Emilio
Mola, the son of an army officer, was
born on 9th June, 1887. When he was 20 years old he was commissioned
in the infantry.
In 1919 he was assigned
to the Moorish Regulares. An intelligent man, he wrote extensively
on military affairs. Good-natured, he was popular with his men and
in 1927 was promoted to brigadier general.
Mola was made director
of general security in 1930. In this post he clashed
with some of Spain's leading left-wing politicians. He became military
commander in Morocco
but was recalled to Spain
after the Popular Front victory in February
1936 and reassigned as military governor in Pamplona.
In February 1936 Mola joined
other Spanish Army officers, such as Francisco
Franco,
Juan Yague, Gonzalo
Queipo de Llano and
José
Sanjurjo,
in talking about overthrowing the Popular Front government. Mola became
leader of this group.
On
the 10th May 1936 the conservative Niceto
Alcala Zamora was
ousted as president and replaced by the left-wing Manuel
Azaña.
As a result of the government's economic measures the wealthy took
vast sums of capital out of the country. This created an economic
crisis and the value of the peseta declined which damaged trade and
tourism. With prices rising workers demanded higher wages. This led
to a series of strikes in Spain.
President Manuel
Azaña appointed
Diego Martinez Barrio as prime minister
on 18th July 1936 and asked him to negotiate with the rebels. He contacted
Mola
and offered him the post
of Minister of War in his government. He refused and when Azaña
realized that the Nationalists
were unwilling to compromise, he sacked Martinez Barrio and replaced
him with José Giral. To protect the
Popular Front government, Giral gave orders for arms to be distributed
to left-wing organizations that opposed the military uprising.
General Mola issued
his proclamation of revolt in Navarre on 19th July, 1936. The coup
got off to a bad start with José
Sanjurjo being
killed in an air crash on 20th July. The uprising was a failure in
most parts of Spain but Mola's forces were
successful in the Canary Islands, Morocco, Seville and Aragon.
By the end of September
1936, the nine other generals involved in the military uprising came
to the conclusion that General
Francisco
Franco should
become commander of the Nationalist
Army. He was
also appointed chief of state. Mola
agreed to serve under him and was placed in charge of the Army of
the North.
Emilio
Mola
was killed on 3rd June 1937 when his plane crashed during bad weather.
As
General José
Sanjurjo had
been killed in a similar accident on 20th July 1936, rumours began
to circulate that General Francisco
Franco was
responsible for the deaths of his two fellow leaders. However, no
evidence has ever been found to substantiate this accusation.
(1)
General Emilio Mola to General
José
Sanjurjo (July
1936)
It
will be borne in mind that the action, in order to crush, as soon
as
possible, a strong and well-organized enemy, will have to be very
violent. Hence, all
directors of political parties, societies, or unions not pledged to
the movement will be imprisoned: such people will be administered
exemplary punishments,
so that movements of rebellion or strikes will be strangled.
(2)
Manchester Guardian (12th August
1936)
One
day about the beginning of July I was walking down the principal street
in Malaga. As I passed the Club Mercantil an old gentleman whom I
know slightly came to me and in a state of great excitement exclaimed:
'Good news, good news. Within a fortnight Calvo Sotelo (the monarchist
leader) will be King of Spain.'
Then
on July 12 Calvo Sotelo was taken from his house by night and shot.
There is some mystery in this assassination. The usual reason given
for it is that it was committed by the Storm Troops or republican
police as a reprisal for the murder of one of their officers the day
before by Fascists. It is also said that it was done on the orders
of those who wished to precipitate a rising of the Right, as they
considered that was the only way to a Communist revolution. The one
thing that seems certain is that the Government, which was extremely
anxious to avoid trouble, had nothing to do with it.
It was decided by the rebel generals to utilise the feeling of indignation
which the assassination had caused among their own partisans. The
rising, which I am told had been arranged for July 25, therefore broke
out on the evening of July 18 in Spain. It had begun on the previous
day in Morocco.
What
happened in Malaga was this. At five o'clock on the evening of July
18 a company of infantry marched out of the barracks and proceeded,
with bands playing, towards the centre of the town. There was already
great tension, since the news of the rising in Morocco had become
known. As they marched the soldiers were asked where they were going.
'To proclaim a state of war.' This is the legal procedure in such
cases, and the soldiers thought that it was by order of the Government.
The Governor's office was rung up, and it was learned that no such
order had been given. This news quickly spread among the bystanders.
The company had reached the Custom offices. Suddenly a workman stepped
forward, saluted with the clenched fist, and cried 'Viva la Republica!'
The officer in command drew his revolver and shot him. This was the
signal. The Storm Troops on the steps of the Custom-house opened fire.
Workmen from behind trees and Fascists from windows joined in. The
troops tried to storm the Custom-house. But this they failed to do,
and after a great deal of firing they were driven into the Calle Larios,
the main shopping street of the city, where they were left alone.
Meanwhile the Governor had released the soldiers from their duty to
their officers, and they began to stream out of the barracks into
the town. They were the less disposed to fight for having been inoculated
two days before against typhoid. Some of them approached the pickets
of the rebel company. One by one the men slunk away till only one
sentry was left. The officers got back to the barracks, where they
were taken prisoners. Apart from isolated Fascists, who continued
sniping from the roofs - and this did not altogether cease for two
days, - the fighting was over. What seems rather rather odd considering
the tens of thousands of rounds let off, less than twenty were killed
on that night. On both sides they were bad shots.
At
dawn the workmen began to stream out of their quarters of the city.
Brandishing revolvers and red flags, singing the 'Internationale,'
and making a strange rhythmical sound- 'Uh-uh-uh,' which those who
heard it told me was most terrifying, - they marched into the Calle
Larios. Selecting particular houses, sometimes those from which snipers
fired at them, sometimes those of people particularly hated or known
to be concerned in this movement, they began to set fire to them.
It was done methodically. The house was first searched, householders
on either side were warned, efforts were made to prevent the fire
from spreading. In this way half the houses in the Calle Larios were
burnt, about twenty houses in other parts of the town and in the garden
suburb to the east of the city some thirty or forty villas. But no
churches or convents. These burnings went on all day until about midnight,
and then, apart from a small recrudescence, stopped. No one was killed
and there was no looting.
A
grocer's shop, for example, was broken into: the hams, wines, and
liqueurs were piled in the street and set fire to. The workmen, many
of whom must have had hungry families at home, watched them burn.
I asked one of them why they did not send the food to their union
and distribute it. 'No,' he replied, 'Spanish workmen do not steal.
They have too much sense of honour.' If one is horrified at the material
destruction - and much of it is, of course, perfectly stupid, - one
should not forget the provocation.
Available from Amazon Books
(order below)
