(1)
General Charles de Gaulle, attempted to halt the German invasion
of France at Abbeville. He wrote about these events in his book,
The Call to Honour (1955)
By the evening (28th May, 1940) the objective was reached. Only
Mont Caubert still held out. There were a great many dead from both
sides on the field. Our tanks had been sorely tried. Barely a hundred
were still in working order. But all the same, an atmosphere of
victory hovered over the battlefield. Everyone held his head high.
The wounded were smiling. The guns fired gaily. Before us, in a
pitched battle, the Germans had retired.
Alas! In the course of
the Battle of France, what other ground had been or would be won,
except this strip of fourteen kilometres deep? If the State had
played its part; if, while there was time, it had directed its military
system towards enterprise, not passivity; if our leaders had in
consequence had at their disposal the instruments for shock and
manoeuvre which had been often suggested to the politicians and
to the High Command; then our arms would have had their chance,
and France would have found her soul again.
(2)
Robert
Boothby, Boothby:
Recollections of a Rebel (1978)
Within hours of the French capitulation, Louis
Spears invited me to lunch to meet what he called 'a French Brigadier
whom I have just brought over from Bordeaux. The Brigadier was de
Gaulle; and the lunch party consisted of Spears, his wife (Mary
Borden), de Gaulle, Mme. de Gaulle, and myself. Spears told us about
their flight, how they had run out of petrol and had to make a forced
landing in the Channel Islands with two minutes to spare. De Gaulle,
who was going to make a broadcast that night, told us that he thought
of saying: "France has lost a battle, but not the war."
We all thought that this was very good. Later on Spears and de Gaulle
quarrelled bitterly when Spears was head of a British Mission to
the Levant, and tried - rightly - to ease the French out of Syria
and the Lebanon. There is no doubt that, in addition to being a
brave soldier and, with Liddell Hart, the most brilliant military
historian of our time, Spears was a natural intriguer.
What is equally beyond
doubt is that, if he had not pulled de Gaulle into that aeroplane
at Bordeaux, de Gaulle would never have been heard of. Spears, and
Spears alone, created de Gaulle; and in so doing made history. De
Gaulle knew it, and resented it. When Spears took him to see Churchill,
the latter said: "Why have you brought this lanky, gloomy Brigadier?"
Spears replied: "Because no one else would come."
(3)
General Charles de Gaulle, BBC radio broadcast (18th June, 1940)
I, General de Gaulle, now in London, call on all French officers
and men who are at present on British soil, or may be in the future,
with or without their arms; I call on all engineers and skilled
workmen from the armaments factories who are at present on British
soil, or may be in the future, to get in touch with me. Whatever
happens, the flame of the French resistance must not and shall not
die.
(4)
General Charles de Gaulle, wrote about Lend-Lease
in his book, The Call to Honour (1955)
On March 9th, at dawn, Mr. Churchill came and woke up to tell me,
literally dancing with joy, that the American Congress had passed
the "Lend-Lease Bill," which had been under discussion
for several weeks. There was, indeed, matter of comfort here for
us, not only from the fact that the belligerents were from now on
assured of receiving from the United States the material necessary
for fighting, but also because America, by becoming, in Roosevelt's
phrase, "the arsenal of the democracies," was taking a
gigantic step toward war.
(5)
General Charles
de Gaulle, The Call to
Honour (1955)
Jean Moulin was dropped by parachute in France during the night
of January 1st. He carried credentials from me appointing him as
my delegate for the non-occupied zone of Metropolitan France and
instructing him to endure unity of action among the elements of
the resistance there. This would mean that his authority would not,
in principle, be disputed. It was therefore agreed that it was he
who would be the centre of our communications in France, first with
the South Zone, then, as soon as possible, with the North Zone.
(6)
General Charles de Gaulle, The Call to Honour (1955)
Churchill had made for himself a rule to do nothing important except
in agreement with Roosevelt. Though he felt, more than any other
Englishman, the awkwardness of Washington's methods, though he found
it hard to bear the conditions of subordination in which United
States aid placed the British Empire, and though he bitterly resented
the tone of supremacy which the President adopted towards him, Churchill
had decided, once for all, to bow to the imperious necessity of
the American alliance.
(7)
Winston Churchill, letter to Franklin
D. Roosevelt (16th December, 1941)
The German setback in Russia, the British successes in Libya, the
moral and military collapse of Italy, above all the the declarations
of war exchanged between Germany and the United States, must strongly
affect the mind of France and the French Empire. Now is the time
to offer to Vichy and to French North Africa a blessing or a cursing.
A blessing will consist in a promise by the United States and great
Britain to re-establish France as a Great Power with her territories
undiminished.
Our relations with General
de Gaulle and the Free French movement will require to be reviewed.
Hitherto the United States have entered into no undertakings similar
to those comprised in my correspondence with him. Through no particular
fault of his own movement has created new antagonism in French minds.
Any action which the united states may now feel able to take in
regard to him should have the effect, inter alia, of redefining
our obligations to him and France so as to make these obligations
more closely dependent upon the eventual effort by him and the French
nation to rehabilitate themselves.
(8)
James
F. Byrnes, as Secretary of State, attended
the Yalta Conference on 4th February,
1945.
In the fall of 1944
the Soviet Union and the Provisional Government of France had entered
into a treaty of friendship. It was immediately obvious at Yalta,
however, that the treaty and the friendly words exchanged over it
by the diplomats had not changed in any degree Marshal Stalin's
opinion on the contribution of France to the war. He thought France
should play little part in the control of Germany, and stated that
Yugoslavia and Poland were more entitled to consideration than France.
When Roosevelt and Churchill
proposed that France be allotted a zone of occupation, Stalin agreed.
But it was clear he agreed only because the French zone was to be
taken out of the territory allotted to the United States and the
United Kingdom. And he especially opposed giving France a representative
on the Allied Control Council for Germany. He undoubtedly concurred
in the opinion expressed to the President by Mr. Molotov that this
should be done "only as a kindness to France and not because
she is entitled to it."
"I am in favor of
France being given a zone," Stalin declared, "but I cannot
forget that in this war France opened the gates to the enemy."
He maintained it would create difficulties to give France a zone
of occupation and a representative on the Allied Control Council
and refuse the same treatment to others who had fought more than
France. He said France would soon demand that de Gaulle attend the
Big
Three's Conferences.
Churchill argued strongly
in favor of France's being represented on the Council. He said the
British public would not understand if questions affecting France
and the French zone were settled without her participation in the
discussion. It did not follow, as Stalin had suggested, that France
would' demand de Gaulle's participation in the conferences of the
Big Three, he added. And, in his best humor, Mr. Churchill said
the conference was "a very exclusive club, the entrance fee
being at least five million soldiers or the equivalent."
(9)
Harold Macmillan, speech in the House
of Commons (31st July 1961)
Therefore,
after long and earnest consideration, Her Majesty's Government have
come to the conclusion that it would be right for Britain to make
a formal application under Article 237 of the Treaty for negotiations
with a view to joining the Community if satisfactory arrangements
can be made to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom, of
the Commonwealth and of the European Free Trade Association.
If, as I earnestly hope, our offer to enter into negotiations with
the European Economic Community is accepted, we shall spare no efforts
to reach a satisfactory agreement. These negotiations must inevitably
be of a detailed and technical character, covering a very large
number of the most delicate and difficult matters. They may, therefore,
be protracted and there can, of course, be no guarantee of success.
When any negotiations are brought to a conclusion then it will be
the duty of the Government to recommend to the House what course
we should pursue.
(10)
Charles De Gaulle, speech (4th January 1963)
The
Treaty of Rome was concluded between six continental States - States
which are, economically speaking, one may say, of the same nature.
Indeed, whether it be a matter of their industrial or agricultural
production, their external exchanges, their habits or their commercial
clientele, their living or working conditions, there is between
them much more resemblance than difference. Moreover, they are adjacent,
they inter-penetrate, they prolong each other through their communications.
It is therefore a fact to group them and to link them in such a
way that what they have to produce, to buy, to sell, to consume
- well, they do produce, buy, sell, consume, in preference in their
own ensemble. Doing that is conforming to realities.
Moreover, it must be added that from the point of view of their
economic development, their social progress, their technical capacity,
they are, in short, keeping pace. They are marching in similar fashion.
It so happens, too, that there is between them no kind of political
grievance, no frontier question, no rivalry in domination or power.
On the contrary, they are joined in solidarity, especially and primarily,
from the aspect of the consciousness they have, of defining together
an important part of the sources of our civilisation; and also as
concerns their security, because they are continentals and have
before them one and the same menace from one extremity to the other
of their territories; finally, they are in solidarity through the
fact that not one among them is bound abroad by any particular political
or military accord.
Thus,
it was psychologically and materially possible to make an economic
community of the Six, though not without difficulties. When the
Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, it was after long discussions;
and when it was concluded, it was necessary in order to achieve
something that we French put in order our economic, financial, and
monetary affairs and that was done in 1959.
Thereupon
Great Britain posed her candidature to the Common Market. She did
it after having earlier refused to participate in the communities
we are now building, as well as after creating a free trade area
with six other States, and, finally, after having - I may well say
it, the negotiations held at such length on this subject will be
recalled - after having put some pressure on the Six to prevent
a real beginning being made in the application of the Common Market.
If England asks in turn to enter, but on her own conditions, this
poses without doubt to each of the six States, and poses to England,
problems of a very great dimension.
England in effect is insular, she is maritime, she is linked through
her exchanges, her markets, her supply lines to the most diverse
and often the most distant countries; she pursues essentially industrial
and commercial activities, and only slight agricultural ones. She
has in all her doings very marked and very original habits and traditions.
(11)
Paul-Henri Spaak, The Continuing Battle: Memories of an European
(1971)
A
new political event of extreme importance was in the making: General
de Gaulle had torpedoed our negotiations without having warned either
his partners or the British. He had acted with a lack of consideration
unexampled in the history of the EEC, showing utter contempt for
his negotiating partners, allies and opponents alike. He had brought
to a halt negotiations which he himself put in train in full agreement
with his partners, and had done so on the flimsiest of pretexts.
What had happened? There is every reason to believe that it was
the attitude adopted by Macmillan at his meeting with Kennedy in
Bermuda which so upset the President of the French Republic. Macmillan's
crime was to have reached agreement with the President of the United
States on Britain's nuclear, weaponry. He had in fact arranged for
the purchase of Polaris missiles from the United States. In General
de Gaulle's eyes the cooperation with the Americans was tantamount
to treason against Europe's interests and justified his refusal
to allow Britain into the Common Market. The General's resentment
was all the greater because a few days before the Bermuda meeting
he had received Macmillan at Rambouillet. The British Prime Minister,
he claimed, had told him nothing of his nuclear plans. On the other
hand, de Gaulle gave Macmillan no warning that he was about to torpedo
the negotiations in Brussels. I think the full truth about these
events still remains to be told. The French and British versions
which have been circulating in the chancelleries differ, but what
is certain is that France, without consulting her partners, unilaterally
withdrew from negotiations to which she had earlier agreed and that
she did so, moreover, after first insisting that the Six must present
a united front.
We were faced with a complete volte-face. Stunned and angry, our
first reaction was to ignore what had been said in Paris and to
continue the negotiation as if nothing had happened. The British
showed extraordinary sang-froid. Though, deep down, they were greatly
shocked, they gave no outward sign of this and continued to present
their arguments at the negotiating table with imperturbable calm.
(12)
Charles De Gaulle, speech (4th January 1963)
I
should like to speak particularly about the objection to integration.
People counter this by saying: "Why not merge the six states
together into a single supranational entity? That would be very
simple and practical". But such an entity is impossible to
achieve in the absence in Europe today of a federator who has the
necessary power, reputation and ability. Thus one has to fall back
on a sort of hybrid arrangement under which the six states agree
to submit to the decisions of a qualified majority. At the same
time, although there are already six national Parliaments as well
as the
European Parliament and, in addition the Consultative Assembly of
the Council of Europe ... it would be necessary to elect over and
above this, yet a further Parliament, described as European, which
would lay down the law to the six states.
These are ideas that might appeal to certain minds but I entirely
fail to see how they could be put into practice, even with six signatures
at the foot of a document. Can we imagine France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg being prepared on a matter
of importance to them in the national or international sphere, to
do something that appeared wrong to them, merely because others
had ordered them to do so? Would the peoples of France, of Germany,
of Italy, of the Netherlands, of Belgium or of Luxembourg ever dream
of submitting to laws passed by foreign parliamentarians if such
laws ran counter to their deepest convictions? Clearly not. It is
impossible nowadays for a foreign majority to impose their will
on reluctant nations. It is true, perhaps, that in this 'integrated'
Europe as it is called there might be no policy at all. This would
simplify a great many things. Indeed, once there was no France,
no Europe; once there was no policy - since one could not be imposed
on each of the six states, attempts to formulate a policy would
cease. But then, perhaps, these peoples would follow in the wake
of some outsider who had a policy. There would, perhaps, be a federator,
but he would not be European. And Europe would not be an integrated
Europe but something vaster by far and, I repeat, with a federator.
Perhaps to some extent it is this that at times inspires the utterances
of certain advocates of European integration. If so, then it would
be better to say so.
