Hugh
Dalton, the son of the chaplain to Queen
Victoria, was born in Neath, Glamorgan, in 1887. After his education
at Eton and King's College, Cambridge,
Dalton served as a soldier in the First World War.
Dalton was a member of the Labour Party
and in the 1924 General Election was elected
to represent Camberwell the House of Commons.
Dalton opposed the National Government formed by Ramsay
MacDonald and as a result lost his seat in the 1931
General Election. Dalton taught at the London
School of Economics before re-entering Parliament after the 1935
General Election. His book, Practical
Socialism (1935), had a major influence on the new Labour
leader, Clement Attlee.
In 1940 Winston Churchill appointed
Dalton as Minister of Economic Warfare in his government. While in
this post he created the Special Operations Executive
(SOE). Two years later he was promoted to Minister of the Board
of Trade.
Following the 1945 General Election, the
new Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, appointed
Dalton as Chancellor of the Exchequer. He nationalized the Bank
of England in 1946 but the following year was forced to resign
after budget details were leaked to a journalist and was replaced
by his long-time enemy Stafford Cripps.
Dalton
returned to office in 1948 as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
He also served as Minister of Town and Planning (1950-51).
Dalton wrote two books about his political career, Call
Back Yesterday (1953) and High
Tide and After (1962). Hugh Dalton, who was made a life
peer in 1960, died in 1962.
(1)
Hugh Dalton, letter to Lord
Halifax (2nd July, 1940)
We have got to organize movements in enemy-occupied territory comparable
to the Sinn Fein movement in Ireland, to the Chinese Guerillas now
operating against Japan, to the Spanish Irregulars who played a notable
part in Wellington's campaign or - one might as well admit it - to
the organizations which the Nazis themselves have developed so remarkably
in almost every country in the world. This "democratic international"
must use many different methods, including industrial and military
sabotage, labour agitation and strikes, continuous propaganda, terrorist
acts against traitors and German leaders, boycotts and riots.
It is quite
clear to me that an organization on this scale and of this character
is not something which can be handled by the ordinary departmental
machinery of either the British Civil Service or the British military
machine. What is needed is a new organization to co-ordinate, inspire,
control and assist the nationals of the oppressed countries who must
themselves be the direct participants. We need absolute secrecy, a
certain fanatical enthusiasm, willingness to work with people of different
nationalities, complete political reliability. Some of these qualities
are certainly to be found in some military officers and, if such men
are available, they should undoubtedly be used. But the organization
should, in
my view, be entirely independent of the War Office machine.
(2)
Hugh Dalton, diary entry (18th December, 1940)
Stanley Baldwin desired only not to be troubled with foreign affairs
at all. He left his successive Foreign Secretaries completely free.
(There was, I recall, though I do not mention it tonight, the famous
case of Hoare proceeding to Paris to negotiate the Hoare-Laval Pact,
and Baldwin, asked in Cabinet by some of the younger Tories whether
all was well, and whether there should not be some discussion now
before irrevocable decisions were taken, said, 'I think we all have
confidence in Sam; we can safely leave it in his hands.'
Halifax
relates that Baldwin, in the year of the Abdication, took three months'
holiday (repeat three months), at the end of which he asked Eden,
then Foreign Secretary, "Have you had many telegrams about the
King?" Eden said no. Then Baldwin said, "I have had a great
many, some from the most extraordinary people. I foresee that I shall
have a lot of trouble over this. I hope that you will not bother me
with foreign affairs during the next three months." Yet these
were mois mouvementes in foreign affairs. Hitler was arming,
arming, arming, day by day. But Baldwin was focused on the tactics
of the Abdication.
(3)
Hugh Dalton, diary entry (28th April, 1941)
Oliver Stanley (Conservative M.P. for Westmorland) dined with me alone
in a secluded corner of the Lansdowne Club. He asked me what I had
thought of the Prime Minister's speech on the air on Sunday. I said
that I thought he had done well in a very difficult situation and
had heartened his hearers. Stanley said, "It may have gone down
very well with the 99 per cent who know nothing, but the 1 per cent
of us who do know, feel rather differently."
He then
began a long tirade against the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary,
with whom I had said that I found my personal relations developing
very satisfactorily, and that this was additionally important for
smooth working, since he was so close to the Prime Minister. Stanley
said he did not think he was the sort of man who ought to be close
to the Prime Minister. He was, he added, vain, weak and unreliable.
He had let down Stanley, Malcolm MacDonald and the rest at the time
of his resignation. He had promised to consult them, and they had
acted together as a group. They were on many points opposed to Chamberlain's
Foreign Policy. Eden, however, chose a most frivolous pretext on which
to resign, and gave Stanley and others no warning that he was going
to do so. So much so that, at the Cabinet, on the proposal that we
should begin again negotiations with Italy, Chamberlain had gone round
the table, and got the acquiescence of all of them, and it was only
then that Eden had quite suddenly said that he could not go on.
Stanley
then proceeded to attack, with such mild vehemence as he could command,
the terrible error, as he judged it, of sending anything beyond a
small token force to Greece. This, he said, was a crowning blunder.
It was the Prime Minister's fault. The decision had been taken against
all military and naval advice. It should have been seen from the start
that the adventure was quite hopeless. The only real way to help Greece
was to win the war. Instead of that we might now lose; both Greece
and Egypt. We had thrown away a most valuable Air Force in Greece.
At least four squadrons of fighters and three squadrons of bombers
had been destroyed. It was quite wrong for Eden to have gone to the
Middle East and worst of all to go to Athens. There he had been cheered
in the streets and smothered in roses. How in such surroundings could
he keep his judgment clear. A Foreign Secretary should stay always
in the Foreign Office protected by distance and his officials from
such local impressions.
(4)
Hugh Dalton, diary entry (27th August, 1942)
In the Middle East the morale of all our people was most deplorable.
Auchinleck had completely lost confidence in himself. Everybody was
always looking over their shoulders towards prepared positions to
which to retreat. The units at the Front were hopelessly mixed up,
and there was no evidence of good staff work. Auchinleck had 180 Generals
on his staff. This number has now been reduced to 30 by his successor.
We should, of course, have hit Rommel hard when he reached his furthest
point of advance. Winston Churchill and Sir Alan Brooke both went
up to the line and followed different routes, and met that evening
to compare notes. "Both", said Morton, "came back with
faces like boots." They were both convinced that drastic and
speedy action must be taken. Already there had been a very great improvement.
But it was only just in time. Alexander, Auchinleck's successor, has
hitherto been in charge of brilliant retreats. He was the last man
off the beaches at Dunkirk and since then he has done Burma.
(5)
Hugh Dalton, diary entry (7th September,
1942)
All ministers of Cabinet rank are invited to lunch at the Admiralty,
and the P.M. makes one of his very attractive, intimate and amusing
speeches to his 'pals and comrades'. He recalls our first gathering
just before Dunkirk, and how then all seemed very black and we were
all prepared to give up everything, including life itself as one of
the least things to give up, rather than give in, and how we, by our
united determination to go on to the end, sustained him in those days.
And now, in spite of all, the prospect is immeasurably brighter. He
gave an account, much on the lines that I had heard before, of his
visit to the Middle East and Moscow. He said very frankly that Auchinleck
had become a very dangerous failure and that the spirit of the troops
was not at all good, though he hoped that now it had been improved.
Of Stalin
he said many complimentary things. Also "He is very genial out
of business hours" and this he had appreciated. He thought that
they had got on very well together. The last night, he being due to
catch a plane away at 5 next morning, Stalin asked him, when they
had finished their formal business about 7 p.m., whether he had any
preoccupation that evening. When he said no, Stalin said, "Then
let us go and have some drinks together." They then repaired
to the Kremlin, to Stalin's private apartments, which were conveniently,
but by no means luxuriously, furnished. Stalin then proceeded himself
to draw the corks from a large number of bottles, in the midst of
which process a pretty red-haired girl entered. She kissed Stalin,
who looked to see how Churchill reacted to this. "And I confess",
said the P.M., "that I acquired a quite definite physical impression.
It was Stalin's daughter."Stalin then asked, "Do you mind
if we have Molotov as well?", and added, "There is one thing
you can say in defence of Molotov: he can drink." So Molotov
was allowed in too. Then they had drinks and food and drinks and talk
till 3 a.m., and then the P.M. said that he must go to pack up, as
his plane left at 5. The P.M. is quite convinced that the Russians
will fight on and on until victory. "Even if we and the Americans
were to throw in our hands tomorrow, I am sure that they would go
on."
(6)
Hugh Dalton, diary entry (22nd October, 1942)
On Sunday night Cabinet changes are announced on the air. Morrison
succeeds Cripps in the War Cabinet and the latter drops down to Minister
of Aircraft Production, thus becoming a lodger downstairs in my own
building. This hole is made by the appointment of Llewellin to Washington.
Cranborne is to be Lord Privy Seal, and Oliver Stanley returns to
the Government as Colonial Secretary. Eden is to lead the House of
Commons.
I write
at once to Morrison, "Congratulations! The War Cabinet is strengthened."
Next morning the Daily Herald begins its leader with these same last
five words. It is, indeed, a great improvement. Nearly all Cripps's
'mystique' is now gone, and he has missed all his chances - never
really good - of resigning with credit. He has, I think, been very
skilfully played by the P.M. He may, of course, be quite good at the
Ministry of Aircraft Production, but seldom has anyone's political
stock, having been so outrageously and unjustifiably overvalued, fallen
so fast and so far. I add in my letter to Morrison that I would like
soon to have a meeting and a talk, and I write also to Ellen Wilkinson
summarizing my letter to Morrison.
(7)
Hugh Dalton, diary entry
(7th September, 1942)
P.M. talks to No. 1 ministers. He has not held one of these general
talks for some time. He says that the great battle in North Africa
will begin this week. We have a superiority in men of more than two
to one, in guns and aircraft of a good deal more. He thinks it will
be a Stalingrad. Hitler has been constantly pouring in reinforcements
and supplies by sea and air. We have sunk and destroyed much, but
much has kept on coming in. This is Hitler's usual obstinacy. But
we need not regret it. Hitler is, moreover, playing for time, and
we have reason to know that he hopes we shall not start any new large
land operations till 1st July. This probably means that he will by
then have trained and ready the last 2,000,000 men whom he has scraped
and squeezed out of German reserves of manpower. He is still immensely
powerful; particularly if the Russians slow down, he could easily
detach some thirty Divisions from the Eastern Front for other duties.
He may still either push down through Spain or attack Turkey. If we
must choose, we should prefer the former. Much thought has been given
to our next move after clearing North Africa. There are practically
no German troops in Italy or in the islands. The P.M. has been carrying
on a double flirtation with Roosevelt and Stalin. The former has gone
pretty easily. His relations with the President are most intimate
and friendly. He does not want to use the direct approach on routine
questions, but on questions of outstanding importance he is always
pretty confident that it will work. Stalin is more difficult. But
he has received two telegrams from him lately. One is thanking Churchill
for the film Desert Victory. This has clearly been much appreciated.
It is being shown in many parts of Russia. It demonstrates, says Stalin,
how bravely and how skilfully the British are fighting. It disposes
of the stories put about by those miscreants who allege that the British
are not seriously in the war. The second telegram is in reply to a
discouraging message about convoys. He takes the news very well, though
not, of course, with pleasure. Further, Stalin always telegraphs congratulations
whenever we raid Berlin. He evidently takes very great satisfaction
in this. And no wonder!
(8)
Konni
Zilliacus wrote about the relative
merits of Ernest
Bevin and Hugh
Dalton in his unpublished autobiography, Challenge to Fear.
He (Bevin) was a great working class leader with a fine record. But
he was tragically miscast as
Labour's Foreign Secretary in 1945. For he did not have a due to the
problems facing him. He was too old and set in his ways to learn.
Or rather, to unlearn and then learn afresh: that is, to do the kind
of painful thinking that goes down to one's own prejudices and assumptions,
tests them in the light of reason and facts, and then works out a
policy that is genuinely 'realistic' because it is rooted in reality
and not to an out-of-date conception of the world in which we are
living, and harnessed to Labour's view of the national interest and
not to that of the defenders of the old order.
Hugh Dalton would have
been far better, first of all because he really did know a lot about
foreign affairs; secondly because he knew how to manage the Foreign
Office officials, instead of being run by them; thirdly, because he
was capable of learning from experience and correcting his mistakes;
fourthly because he would listen to the views of back bench colleagues
instead of treating any criticism or comments as an insult and relying
on blind trade union loyalties and the power of the block vote to
impose on the Labour Party the Churchillian policies that the Foreign
Office had induced him to adopt.
(9)
Harold
Wilson,
Memoirs: 1916-1964 (1986)
We were therefore closely involved in the economic crisis in the late
autumn of 1947, which had persuaded Hugh Dalton in November to introduce
an interim budget. It brought about his downfall. On his way to the
House, he met by chance the Lobby correspondent of an evening newspaper
and nonchalantly told him the main features of the measures he had
in mind. These were telephoned by the journalist to his newspaper
and, as a result of some misunderstanding, were printed and on the
streets before the Chancellor, who as usual began with a general statement
analysing the country's economic and financial problems, started to
outline his specific proposals. While he was speaking, early copies
of the newspaper were being passed from hand to hand on the Conservative
benches. At first there was no attempt by the
Opposition to make capital out of the Dalton gaffe, and Churchill
spoke in a sympathetic vein about the indiscretion. But this was not
enough for some of his backbenchers. The following afternoon, it became
clear that Churchill was going to press the matter hard, involving
Dalton's continuance in office.
(10)
Herbert
Morrison, An
Autobiography (1960)
The 1947 economic crisis was at root largely due to the
faulty administration
at the Treasury for which Dalton must be held responsible as head
of the department. Cripps, who was by this time a close friend of
Dalton's, felt that the economic co-ordination required the attention
of a full-time economic minister. Cripps, with the support of Dalton,
was ready to lay the blame at Attlee's feet. I was told that Cripps
wanted Bevin to be prime minister, and that Dalton agreed to this.
Bevin, it was said - apparently wrongly - was ready to accept. I was
asked what would I do? I have never felt up to indulging in high conspiracy
and I refused to participate. Anyway, the conspiracy failed.
(11)
George
Brown, In My Way (1970)
Dalton had known John
Carvel for years and he stopped to chat with him for a moment, very
misguidedly mentioning one or two of the things that he proposed to
do in his Budget. It never occurred to Dalton that there could be
any harm in this; he was on his way into the Chamber to make his Budget
speech, and it never crossed his mind that any newspaper could print
it before he said it.
But it did. A few lines
of Budget news got into the Stop Press column of the old London Star,
not, indeed, before Dalton got up, but before he sat down. That was
enough to make Dalton feel that he had to resign as Chancellor. He
was by then so broken by his struggles in the Cabinet that I think
he would have resigned soon, anyway, but he would not have gone because
of what was inevitably described as a Budget scandal. Dalton was undoubtedly
indiscreet, but whether the incident was sufficiently scandalous to
require the resignation of a Senior Minister I am less sure. Dalton
himself felt that it was, and that was that.
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