(1)
General Peter Wrangel was on the Eastern Front when he heard
of Rasputin's death. He wrote about this incident in his Memoirs
(1929)
During the march an orderly came to inform me that
General Krymov, who was marching at the head of our column, wanted
me. I found him with our General Staff busily reading a letter which
had just come. Whilst I was still some way off he called out to me:
"Great news! At last they have killed that scoundrel Rasputin.!"
The newspapers announced the bare facts, letters from the capital
gave the details. Of the three assassins, I knew two intimately. What
had been their motive? Why, having killed a man whom they regarded
as a menace to the country, had they not admitted their action before
everyone? Why had they not admitted their action before everyone?
Why had they not relied on justice and public opinion instead of trying
to hide all trace of the murder by burying the body under the ice?
we thought over the news with great anxiety.
(2)
General Peter Wrangel, Memoirs (1929)
Towards the winter of 1916 the bloody struggles which
had been waged throughout the summer and autumn drew to a close. We
consolidated our position, filled in the gaps in our effective forces,
and reorganized generally.
The experience
gained from two years of warfare had not been acquired in vain. We
had learnt a great deal, and the shortcomings for which we had paid
so dearly were now discounted. A number of generals who had not kept
pace with modern needs had had to give up their commands, and life
had brought other more capable men to the fore. But nepotism, which
permeated all spheres of Russian life, still brought unworthy men
into important positions too often.
After two
years of warfare, the Army was not what it had been. The majority
of the original officers and men, especially the infantry, had been
killed or put out of action. The new officers, hastily trained, and
lacking military education and espirit de corps, could not
make satisfactory instructors of the men. They found difficulty in
enduring the dangers, fatigue, and privations of life at the front,
and war to them meant nothing but suffering. It was impossible for
them to inspire the troops and put fresh heart into their men.
Neither
were the troops what they had been. The original soldiers, inured
to fatigue and privation, and brave in battle, were better than ever;
but there were few of them left. The new contingents were by no means
satisfactory. The reserve forces were primarily fathers of families
who had been dragged away from their villages, and were warriors only
in spite of themselves. For they had forgotten that once upon a time
they had been soldiers; they hated war, and thought only of returning
to their homes as soon as possible.
(3)
During 1917 senior officers in the Russian
Army began to realize that the war against the Central Powers
could not be won with Nicholas II as commander-in-chief.
Those of us who loved our country and the Army were
terribly anxious at the continual changes in the Ministry, the conflicts
between the Government and the Duma, the ever-increasing number of
petitions and appeals addressed to the Tsar by many influential organizations,
each one demanding popular control, and, above all, by the alarming
rumours concerning certain persons in the Tsar's entourage.
The patriots
amongst the High Command suffered deeply as they watched the Tsar
making fatal mistakes whilst the danger grew and came ever nearer;
they held mistaken views, but they believed in them sincerely; they
contemplated the possibility of a revolution from within the Palace
to be effected by means of a bloodless coup d'etat.
General
Krymov, my immediate superior, was one of those who was strongly in
favour of this plan. During the long discussions we had on many an
evening he tried again and again to prove to me that things could
not go on as they were, that we must prevent a catastrophe, and that
we ought to find men who, without a day's delay, would remove the
Tsar by means of revolution from within the Palace.
(4)
General Peter Wrangel
went to St. Petersburg after the February Revolution and the creation
of the Provisional Government.
The first
thing I noticed in Petersburg was the profusion of red ribbon. Everyone
was decorated with it, not only soldiers, but students, chauffeurs,
cab-drivers, middle-class folk, women, children, and many officers.
Men of some account, such as old generals and former aides-de-camp
to the Tsar, wore it too.
I expressed
my astonishment to an old comrade of mine at seeing him thus adorned.
He tried to laugh it off, and said jokingly: "Why, my dear fellow,
don't you know that it's the latest fashion?"
I considered
this ridiculous adornment absolutely useless. Throughout my stay in
the capital I wore the Tsarevich's badge, the distinguishing mark
of my old regiment, on my epaulettes, and, of course, I wore no red
rag.
(5)
In 1917 General Peter
Wrangel decided to join the rebellion led by General Lavr
Kornilov against the Provisional
Government.
I knew
Kornilov personally through having dined with him once at the Tsar's
table in Moghilev, and I had spent an hour or two in the same railway-carriage
with him.
Small,
spare, swarthy, of the Mongolian type, with a little goatee beard
and a black moustache, he spoke in short, abrupt sentences. One had
only to see him to realize that he was a man of indomitable energy
and great breadth of mind.
(6)
In November, 1918, General Peter
Wrangel was fighting with General Anton
Denikin in the Kuban area.
In the course of the last few months my command had
received considerable reinforcements. In spite of heavy losses, its
strength was almost normal. We were well supplied with artillery,
technical equipment, telephones, telegraphs, and so on, which we had
taken from the enemy. When the Reds had succeeded in making themselves
masters of the Kuban district they had recourse to conscription there.
Now these forced recruits were deserting en masse, and coming over
to us to defend their homes. They were good fighters, but once their
own village was cleared of Reds, many of them left the ranks to cultivate
their land once more.
(7)
Letter by General Peter Wrangel
that was sent to General Anton
Denikin on 9th December, 1919.
The continual advance has reduced the Army's effective
force. The rear has become too vast. Disorganization is all the greater
because of the re-equipment system which Supreme Headquarters have
adopted; they have turned over this duty to the troops and take no
share in it themselves.
The war
is becoming to some a means of growing rich; re-equipment has degenerated
into pillage and peculation. Each unit strives to secure as much as
possible for itself, and seizes everything that comes to hand. What
cannot be used on the spot is sent back to the interior and sold at
a profit. The rolling-stock belonging to the troops has taken on enormous
dimensions - some regiments have two hundred carriages in their wake.
A considerable number of troops have retreated to the interior, and
many officers are away on prolonged missions, busy selling and exchanging
loot.
The Army
is absolutely demoralized, and is fast becoming a collection of tradesmen
and profiteers. All those employed on re-equipment work - that is
to say, nearly all the officers - have enormous sums of money in their
possession; as a result, there has been an outbreak of debauchery,
gambling and wild orgies.
(8)
General Peter
Wrangel, statement issued to the White
Army (19th October, 1920).
The Polish Army which has been fighting side by side with
us against the common enemy of liberty and order has just laid down
its arms and signed a preliminary peace with the oppressors and traitors
who designate themselves the Soviet Government of Russia. We are now
alone in the struggle which will decide the fate not only of our country
but of the whole of humanity. Let us strive to free our native land
from the yoke of these Red scum who recognize neither God nor country,
who bring confusion and shame in their wake. By delivering Russia
over to pillage and ruin, these infidels hope to start a world-wide
conflagration.
(9)
General Peter Wrangel,
statement issued to the people of Russia (29th October, 1920.
People of Russia! Alone in its struggle against the oppressor,
the Russian Army has been maintaining an unequal contest in its defence
of the last strip of Russian territory on which law and truth hold
sway. Conscious of my responsibility, I have tried to anticipate every
possible contingency from the very beginning.
I now order
the evacuation and embarkation at the Crimean ports of all those who
are following the Russian Army.
I have
done everything that human strength can do to fulfill my duty to the
Army and the population. We cannot foretell our future fate. We have
no other territory than the Crimea. We have no money. Frankly as always,
I warn you all of what awaits you. May God grant us strength and wisdom
to endure this period of Russian misery, and to survive it.
Available
from Amazon Books (order below)
