Sergei
Sazonov was born in Russia in 1860. Nicholas
II considered Sazonov to be a competent international analyst
and in 1910 appointed him as his foreign minister.
Sazonov
was aware that although the Russian Army
was large, it was also inefficient, and was careful to avoid conflict
with Turkey during the Balkan Wars.
However, in 1914, Sazonov was of the opinion that in the event of
a war, Russia's membership of the Triple
Entente would enable it to make territorial gains from neighbouring
countries. Sazonov and Nicholas II were
especially interested in taking Posen, Silesia, Galicia and North
Bukovina.
On
31st July, Sazonov advised the Tsar to order the mobilization of the
Russian Army even though he knew it would
lead to war with the Germany and Austria-Hungary.
During
the early stages of the First World War Sazonov
was busy making long-term territorial arrangements with Britain
and France. This including the promise
that after the war Russia would be given control of the Dardanelles.
Sazonov
came into conflict with Nikolai Maklakov
and other conservative figures in the government. His desire to create
a unified, independent Poland after
the war lost him the support of Nicholas II
and he was dismissed from office in July, 1916.
Sent
to Britain on diplomatic duties, Sazonov remained in London
during the February Revolution and the
creation of the Provisional Government.
As an opponent of the Bolshevik Government
in Russia, Sazonov was invited to the Paris
Peace Conference in 1919. Sergei Sazonov died in 1927.
(1)
Alexander Kerensky, Russia and History's
Turning Point (1965)
On 25th October, 1912, A. P. Izvolsky, Russian ambassador
to Paris, informed Foreign Minister Sazonov of the following statement
of policy adopted by the French Cabinet: "France now recognizes
that Austria's territorial ambitions involve the over-all balance
of power in Europe and consequently France's own interests."
In short,
France was encouraging Russia to take a stronger stand in the Balkans.
At about the same time France began pressing Russia to strengthen
the construction of strategically important railroads without delay.
(2)
Bernard Pares knew Nicholas
II and Sergei Sazonov during the summer of 1914.
At this time the Tsar nor his army had any doubt (that
if there was a war) of the ultimate victory of the Triple Entente,
and Nicholas played at the then fashionable game of redividing up
the world. Russia must receive Posen, part of Silesia, Galicia and
North Bukovina which will permit her to reach her natural limit, the
Carpathians. The Turks were to be driven from Europe; the Northern
Straits might be Bulgarian, but the environs of Constantinople - Sazonov
had not yet asked for the city itself - must be in the hands of Russia.
(3)
Sergei Sazonov, letter to the Russian ambassador in Serbia (5th May
1913)
Serbia has only gone through the first stage of her historic
road and for the attainment of her goal must still endure a terrible
struggle in which her whole existence may be at stake. Serbia's promised
land lies in the territory of present-day
Hungary and not in the direction in which she is now tending and where
Bulgaria stands in her way. In these circumstances it is a vital interest
of Serbia on the one hand to uphold the alliance with Bulgaria and
on the other by tenacious and patient effort to attain the necessary
degree of preparedness for the future inevitable struggle.
(4)
Sergei Sazonov, letter to the Russian ambassador In London (19th February
1914)
The peace of the world will only be secure on the day
when the Triple Entente, whose real existence is not better authenticated
than the existence of the sea serpent, shall transform itself into
a defensive alliance without secret clauses and publicly announced
in all the world press. On that day the danger of a German hegemony
will be finally removed, and each one of us will be able to devote
himself quietly to his own affairs.
(5)
Sergei Sazonov, Fateful Years 1909-1916 (1929)
I had a vivid recollection of the impression produced
everywhere, and especially in Germany, by Mr. Lloyd George's speech
in 1911 when, owing to the Agadir incident, Europe was on the brink
of war. A decisive statement on the part of the British Government
of its solidarity with France had then been sufficient to dispel the
gathering storm clouds. I was profoundly convinced at the time and
am still convinced now that, had the British Government sided with
Russia and France on the Serbian question from the first, Berlin would
not have encouraged Austria in its policy of aggression, but would
on the contrary have advised caution and moderation, and the hour
of reckoning between the two hostile camps into which Europe was divided
would have been postponed for years if not for ever.
(6)
In his autobiography, Fateful Years 1909-1916, Sergei
Sazonov explained that once Nicholas
II had signed the general mobilisation order, he knew
that war was inevitable.
There was no more hope of preserving peace. All our conciliatory
offers, which went far beyond anything that a Great Power, whose resources
were still untouched, could be expected to concede, had been rejected.
The same thing happened about the offers made, with our consent, by
Sir Edward Grey, which proved that the British Government was no less
peaceably disposed than ourselves. I told the Tsar that it was dangerous
to delay the general mobilisation any longer, since, according to
the information they possessed, the German mobilisation, though not
as yet proclaimed officially, was fairly advanced. The perfection
of the German military organisation made it possible by means of personal
notices to the reservists to accomplish a great part of the work quietly
and then, after the formal orders have been issued, to complete the
mobilisation in a very short time. This circumstance gave a tremendous
advantage to Germany, but we could counteract it to a certain extent
by taking measures for our own mobilisation in good time. The Tsar
knew all this very well and he signified it by inclining his head
without speaking.
In the
circumstances there was nothing left for the Tsar but to give orders
for general mobilisation. The Tsar was silent. Then he said to me,
in a voice full of deep feeling: "This would mean sending hundreds
of thousands of Russian people to their death. How can one help hesitating
to take such a step?" I answered that the responsibility for
the precious lives carried away by the war would not fall upon him.
Neither he nor his government desired the war thrust upon Russia and
Europe by the ill-will of the enemy, determined to increase their
power by enslaving our natural Allies in the Balkans, destroying our
influence there and reducing Russia to a pitiful dependence upon the
arbitrary will of the Central Powers.
(7)
Alexander Kerensky, Russia and History's
Turning Point (1965)
On January 19, Goremykin was replaced by Sturmer, an extreme
reactionary who hated the very idea of any form of popular representation
or local self-government. Even more important, he was undoubtedly
a believer in the need for an immediate cessation of the war with
Germany.
During
his first few months in office, Sturmer was also Minister of Interior,
but the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs was still held by Sazonov,
who firmly advocated honouring the alliance with Britain and France
and carrying on the war to the bitter end, and who recognized the
Cabinet's obligation to pursue a policy in tune with the sentiments
of the majority in the Duma.
On August
9, however, Sazonov was suddenly dismissed. His portfolio was taken
over by Sturmer, and on September 16, Protopopov was appointed acting
Minister of the Interior. The official government of the Russian Empire
was now entirely in the hands of the Tsarina and her advisers.
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