hitler did not attack the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 he
would have to wait until 1942. No one, not even someone as rash as
Hitler, would invade the Soviet Union in the winter, he argued.
Germany
was now in a strong negotiating position and found it impossible to
agree to Hitler's demands. As soon as talks broke-up, Hitler ordered
his military leaders to prepare for Operation Barbarossa. The plan
was for the invasion of the Soviet Union to start on the 15th May,
1941. Hitler believed that this would give the German Army enough
time to take control of the country before the harsh Soviet winter
set in.
General
Friedrich Paulus was asked to carry out
a strategic survey on the Soviet Union for
the proposed invasion. The main advice given by Paulus to Adolf
Hitler was to make sure that after the invasion the Red
Army did not retreat into the interior. For the campaign to be
successful he argued for battles of encirclement. He also suggested
that the main thrust should be made north of the Pripyat Marshes in
order to capture Moscow.
Information
on the proposed invasion came to Stalin from various sources. Richard
Sorge, an agent working for the Red
Orchestra in Japan, obtain information about the proposed invasion
as early as December, 1940. Winston Churchill sent a personal message
to Stalin in April, 1941, explaining how German troop movements suggested
that they were about to attack the Soviet Union. However, Stalin was
still suspicious of the British and thought that Churchill was trying
to trick him into declaring war on Germany.
When the
Red Orchestra prediction that Germany
would invade in May, 1941, did not take place, Stalin became even
more convinced that Germany had invaded Yugoslavia in April. Adolf
Hitler had expected the Yugoslavs to surrender immediately but
because of stubborn resistance, Hitler had to postpone Operation Barbarossa
for a few weeks.
On 21st
June, 1941, a German sergeant deserted to the Soviet forces. He informed
them that the German Army would attack at dawn the following morning.
Stalin was reluctant to believe the soldier's story and it was not
until the German attack took place that he finally accepted that his
attempts to avoid war with Germany until 1942 had failed.
The German
forces, made up of three million men and 3,400 tanks, advanced in
three groups. The north group headed for Leningrad, the centre group
for Moscow and the southern forces into the Ukraine. Within six days,
the German Army had captured Minsk. General Demitry
Pavlov, the man responsible for defending Minsk, and two of his
senior generals were recalled to Moscow and were shot for incompetence.
With the
execution of Pavlov and his generals, Joseph
Stalin made it clear that he would punish severely any commander
whom he believed had let down the Soviet Union. In future, Soviet
commanders thought twice about surrendering or retreating. Another
factor in this was the way that the German Army massacred the people
of Minsk. Terrified of both Stalin and Hitler, the Soviet people had
no option but to fight until they were killed.
The first
few months of the war was disastrous for the Soviet Union. The German
northern forces surrounded Leningrad
while the centre group made steady progress towards Moscow. German
forces had also made deep inroads into the Ukraine. Kiev was under
siege and Stalin's Chief of Staff, Georgi
Zhukov, suggested that the troops defending the capital of the
Ukraine should be withdrawn, thus enabling them to take up strong
defensive positions further east. Stalin insisted that the troops
stayed and by the time Kiev was taken, the casualties were extremely
high. It was the most comprehensive defeat experienced by the red
army in its history. However, the determined resistance put up at
Kiev, had considerably delayed the attack on Moscow.
It was
now September and winter was fast approaching. As German troops moved
deeper into the Soviet Union, supply lines became longer. Joseph
Stalin gave instructions that when forced to withdraw, the Red
Army should destroy anything that could be of use to the enemy.
The scorched earth policy and the formation
of guerrilla units behind the German front lines, created severe problems
for the German war machine which was trying to keep her three million
soldiers supplied with the necessary food and ammunition.
By October,
1941, German troops were only fifteen miles outside Moscow.
Orders were given for a mass evacuation of the city. In two weeks,
two million people left Moscow and headed east. Stalin rallied morale
by staying in Moscow. In a bomb-proof air raid shelter positioned
under the Kremlin, Stalin, as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, directed
the Soviet war effort. All major decisions made by his front-line
commanders had to be cleared with Stalin first.
In November,
1941, the German Army launched a new offensive on Moscow. The Soviet
army held out and the Germans were brought to a halt. Stalin called
for a counter-attack. His commanders had doubts about this policy
but Stalin insisted and on 4th December the Red
Army attacked. The German army, demoralized by its recent lack
of success, was taken by surprise and started to retreat. By January,
the Germans had been pushed back 200 miles.
Stalin's
military strategy was basically fairly simple. He believed it was
vitally important to attack the enemy as often as possible. He was
particularly keen to use new, fresh troops for these offensives. Stalin
argued that countries in western Europe had been beaten by their own
fear of German superiority. His main objective in using new troops
in this way was to convince them that the German forces were not invincible.
By pushing the German Army back at Moscow, Stalin proved to the Soviet
troops that Blizkrieg could be counteracted;
it also provided an important example to all troops throughout the
world fighting the German war-machine.
In December,
1941, Adolf Hitler agreed to the suggestion
made by Field Marshal Walther von Reichenau
that General Freidrich
Paulus should be given command of the 6th Army. Promoted
to general, Paulus took up his appointment on 1st January 1942 and
fought his first battle at Dnepropetrovsk in the Soviet
Union. The advance of the 6th Army was halted by the Red
Army and the following month Paulus was forced to order his men
to move back in search of better defensive positions.
On 9th
May 1942, General Semen Timoshenko,
with 640,000 men, attacked the 6th Army at Volchansk. Paulus, seriously
outnumbered, decided to move his troops back toward Kharkov. The 6th
Army was rescued by General Paul von Kleist
and his 1st Panzer Army when they struck Timoshenko's exposed southern
flank on 17th May. Paulus was now able to launch a counter-attack
on 20th May and by the end of the month all Soviet resistance had
come to an end. A total of 240,000 Soviet soldiers were killed or
captured and Paulus was awarded the Knights' Cross.
In the
summer of 1942 General Freidrich
Paulus advanced toward Stalingrad
with 250,000 men, 500 tanks, 7,000 guns and mortars, and 25,000 horses.
Progress was slow because fuel was rationed and Army Group A were
given priority. At the end of July 1942, a lack of fuel brought Paulus
to a halt at Kalach. It was not until 7th August that he had received
the supplies needed to continue with his advance. Over the next few
weeks his troops killed or captured 50,000 Soviet troops but on 18th
August, Paulus, now only thirty-five miles from Stalingrad, ran out
of fuel again.
When fresh
supplies reached him, Paulus decided to preserve fuel by move forward
with only his XIV Panzer corps. The Red Army
now attacked the advance party and they were brought to a halt just
short of Stalingrad. The rest of his forces were brought up and Paulus
now circled the city. As his northern flank came under attack Paulus
decided to delay the attack on the city until 7th September. While
he was waiting the Luftwaffe bombed
the city killing thousands of civilians.
As the
German Army advanced
into Stalingrad the Soviets fought
for every building. The deeper the troops got into the city, the more
difficult the street fighting became and casualties increased dramatically.
The German tanks were less effective in a fortified urban area as
it involved house-to-house fighting with rifles, pistols, machine-guns
and hand grenades. The Germans had particularly problems with cleverly
camouflaged artillery positions and machine-gun nests. The Soviets
also made good use of sniper detachments deployed in the bombed out
buildings in the city. On the 26th September the 6th Army was able
to raise the swastika flag over the government buildings in Red Square
but the street fighting continued.
Adolf
Hitler now ordered Paulus to take Stalingrad whatever the cost
to German forces. On the radio Hitler told the German people: "You
may rest assured that nobody will ever drive us out of Stalingrad."
When General Gustav von Wietersheim, commander of the XIV Panzer Corps,
complained about the high casualty rates, Paulus replaced him with
General Hans Hube. However, Paulus, who
had lost 40,000 soldiers since entering the city, was running out
of fighting men and on 4th October he made a desperate plea to Hitler
for reinforcements.
A few days
later five engineer battalions and a panzer division arrived in Stalingrad.
Fighting a war of attrition, Joseph Stalin
responded by ordering three more armies to the city. Soviet losses
were much higher than those of the Germans, but Stalin had more men
at his disposal than Paulus.
The heavy
rains of October turned the roads into seas of mud and the 6th Army's
supply conveys began to get bogged down. On 19th October the rain
turned to snow. Paulus continued to make progress and by the beginning
of November he controlled 90 per cent of the city. However, his men
were now running short of ammunition and food. Despite these problems
Paulus decided to order another major offensive on 10th November.
The German Army
took heavy casualties for the next two days and then the Red
Army launched a counterattack Paulus was forced to retreat southward
but when he reached Gumrak Airfield, Adolf
Hitler ordered him to stop and stand fast despite the danger of
encirclement. Hitler told him that Hermann
Goering had promised that the Luftwaffe
would provide the necessary supplies by air.
Senior
officers under Paulus argued that they doubted if the scale of the
airlift required could be achieved during a Russian winter. All of
the corps commanders argued for a breakout before the Red
Army were able to consolidate its positions. General Hans
Hube told Paulus: "A breakout is our only chance." Paulus
responded by saying that he had to obey Hitler's orders.
Throughout
December the Luftwaffe dropped an average
of 70 tons of supplies a day. The encircled German
Army needed a minimum of 300 tons a day. The soldiers were
put on one-third rations and began to kill and eat their horses. By
7th December the 6th Army were living on one loaf of bread for every
five men.
Now aware
that the 6th Army was in danger of being starved into surrender, Adolf
Hitler ordered Field Marshal Erich von
Manstein and the 4th Panzer Army to launch a rescue attempt. Manstein
managed to get within thirty miles of Stalingrad but was then brought
to a halt by the Red Army. On 27th December, 1942, Manstein decided
to withdraw as he was also in danger of being encircled by Soviet
troops.
In Stalingrad
over 28,000 German soldiers had died in just over a month. With little
food left Paulus gave the order that the 12,000 wounded men could
no longer be fed. Only those who could fight would be given their
rations. Erich von Manstein now gave
the order for Paulus to make a mass breakout. Paulus rejected the
order arguing that his men were too weak to make such a move.
On 30th
January, 1943, Adolf Hitler promoted to
Paulus to field marshal and sent him a message reminding him that
no German field marshal had ever been captured. Hitler was clearly
suggesting to Paulus to commit suicide but he declined and the following
day surrendered to the Red Army. The last
of the Germans surrendered on 2nd February.
The battle
for Stalingrad was over. Over 91,000
men were captured and a further 150,000 had died during the siege.
The German prisoners were forced marched to Siberia. About 45,000
died during the march to the prisoner of war camps and only about
7,000 survived the war.
David
Low, Someone is taking someone
for a walk (2nd November, 1939)
(1)
Leopold Trepper, the head of the Red
Orchestra, kept Joseph Stalin and
the Red Army informed of the planned German
invasion of the Soviet Union. He wrote about this in his autobiography,
The Great Game (1977)
On December
18, 1940, Hitler signed Directive Number 21, better known as Operation
Barbarossa. The first sentence of the plan was explicit: "The
German armed forces must be ready before the end of the war against
Great Britain to defeat the Soviet Union by means of Blitzkrieg."
Richard
Sorge warned the Centre immediately; he forwarded them a copy of the
directive. Week after week, the heads of Red Army Intelligence received
updates on the Wehrmacht's preparations. At the beginning of 1941,
Schulze-Boysen sent the Centre precise information on the operation
being planned; massive bombardments of Leningrad, Kiev, and Vyborg;
the number of divisions involved.
In February,
I sent a detailed dispatch giving the exact number of divisions withdrawn
from France and Belgium, and sent to the east. In May, through the
Soviet military attaché in Vichy, General Susloparov, I sent
the proposed plan of attack, and indicated the original date, May
15, then the revised date, and the final date. On May 12, Sorge warned
Moscow that 150 German divisions were massed along the frontier.
The Soviet
intelligence services were not the only ones in possession of this
information. On March 11, 1941, Roosevelt gave the Russian ambassador
the plans gathered by American agents for Operation Barbarossa. On
the 10th June the English released similar information. Soviet agents
working in the frontier zone in Poland and Rumania gave detailed reports
on the concentration of troops.
He who
closes his eyes sees nothing, even in the full light of day. This
was the case with Stalin and his entourage. The generalissimo preferred
to trust his political instinct rather than the secret reports piled
up on his desk. Convinced that he had signed an eternal pact of friendship
with Germany, he sucked on the pipe of peace. He had buried his tomahawk
and he was not ready to dig it up.
(2)
Joachim von Ribbentrop,
letter to Staatssekretaer Weizsaecker (29th April, 1941)
I can summarize
my opinion on a German-Russian conflict in one sentence: if every
burned out Russian city was worth as much to us as a sunk English
battleship, then I would be in favour of a German-Russian war in this
summer; I think though that we can win over Russia only militarily
but that we should lose economically. One can find it enticing to
give the Communist system its death blow and perhaps say too that
it lies in the logic of things to let the European-Asiatic continent
now march forth against Anglo-Saxondom and its allies. But only one
thing is decisive: whether this undertaking would hasten the fall
of England.
That we
will advance militarily up to Moscow and beyond victoriously, I believe
is unquestionable. But I thoroughly doubt that we could make use of
what was won against the well known passive resistance of the Slavs.
A German
attack on Russia would only give a lift to English morale. It would
be evaluated there as German doubt of the success of our war against
England. We would in this fashion not only admit that the war would
still last a long time, but we could in this way actually lengthen
instead of shorten it.
(3)
Joseph Stalin, radio speech (June, 1941)
The Red
Army, the Red Navy, and all citizens of the Soviet Union must defend
every inch of Soviet soil, must fight to the last drop of blood for
our towns and villages, must display the daring, initiative and mental
alertness characteristic of our people.
In case
of forced retreat of Red Army units, all rolling stock must be evacuated,
the enemy must not be left a single engine, a single railway truck,
not a single pound of grain or gallon of fuel. Collective farmers
must drive off all their cattle and turn over their grain to the safe
keeping of the state authorities, for transportation to the rear.
lf valuable property that cannot be withdrawn, must be destroyed without
fail.
In areas
occupied by the enemy, partisan units, mounted and on foot, must be
formed; sabotage groups must be organized to combat enemy units, to
foment partisan warfare everywhere, blow up bridges and roads, damage
telephone and telegraph lines, set fire to forests, stores and transport.
In occupied regions conditions must be made unbearable for the enemy
and all his accomplices. They must be hounded and annihilated at every
step, and all their measures frustrated.
(4)
Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky, Memoirs
(1974)
Stalin
was unjustifiably self-confident, headstrong, unwilling to listen
to others; he overestimated his own knowledge and ability to guide
the conduct of the war directly. He relied very little on the General
Staff and made no adequate use of the skills and experience of its
personnel. Often for no reason at all, he would make hasty changes
in the top military leadership. Stalin quite rightly insisted that
the military must abandon outdated strategic concepts, but he was
unfortunately rather slow to do this himself. He tended to favour
head-on confrontations.
(5)
Operation Barbarossa directive issued by Adolf
Hitler on 18th December, 1940.
In the
zone of operations, divided by the Pripet marshes into a southern
and a northern sector, the main effort will be made north of this
area. Two army groups will be provided here.
The more
southerly of these two army groups - the Centre one of the front as
a whole - will be given the task of annihilating the enemy's forces
in White Russia by advancing from the area around and north of Warsaw
with specially strong armoured and motorized forces. This will make
it possible to switch strong mobile formations northward to co-operate
with Army Group North in annihilating the enemy's forces fighting
in the Baltic States - Army Group North operating from East Prussia
in the general direction of Leningrad. Only after having accomplished
this most important task, which must be followed by the occupation
of Leningrad and Kronstadt, is there to be a continuation of the offensive
operations which aim at the capture of Moscow - as a focal centre
of communications and armament industry.
Only a
surprisingly quick collapse of Russian resistance could justify aiming
at both objectives simultaneously.
The Army
Group employed south of the Pripet marshes is to make its main effort
from the Lublin area in the general direction of Kiev, in order to
penetrate deeply into the flank and rear of the Russian forces and
then to roll them up along the Dnieper River.
(6)
In his diary Joseph Goebbels
recorded how he expected a quick victory in the Soviet Union (July
1941)
The Führer
thinks that the action will take only 4 months; I think - even less.
Bolshevism will collapse as a house of cards. We are facing an unprecedented
victorious campaign.
Cooperation
with Russia was in fact a stain on our reputation. Now it is going
to be washed out. The very thing we were struggling against for our
whole lives, will now be destroyed. I tell this to the Führer
and he agrees with me completely.
(7)
Elena Skriyabina was living in Leningrad when Vyacheslav
Molotov
announced the German attack on the Soviet Union.
Molotov's
speech sounded hesitatingly and hastily, as if he was out of breath.
His encouraging appeal seemed quite inappropriate. Immediately I had
the feeling as if a monster was approaching slowly, threateningly,
frightening everybody to death. After the news I ran out to the street.
Panic was spreading around the city. People hastily exchanged a couple
of words, then rushed to the shops, buying anything they saw. They
were running in the streets like mad. Many went to the savings banks
to take out their deposits. This wave absorbed me too. I also tried
to receive cash from my savings book. But I came too late. The bank
was empty, payments had been stopped. The crowd around was shouting
and complaining. The June day blazed, the heat was unbearable. Somebody
fainted, others were cursing. The day passed in a tense and uneasy
mood. Only in the evening everything became strangely quiet. It seemed
that everybody has hidden somewhere, possessed by terror.
(8)
Macha Rolnikas, diary entry (June, 1941)
The Nazis have occupied the town. People are crying and talking about
the Nazis' hatred of Jews and Communists. And we, we are both. And
on top of it all, Papa has been working very actively for the Soviets.
New decrees
have been posted in the town: all the Jews - adults and children -
must wear insignias, a white piece of cloth, ten square centimeters,
and in the middle the yellow letter "J". Is it possible
that the invaders no longer regard us as human beings and brand us
just like cattle? One can not accept such meanness. But who dares
oppose them?
(9)
Colonel-General Yeremenko of the Red Army,
wrote about the German Army at Smolensk
in the book, Strategy and Tactics of the Soviet-German War
(1943)
Having covered every inch of ground with corpses the Nazis broke through
to Smolensk. Stubborn fighting for the town proper raged for almost
a whole month. The city repeatedly passed from hand to hand. More
than one German division found its last resting place in the approaches
to Smolensk and in the town itself. Every street and every house was
contested by severe fighting and the Nazis paid very heavily for every
yard of their advance. Hundreds of German soldiers and officers perished
in the waters of the Dnieper River.
(10)
General Guenther Blumentritt
argued that Heinrich von Brauchitsch,
Franz Halder and Gerd
von Rundstedt were all against the plan to invade the Soviet
Union in June 1941.
All three
realized the difficulties presented by the nature of the country from
their experiences in the 1914-18 war - above all, the difficulties
of movement, reinforcement, and supply. Field-Marshal von Rundstedt
asked Hitler bluntly: "Have you weighed up what you are undertaking
in an attack on Russia?"
(11)
General Paul von Kliest was interviewed
by Basil Liddell Hart about Operation
Barbarossa in his book The Other Side of the Hill (1948)
It was the same with the other high commanders. We were told the
Russian armies were about to take the offensive, and it was essential
for Germany to remove the menace. It was explained to us that the
Führer could not proceed with other plans while this threat loomed
dose, as too large a part of the German forces would be pinned down
in the east keeping guard. It was argued that attack was the only
way for us to remove the risks of a Russian attack.
We did
not underrate the Red Army, as is commonly imagined. The last German
military attaché in Moscow, General Kostring - a very able
man-had kept us well informed about the state of the Russian Army.
But Hitler refused to credit his information.
Hopes of
victory were largely built on the prospect that the invasion would
produce a political upheaval in
Russia. Most of us generals realized beforehand that if the Russians
chose to fall back there was very little chance of achieving a final
victory without the help of such an upheaval. Too high hopes were
built on the belief that Stalin would be overthrown by his own people
if he suffered heavy defeats. The belief was fostered by the
Führer's political advisers, and we, as soldiers, didn't know
enough about the political side to dispute it. There were no preparations
for a prolonged struggle. Everything was based on the idea of a decisive
result before the autumn.
(12)
General Walter Warlimont, order issued
to the German Army
about the occupation of the Soviet Union
(12th May, 1941)
1. Political officials and leaders are to be liquidated.
2. Insofar
as they are captured by the troops, an officer with authority to impose
disciplinary punishment decides whether the given individual must
be liquidated. For such a decision the fact suffices that he is a
political official.
3. Political
leaders in the troops (Red Army) are not recognized as prisoners of
war and are to be liquidated at the latest in the prisoner-of-war
transit camps.
(13)
Alfred Jodl, order issued to the German
Army (23rd July, 1941)
In view of the vast size of the occupied areas in the East the forces
available for establishing security in these areas will be sufficient
only if al resistance is punished not by legal prosecution of the
guilty but by the spreading of such terror by the occupying power
as is appropriate to eradicate every inclination to resist among the
population. The competent commanders must find the means of keeping
order not by demanding more security forces but by applying suitable
Draconian methods.
(14)
Order issued by Hans Hingst, regional commander of Vilno (2nd August
1941)
1. All the Jews of both sexes from the city of Vilno must wear a yellow
Zion star for identification on the left side of the chest and on
the back.
2. The
Jewish population is forbidden to use sidewalks. They must walk along
the right side of the road and walk one after another.
3. The
Jewish population is forbidden to stay in the boulevards and all public
parks. The Jewish population is also forbidden to use street benches
for rest.
4. The
Jewish population is forbidden to use any kind of public transport,
such as taxis, cabs, buses, steamboats etc. The owners or holders
of all means of transport facilities should put a poster saying "Jews
not allowed" on their vehicles so that they are clearly visible.
5. Anyone
violating this order should be punished in the strictest way.
(15)
Order from the German Army Supreme Command (16th June 1941)
General provisions on the treatment of Soviet POWs. Bolshevism is
a deadly enemy of National Socialist Germany. For the first time the
German soldier is facing an enemy, who has not just received military
training, but is indoctrinated in the spirit of Bolshevism. Struggle
against National Socialism is in his flesh and blood. He wages this
struggle using all means: sabotage, subversive propaganda, arson,
murder. Therefore the Bolshevik soldier has lost the privilege to
be treated as a genuine soldier according to the Geneva Convention.
(1) The
faintest manifestations of protest or disobedience should be met with
ruthless reprisals.
(2) Weapons
should be used ruthlessly to suppress resistance.
(3) The
escaping POWs should be shot at without warning and with the determination
to hit the target.
(16)
Major Shabalin, a member of the Red Army,
kept a diary of the fighting with the German
Army in 1941. He was killed on 20th October and his diary
was translated by the Germans for military analysis.
9th September, 1941: The situation with the personnel is very bad,
practically the whole army consists of men, whose homes have been
captured by the Germans. They want to go home. The passivity at the
front, immobility in the trenches demoralise the soldiers. There are
some cases of drinking among the officers and political Commissars.
Sometimes people do not come back from reconnaissance missions.
14th October,
1941: The enemy has encircled us. Incessant gunfire. Cannon, mortar
and submachine gun exchanges. Danger and fear all day long. And this
is not to mention the swamp, the forest, and the problem of passing
the night. I have not slept since the
15th October,
1941: Terrifying! I wander around, dead bodies, was horrors and permanent
bombardment everywhere. I am hungry and had no sleep again. Took a
bottle of alcohol. Went to the forest for reconnaissance. Our total
destruction is obvious. The army is beaten, its supply train is destroyed,
am writing sitting in a forest by a bonfire. In the morning lost all
my Cheka (KGB) officers, and now I am alone among strangers. The army
has disintegrated.
16th October,
1941: I spent the night in the forest, had no bread for three days.
There are a lot of soldiers in the forest, but no officers. Throughout
the night and the morning the Germans were firing at the forest from
all kind of weapons. At about 7 a.m. we got up and marched north.
The gunfire continues. During a halt I managed to wash my face and
hands.
19th October,
1941: All night long we were marching through the rain across marshlands.
Pitch dark. I was wet to the bone, my right foot has swollen; very
difficult to walk.
(17)
After the war Wilhelm von Thoma, commander
of 2nd Panzer Division, was highly critical of the military tactics
of Adolf Hitler during Operation Barbarossa.
Hitler
had not interfered in the Polish campaign, but the immense public
acclaim of 'his' strategy there, and still more after the French campaign,
had given him a swelled head. He had a taste for strategy and tactics,
but he did not understand the executive details. He often had good
ideas, but he was stubborn as a rock - so that he spoilt the fulfillment
of his own conceptions.
What we
had was good enough to beat Poland and France, but not good enough
to conquer Russia. The space there was so vast, and the going so difficult.
We ought to have had twice as many tanks in our armoured divisions,
and their motor-infantry regiments were not mobile enough.
The original
pattern of our armoured division was ideal - with two tank regiments
and one motor-infantry regiment. But the latter should be carried
in armoured tracked vehicles, even though it entails more petrol.
In the earlier part of the Russian campaign it was possible to bring
them up in their lorries close to the scene of action before they
dismounted. They were often brought up as close as a quarter of a
mile from the fighting line. But that ceased to be possible when the
Russians had more aircraft.
The lorry-columns
were too vulnerable, and the infantry had to get out too far back.
Only armoured infantry can come into action quickly enough for the
needs of a mobile battle. Worse still, these clumsy lorries easily
became bogged. France had been ideal country for armoured forces,
but Russia was the worst-because of its immense tracts of country
that were either swamp or sand. In parts the sand was two or three
feet deep. When the rain came down the sand turned into swamp.
(18)
Vladimir Stavsky was a Soviet journalist who witnessed the invasion
of the Soviet Union in 1941.
We pass
through village after village, most of them mere hamlets. Standing
at the gates are collective-farm peasants who greet us enthusiastically.
In the still evening these shouts of greetings are mingled with the
sound of women and children weeping as they contemplate the charred
ruins where their homes once stood. Behind us are a series of low
hills and before us - in the valley lies the town of Yelnia.
Yelnia
is burnt to the ground and its destitute inhabitants pass through
the streets covered with ashes and chaired ruins. The Nazis here were
helped by one Rozalinsky, whom they appointed commandant of the town
of Yelnia. Rozalinsky proved to be a Nazi agent who had for many years
lived in Smolensk and paraded as a modest book-keeper. The Germans
were also helped by Dombrovsky and his wife, former local landowners.
In the villages the Nazis appointed rural elders, who helped them
to loot and oppress the population.
(19)
Ina Konstantinova was one of the many Russian women who went to help
the Red Army. She wrote about her experiences
in her diary.
I haven't
written for a long time. So much has happened! was not mistaken: this
copy-book will see a great deal. Particularly remember the events
of 19 June. At night a large punitive detachment approached our village
very, very close. The exchange of fire continued throughout the night.
In the morning, when we woke up, villages burned all around us. Soon
the first casualty was brought to me. My hands were covered with blood,
then took this seriously wounded man to a doctor, 6 kms away. When
I returned, we had to execute a certain village elder, a collaborator.
We went to get him; we read him the sentence and led him to the pace
of execution. I felt awful.
In the
evening, about eleven, just as was getting ready to go to bed, another
wounded man was brought in. Again dressed his wounds, and again had
to deliver him to a doctor. And the weather was terrible; it was cold,
dark, raining, and windy. I dressed warm and we went. My sick man
instantly froze; I had to give him at first my rain cape and then
my jacket. I had only a blouse on, and was terribly chilled. On the
way, the cart broke down and I fixed it, and then we got lost. In
short, it took us four hours to get to our destination, barely had
time to warm up a bit when had to start back. I returned in the morning;
I had quite a night!
(20)
William
Joyce,
Germany Calling (31st December, 1942)
We are approaching the
end of a year signalised by the magnificent triumphs of Germany and
her allies which have laid the sure basis of their victory, a year
in which the Führer and the forces under this command have made
a great advance towards final victory ... as the year draws to a close
we are witnessing the dramatic spectacle of the Soviet Union dissipating
its forces, squandering its reserves and smashing its war potential
to pieces on the adamant rock of German resistance. Next year, when
the German offensive is resumed, we shall see the real significance
of the desperate and prodigious sacrifices which Stalin is now making.
Even before that time comes, the world may well be able to perceive
the tremors which will precede the earthquake of economic collapse
in the Soviet Union, and before the German and allied forces move
forward in their next great attack, there will probably be much strife
and discord between the Soviets and the Allies, for even if shipping
space were available in plenty to Britain and the USA, as it certainly
is not, the war production of the two countries combined would not
yield a sufficient quantity of arms and munitions to replace the losses
the Bolsheviks have suffered during the last month.
(21)
Joseph Stalin to Anthony
Eden (16th December, 1941)
The war policy of the Soviet Union has so far been that of a fighting
retreat. We have defended every district and every point so as to
wear down gradually the German forces. The moment has now arrived
when the wearing-down process has reached the point where the Germans
feel the pinch. The German soldiers are tired. Their Commanders hoped
to finish the war before the winter and they made no preparations
for a winter campaign.
This December
the German army has shown itself tired and ill-clad and just at this
time new Soviet armies and formations reached the front. These reinforcements
created the possibility for the change over at the front which you
have noticed during the last two weeks. The Germans attempted to dig
themselves in, but were not inclined to make very strong fortifications.
Our troops were able to break through and now we have the possibility
of attacking; counter-attacks have gradually developed into counter-offensives.
We shall try and carry this on all through the winter.
We have
now the air superiority, but not a very great one. The Germans still
have a great superiority in tanks, and tanks are vitally necessary
for us, especially Valentines, which we have found to be much better
for use in the winter. The Matilda will be all right in the summer
weather, but the engine is too weak for winter conditions. We shall
go ahead on all fronts. In the south the position is quite satisfactory.
The bringing in of fresh reinforcements was the cause of the recent
successes. The German army is not so strong after all. It is only
because it has an enormous reputation.
(22)
After the war Gerd von Rundstedt explained
why the German Army failed to
conquer the Soviet Union in 1941.
Long before
winter came the chances had been diminished owing to the repeated
delays in the advance that were caused by bad roads, and mud. The
'black earth' of the Ukraine could be turned into mud by ten minutes
rain - stopping all movement until it dried. That was a heavy handicap
in a race with time. If was, increased by a lack of railways in Russia
- for bringing up supplies to our advancing troops. Another adverse
factor was the way the Russians received continual reinforcements
from their back areas, as they fell back. It seemed to us that as
soon as one force was wiped out, the path was blocked by the arrival
of a fresh force.
(23)
William
Joyce,
Germany Calling (16th January, 1943)
The extent of the enemy's
sacrifices has been colossal and cannot be maintained. In the Stalingrad
Sector, above all, the Soviets have been employing heavy forces and
their losses have been proportionately high. Day after day, more Soviet
tank losses have been reported and at the same time, the ratio between
the German and Soviet air losses is incomparably in favour of the
Luftwaffe. For example, it was reported yesterday that sixty-seven
Soviet aircraft had been shot down as against four German losses;
on Tuesday, the ratio was fifty-two to one in our favour. As might
be expected, the Luftwaffe's superiority has dealt a hard blow at
the enemy and it is now reported that the Soviets are being compelled
to use untrained personnel in their larger bombers.
(24)
In 1948 General Guenther Blumentritt
told Basil Liddell Hart
about the problems that the German
Army had during the invasion of the Soviet Union.
It was
appallingly difficult country for tank movement - great virgin forests,
widespread swamps, terrible roads, and bridges not strong enough to
bear the weight of tanks. The resistance also became stiffer, and
the Russians began to cover their front with minefields. It was easier
for them to block the way because there were so few roads.
The great
motor highway leading from the frontier to Moscow was unfinished -
the one road a Westerner would call a 'road'. We were not prepared
for what we found because our maps in no way corresponded to reality.
On those maps all supposed main roads were marked in red, and there
seemed to be many, but they often proved to be merely sandy tracks.
The German intelligence service was fairly accurate about conditions
in Russian-occupied Poland, but badly at fault about those beyond
the original Russian frontier.
Such country
was bad enough for the tanks, but worse still for the transport accompanying
them - carrying their fuel, their supplies, and all the auxiliary
troops they needed. Nearly all this transport consisted of wheeled
vehicles, which could not move off the roads, nor move on if the sand
turned into mud. An hour or two of rain reduced the panzer forces
to stagnation. It was an extraordinary sight, with groups of them
strung out over a hundred miles stretch, all stuck - until the sun
came out and the ground dried. Hoth, who was advancing from the Orsha-Nevel
sector, was delayed by swamps as well as bursts of rain. Guderian
made a rapid advance to Smolensk, but then met similar trouble.
A number
of the generals declared that a resumption of the offensive in 1942
was impossible, and that it was wiser to make sure of holding what
had been gained. Halder was very dubious about the continuance of
the offensive. Von Rundstedt was still more emphatic and even urged
that me German Army should withdraw to their original front in Poland.
Von Leeb agreed with him. While other generals did not go so far as
this, most of them were very worried as to where the campaign would
lead. With the departure of von Rundstedt as well as von Brauchitsch,
the resistance to Hitler's pressure was weakening and that pressure
was all for resuming the offensive.
There was
a "battle of opinion" between Halder and him. The Intelligence
had information that 600 to 700 tanks a month were coming out of the
Russian factories, in the Ural Mountains and elsewhere. When Halder
told him of this. Hitler slammed the table and said it was impossible.
He would not believe what he did not want to believe.
Secondly,
he did not know what else to do-as he would not listen to any idea
of a withdrawal. He felt that he must do something and that something
could only be offensive.
Thirdly,
there was much pressure from economic authorities in Germany. They
urged that it was essential to continue the advance, telling Hitler
that they could not continue the war without oil from the Caucasus
and wheat from the Ukraine.
(25)
George Orwell, BBC radio broadcast (18th
July 1942)
The German offensive against our Russian allies is now at its
height, and it would be stupid to disguise the fact that the situation
is very serious. The main German drive, as we foretold in earlier
newsletters, is south-east towards the region of the Caucasus. The
Germans have now crossed the upper reaches of the River Don, and fighting
is now going on around and inside the important town of Voronezh.
They are also making fierce attacks further south in the direction
of Rostov, the important city near the south of the Don and the Donets
which the Russians recaptured from the Germans last year, and in the
direction of Stalingrad on the Volga. Both Rostov and Stalingrad are
in danger.
In these
attacks the Germans' aim is evidently twofold. The final aim is, of
course, to capture the oilfields of the Caucasus and the Middle East,
but the more immediate aim is to cut communications between this area
and the more northerly parts of Russia. By crossing the Don near Voronezh,
they have already cut one important route northward, since this move
has put them across the railway between Voronezh and Rostov. A further
advance might leave only one railway line from this area open to the
Russians, while if the Germans could get as far as Stalingrad all
direct railway communication between the Caucasus region and the northern
fronts of Moscow and Leningrad would be cut. This does not, of course,
mean that the Russian oil would not any longer be transported, but
it would mean that it would have to be transported by roundabout routes
and largely by river, putting an enormous extra strain on the Russian
transport system.
This phase
of the war is essentially a struggle for oil. The Germans are trying
to win for themselves the fresh supplies of oil that would allow them
to continue their campaign of aggression, and at the same time trying
to strangle the Russian people by cutting their supplies of oil and
thus starving both their war industries and their agriculture. Taking
the long view, we may say that either the Germans must reach the Caspian
Sea this year or they have lost the war, though they might be able
to go on fighting for a considerable time.
(26)
General Guenther Blumentritt
was convinced that the German Army
could have taken Leningrad in 1941.
Leningrad
could have been taken, probably with little difficulty. But after
his experience at Warsaw in 1939 Hitler was always nervous about taking
big cities, because of the losses he had suffered there. The tanks
had already started on the last lap of the advance when Hitler ordered
them to stop - as he had done at Dunkirk in 1940. So no genuine attack
on Leningrad was attempted in 1941, contrary to appearances - although
all preparations had been completed, including the mounting of long-range
artillery that had been brought from France.
(27)
General Walter Warlimont was also critical
of Adolf Hitler's decision not to attack Leningrad
in 1941.
Hitler
gave another fateful halt order just when the armoured vanguards of
Army Group North had reached the outskirts of Leningrad. Apparently
he thereby wanted to avoid the losses of human life and material to
be expected from fighting in the streets and squares of this Soviet
metropolis against an outraged population, and hoped to gain the same
ends by cutting off the city from all lines of supply.
(28)
Report published by the German Secret Service (4th February, 1943)
Reports
about the termination of the Battle of Stalingrad have shaken the
entire people once again to its depth. The speeches of January 30
and the proclamation of the Fuhrer have taken a backseat in view of
this event, and play a lesser role in serious conversations on the
part of our fellow Germans, than do a number of questions connected
with the events at Stalingrad. First of all it is the number of casualties
which the population wants to know. Conjunctures fluctuate between
60,000 and 300,000 men. It is being assumed that the great majority
of those who fought at Stalingrad have perished. Regarding those troops
who have become prisoners of the Russians there are two popular conceptions.
On the one hand there are those who say that imprisonment is worse
than death because they are bound to treat those soldiers who have
fallen into their hands alive in an inhumane manner. Others believe
in turn how fortunate it is that not all of them have perished; this
way there remains the hope that some of them might eventually return
to the homeland. Especially the relatives of those who fought at Stalingrad
suffer much under this ambiguous situation and the uncertainty that
results from it.
Furthermore,
large segments of the population are debating whether the developments
at Stalingrad were inevitable and whether the immense sacrifices were
necessary. Our fellow Germans are specifically concerned with the
question whether the retreat to Stalingrad was at the time promptly
recognised. Air reconnaissance should have spotted the concentration
of Russian armies that were then moving against Stalingrad.
Furthermore,
the question is being discussed why the city was not evacuated when
there was still time. The third issue around which the conversations
of our fellow Germans resolve right now is the importance of the Battle
of Stalingrad seen in the context of the war as a whole.
(29)
Studs
Terkel interviewed Oleg
Tsakumov about his experiences in Leningrad during the Second
World War for his book, The Good War (1985)
The most difficult days
were when my mother could not get up from bed to go to work. She was
too weak from hunger. I went to the kindergarten by myself. With my
steps as a man, it is not a far distance. To a man, they are snow
heaps. To me, this little boy, they were snow mountains.
In this silent city, there
came these sudden bursts of sound. The explosions. I was very frightened,
and it was such a long distance to school.
We ate what you give to
horses. Oats. In the summer, we picked up grass, boiled it, and ate
it. It was food on our minds all the time. Morning was the best time
of the day, when you get up. You think something might turn up, you
might get something to eat. All the days became one long day and night.
Imagine nine hundred such days. It seemed forever.
Victory day? On the ninth
of May, 1945, we went to a small opera theater. It was lolanthe.
Suddenly the performance stopped and the director came out and said
that the Germans surrendered. Everybody in the theater went to the
square. I saw hundreds of thousands of people dancing, embracing each
other. Tossing the soldiers in the air. They were crying and kissing
each other. I was nine years old.
(30)
William
Joyce,
Germany Calling (3rd February, 1943)
It would be a profound,
a cardinal error to suppose that the German nation does not know how
to take one defeat after so many victories. Nor, if the truth must
be told, am I convinced that Stalingrad was, in the worst sense of
the word, in the most essential, in the psychological sense, a defeat.
Let us look at the facts. I think it was Napoleon who said, 'In warfare
the moral is to the physical as three to one'. So far as divisions,
brigades and battalions are concerned, Stalingrad was a German defeat.
But when a Great Power like the National Socialist Reich is waging
a total war, divisions and battalions can be replaced. If we review
the position in sober and cold calculations, all sentiment apart,
we must realise that the fall of Stalingrad cannot impair the German
defensive system as a whole. Whatever individuals have lost, whatever
they may have sacrificed, there is nothing in the position as a whole
to controvert the view that the main objectives of the enemy offensives
have been frustrated. Stalingrad was a part of the price which had
to be paid for the salvation of Europe from the, Bolshevik hordes.
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