(1) George Buchanan
sent a report to Sir Edward Grey about discussions
he had with French and Russian officials (July 1914)
As they
both continued to press me to declare our complete solidarity with
them, I said that I thought you might be prepared to represent strongly
at Vienna and Berlin danger to European peace of an Austrian attack
on Serbia. You might perhaps point out that it would in all probability
force Russia to intervene, that this would bring Germany and France
into the field, and that if war became general, it would be difficult
for England to remain neutral. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that
he hoped that we would in any case express strong reprobation of Austria's
action. If war did break out, we would sooner or later be dragged
into it, but if we did not make common cause with France and Russia
from the outset we should have rendered war more likely.
(2)
George Buchanan met Nicholas II at the Imperial
Palace on 12th January, 1917. He later wrote about this meeting in
his book, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories
(1922).
I went
on to say that there was now a barrier between him and his people,
and that if Russia was still united as a nation it was in opposing
his present policy. The people, who have rallied so splendidly round
their Sovereign on the outbreak of war, had seen how hundreds of thousands
of lives had been sacrificed on account of the lack of rifles and
munitions; how, owing to the incompetence of the administration, there
had been a severe food crisis, and - much to my surprise, the Emperor
himself added, "a breakdown of the railways". All that they
wanted was a Government that would carry on the war to a victorious
finish. The Duma, I had reason to know, would be satisfied if His
Majesty would but appoint as President of the Council a man whom both
he and the nation could have confidence, and would allow him to choose
his own colleagues.
I next
called His Majesty's attention to the attempts being made by the Germans,
not only to create dissension between the Allies, but to estrange
him from his people. Their agents were everywhere at work. They were
pulling the strings, and were using as their unconscious tools those
who were in the habit of advising His Majesty as to the choice of
his Ministers. They indirectly influenced the Empress through those
in her entourage, with the result that, instead of being loved, as
she ought to be, Her Majesty was discredited and accused of working
in German interests. The Emperor once more drew himself up and said:
"I choose my Ministers myself, and do not allow anyone to influence
my choice."
Tsereteli
had a refined and sympathetic personality. He attracted me by his
transparent honesty of purpose and his straightforward manner. He
was, like so many other Russian Socialists, an Idealist; but though
I do not reproach him with this, he made the mistake of approaching
grave problems of practical policies from a purely theoretical standpoint.
(5)
George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories
(1922).
The Social
Revolutionaries (SRs) were agrarian, in contradistinction to the Social
Democrats, who represented the interests of the proletariats of the
towns. The watchword of the former had always been "Land and
Liberty". During the latter part of the last and the commencement
of the present century they had adopted terrorism as a weapon for
attaining their ends.
As regarded
the war, both Mensheviks and SRs advocated the speedy conclusion of
peace without annexations or contributions. There was, however, a
small Menshevik group, led by Plekhanov, that called on the working
classes to cooperate for the purpose of securing the victory over
Germany, which would alone guarantee Russia's new freedom. The Bolsheviks,
on the other hand, were out and out 'Defeatists'. The war had to be
brought to an end by any means and at any cost. The soldiers had to
be induced by organized propaganda to turn their arms, not against
their brothers in the enemy ranks, but against the reactionary bourgeois
governments of their own and other countries. For a Bolshevik there
was no such thing as country or patriotism.
(6)
After meeting George Lvov George Buchanan,
sent a report on their discussions to the Foreign Office (8th April,
1917)
Lvov does
not favour the idea of taking strong measures at present, either against
the Soviet or the Socialist propaganda in the army. On my telling
him that the Government would never be masters of the situation so
long as they allowed themselves to be dictated to by a rival organization,
he said that the Soviet would die a natural death, that the present
agitation in the army would pass, and that the army would then be
in a better position to help the Allies to win the war than it would
have been under the old regime.
(7)
During the summer of 1917 George Buchanan
became concerned about the survival of the Provisional Government.
The Russian
idea of liberty is to take things easily, to claim double wages, to
demonstrate in the streets, and to waste time in talking and in passing
resolutions at public meetings. Ministers are working themselves to
death, and have the best intentions; but, though I am always being
told that their position is becoming stronger, I see no signs of their
asserting their authority. The Soviet continues to act as if it were
the Government.
The military
outlook is most discouraging. Nor do I take an optimistic view of
the immediate future of the country. Russia is not ripe for a purely
democratic form of government, and for the next few years we shall
probably see a series of revolutions or counter-revolutions. A vast
Empire like this, with all its different races, will not long hold
together under a Republic. Disintegration will, in my opinion, sooner
or later set in, even under a federal system.
(8)
George Buchanan, report to the Foreign Office (7th May, 1917)
The Government,
as Prince Lvov remarked, was "an authority without power",
while the Workmen's Council (Soviet) was "a power without authority".
Under such conditions it was impossible for Guchkov, as Minister of
War, and for Kornilov, as military governor of Petrograd, to accept
responsibility for the maintenance of discipline in the army. They
both consequently resigned, while the former declared that if things
were to continue as they were the army would cease to exist as a fighting
force in three weeks' time. Guchkov's resignation precipitated matters,
and Lvov, Kerensky and Tershchenko came to the conclusion that, as
the Soviet was too powerful a factor to be either suppressed or disregarded,
the only way of putting an end to the anomaly of a dual Government
was to form a Coalition.
(9)
George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories
(1922).
From the
very first Kerensky had been the central figure of the revolutionary
drama and had, alone among his colleagues, acquired a sensible hold
on the masses. An ardent patriot, he desired to see Russia carry on
the war till a democratic peace had been won; while he wanted to combat
the forces of disorder so that his country should not fall a prey
to anarchy. In the early stages of the revolution he displayed an
energy and courage which marked him out as the one man capable of
securing the attainment of these ends.
(10)
George Buchanan, report to the Foreign Office sent during the summer
of 1917.
The Bolsheviks,
who form a compact minority, have alone a definite political programme.
They are more active and better organized than any other group, and
until they and the ideas which they represent are finally squashed,
the country will remain a prey to anarchy and disorder.
If the
Government are not strong enough to put down the Bolsheviks by force,
at the risk of breaking altogether with the soviet, the only alternative
will be a Bolshevik Government.
(11)
George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories
(1922).
I readily
admit that Lenin and Trotsky are both extraordinary men. The Ministers,
in whose hands Russia had placed her destinies, had all proved to
be weak and incapable, and now by some cruel turn of fate the only
two really strong men whom she had produced during the war were destined
to consummate her ruin. On their advent to power, however, they were
still an unknown quantity, and nobody expected that they would have
a long tenure of office.
