Hugh
Gaitskell was born on 9th April 1906. Educated at Winchester
School and New College, Oxford,
he became a socialist during the 1926 General
Strike.
After leaving
university he joined the Workers' Educational association and lectured
on economics to miners in Nottinghamshire. In 1938 he accepted a post
teaching political economy at the University
of London. The following year he published Money
and Everyday Life (1939). Gaitskell worked as a civil servant
during the Second World War.
Gaitskell,
a member of the Labour Party, was selected
as
the parliamentary candidate for South Leeds and was elected to the
House of Commons in the 1945
General Election.
Clement
Attlee
appointed him as Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Fuel and
Power. This was followed by posts as Minister of Fuel and Power (October,
1947 - February, 1950) and Minister of State for Economic Affairs
(February, 1950 - October, 1950) and Chancellor of the Exchequer (October,
1950 - October, 1951).
The
National Insurance Act
created the structure of the Welfare
State and after the passing of the National
Health Service Act in 1948, people in Britain were provided with
free diagnosis and treatment of illness, at home or in hospital, as
well as dental and ophthalmic services. However, when Gaitskell announced
that he intended to introduce measures that would force people to
pay half the cost of dentures and spectacles and a one shilling prescription
charge, three members of the government, Harold
Wilson, Aneurin
Bevan and
John Freeman resigned from office.
Gaitskell was hated by
the left-wing of the Labour
Party for
the introduction of National Health charges. However, when Clement
Attlee resigned
in 1955 he defeated Herbert
Morrison to become
the party's new leader. The following year he led the protests against
the Anthony
Eden and his
policy on the Suez
Canal.
Gaitskell urged Britain's
entry to the European
Economic Community
but was unable to persuade the majority of members of the Labour
Party to
agree to this policy. in 1959 he also attempted to change party policy
on nationalization (Clause IV). Gaitskell was also in conflict with
his party over his opposition to
unilateral nuclear disarmament.
Hugh
Gaitskell died on 18th January, 1963 and replaced as leader of the
Labour Party by his long time enemy, Harold
Wilson.
Vicky,
cartoon showing Harold
Wilson, Aneurin
Bevan,
Michael Foot, Ian Mikardo attacking Herbert
Morrison,
Clement Attlee and Hugh
Gaitskell (July, 1951)
(1)
Harold
Wilson,
Memoirs: The Making of a Prime Minister, 1916-64 (1986)
Hugh Gaitskell had many
fine qualities, including unswerving loyalty to his
close band of friends and to the principles of economics as he interpreted
them, together with great personal charm. But once he came
to a decision, a remarkably speedy process associated with great
certainty, the Medes and the Persians had nothing on him. Whether
the argument took place in the Cabinet, or later in the Shadow
Cabinet or the National Executive, any colleague taking a different
line from his was regarded not only as an apostate, but as a
troublemaker or simply a person lacking in brains.
Hugh Gaitskell and Nye
Bevan were as temperamentally and politically opposed to one another
as it was possible to be within a single political party. I had relations
of fairly long standing with both of them. I had first come close
to Nye during my housing stint at the Ministry of Works, although
it had taken time for the relationship to develop. Nye was suspicious
of university-trained MPs, particularly those from Oxford and above
all economists, but I had broken down that barrier and we had great
confidence in each other. I had early developed an admiration for
Hugh Gaitskell's qualities and in many way we were intellectual partners.
He was more doctrinaire and I was more of a pragmatist.
One other fact soon became
clear about Hugh. He was certainly ambitious, and had close links
with the right-wing trade unions. It was not long before that ambition
took the form of a determination to outmanoeuvre, indeed humiliate,
Aneurin Bevan. Hugh, for his part, despised what he regarded as emotional
oratory, and if he could defeat Nye in open conflict, he would be
in a strong position to oust Morrison as the heir apparent to Clement
Attlee. At the same time he would ensure that post-war socialism would
take a less dogmatic form, totally anti-communist but unemotional.
(2)
Herbert
Morrison, An
Autobiography (1960)
The retirement of Cripps was the big chance for Hugh Gaitskell,
a chance which set him contemplating the leadership of the Party.
I regarded him at that time as a man of considerable ability and with
a praiseworthy desire to act in a sane and responsible manner.
Gaitskell is often able
to see both sides of a question, an ability which contrasted him to
his then chief, Cripps, who was, incidentally, very fond of him. His
appointment as Chancellor of the Exchequer at the age of forty-five
was a bold but wise move, though it displeased some of the old guard
and infuriated a few of his own contemporaries, possibly including
Nye Bevan and Harold Wilson. However, under Gaitskell, they became
the No. 2 and the No. 3 in the Parliamentary Party.
(3)
Aneurin Bevan, letter to Clement
Attlee after he promoted Hugh Gaitskell to the post of Chancellor
of the Exchequer
(October, 1950)
I feel bound to tell you that for my
part I think the appointment
of Gaitskell to be a great mistake. I should have thought myself
that it was essential to find out whether the holder of this great
office would commend himself to the main elements and currents
of opinion in the Party. After all, the policies which he
will have to propound and carry out are bound to have the most
profound and important repercussions throughout the movement.
(4)
Henry
(Chips) Channon,
diary entry (10th
April, 1951)
Suspense and a brooding atmosphere at the House, when Gaitskell,
rather nattily if unsuitably dressed and wearing a red carnation,
began to address the crowded and attentive benches. Every seat was
taken. The sun smiled in a desultory way, and for a bit there were
brief shafts of light; six Tories wore top-hats and looked faintly
ridiculous. Winston, who has seemed so boyish recently suddenly seemed
sleepy and old. Perhaps he had had too rich a lunch . . . Mrs Chamberlain
and Mrs Attlee were in the Speaker's Gallery. Bevin, on the front
bench looked thin, and had the parchment pallor one associates with
death . . . Doom has now struck. It is 4 o'clock, and we await the
worst. If it is very bad the Government may decide to go to the country
at once. Last night's defeat, although it was only on cheese, has
further dampened their spirits. Many would welcome a face-saving dissolution
. . .
Gaitskell has a Wykehamistical
voice and manner and a 13th century face. He began in a moderate fashion,
and at once put the House in a receptive mood by his clear enunciation
and courteous manner; he was lucid, clear and coherent and there was
a commendable absence of Daltonian sneers or bleak Crippsian platitudes.
A breath of fresh air. Nevertheless there was anxiety as the House
soon realised that he intended to raise taxation, to produce a balanced
Budget rather than
to issue loans . . . one listened sadly. Ambassadors peered over the
Gallery: there were no interruptions. I stood by the Speaker's Chair,
and Bevan, red in the face and breathing like an angry bull was next
to me. He was standing as inconspicuously as possible, and it was
soon evident why: he had recently declared that he would never serve
in a Government which taxed the ridiculous health service: Gaitskell
announced some changes. Everybody wondered whether that meant Bevan's
resignation? Eventually Gaitskell announced a rise in petrol and 6d.
on the income tax, and a heavy increase on distributed profits - that
was all. Once again we have been let off revolutionary legislation,
or confiscatory political contrivances.
(5)
Michael
Foot, Aneurin Bevan (1973)
On the afternoon of 10
April he (Hugh Gaitskell) presented his Budget, including the proposal
to save £13 million - £30 million in a full year-by imposing
charges on spectacles and on dentures supplied under the Health Service.
And glancing over his shoulder at the benches behind him he had seemed
to underline his resolve: having made up his mind, he said, a Chancellor
'should stick to it and not be
moved by pressure of any kind, however insidious or well-intentioned'.
Bevan did not take his accustomed seat on the Treasury bench, but
listened to this part of the speech from behind the Speaker's chair,
with Jennie by his side. A muffled cry of 'shame' from her was the
only hostile demonstration Gaitskell received that afternoon.
(6)
Denis
Healey, The Time of My Life
(1989)
One of Attlee's few general statements about politics was that
the Labour Party should always be led from Left of Centre. That was
one reason why he stayed on until it was clear in 1955 that Herbert
Morrison would not succeed him. However, I doubt if he was altogether
happy to see Hugh Gaitskell take his place.
I was worried by a streak
of intolerance in Gaitskell's nature; he tended to believe that no
one could disagree with him unless they were either knaves or fools.
Rejecting Dean Rusk's advice, he would insist on arguing to a conclusion
rather than to a decision. Thus he would keep meetings of the Shadow
Cabinet going, long after he had obtained its consent to his proposals,
because he wanted to be certain that everyone understood precisely
why he was right. In the political world a leader must often be content
with acquiescence; he is sometimes wise to leave education to his
juniors.
I myself was young enough
to indulge in educational activities - speaking, writing articles,
and broadcasting to spread my gospel. Gaitskell took my views on foreign
policy seriously. I think I helped to form his position on Suez, the
Common Market, Russia, and the atomic bomb. Most of his Godkin lecture
on disengagement was written by me. If he had become Prime Minister
I would probably have become his Foreign Secretary, after Harold Wilson
had held the job for a year or two; and he told close friends that
he thought I would be the best person to succeed him as Party leader.
Nevertheless, I have always doubted whether the fierce puritanism
of his intellectual convictions would have enabled him to run a Labour
Government for long, without imposing intolerable strains on so anarchic
a Labour movement.
(7)
Hugh Gaitskell, speech at the Labour Party Conference (November, 1959)
We are told that we have succeeded so well in reforming
capitalism that we have made it not only civilized but practically
indestructible. We are told . . . that our best bet is to accept it
almost completely in its present modified form, abandon the attempt
to take over any more industries, and use public ownership merely
to ensure that the community gets a cut at the capitalist cake. Such
a policy would lead us slap bang into the fallacious belief that one
can separate moral issues from economic ones.
Nevertheless, we can probably
expect a further improvement in living conditions of the same kind
as that experienced in recent years. To full employment we can add
the Welfare State - another of our achievements which has had profound
consequences. We point out rightly how much remains to be done. Indeed,
we fought the election very largely on the improvements in the Welfare
State which are so urgently needed. But this is not to deny that for
the majority at least, the protection of the Welfare State has made
a profound difference. Unfortunately, gratitude is not a reliable
political asset.
Moreover, the recent improvements
in living standards have been of a special kind. There has been an
especially notable increase in comforts, pleasures and conveniences
in the home. Television, whether we like it or not, has transformed
the leisure hours of the vast majority of our fellow citizens. Washing
machines, refrigerators, modern cookers have made women's lives a
great deal easier. Incidentally, I suspect that our failure this time
was largely a failure to win support from the women.
Now I turn to public ownership
and nationalization. Why was nationalization apparently a vote loser?
For two reasons, I believe. First, some of the existing nationalized
industries, rightly or wrongly, are unpopular. This unpopularity is
overwhelmingly due to circumstances which have nothing to do with
nationalization. London buses are overcrowded and slow, not because
the Transport Commission is inefficient, but because of the state
of London traffic which the Tory Government has neglected all these
years. The backward conditions of the railways are not due to bad
management but to inadequate investment in the past, which has left
British Railways with a gigantic problem of modernization. Coal costs
more, not because the Coal Board has done badly, but because in the
post-war world we have to pay miners a decent wage to induce them
to work in the pits.
Above all, we must face
the fact that nationalization will not be positively popular until
all these industries are clearly seen to be performing at least as
well as the best firms in the private sector. When we have achieved
that goal, then we can face the country with complete confidence.
We should make two things
clear. First, that we have no intention of abandoning public ownership
and accepting for all time the present frontiers of the public sector.
Secondly, that we regard public ownership not as an end but as a means,
not necessarily the only or most important one, to certain ends: full
employment, greater equality, higher productivity. We do not aim to
nationalize every private firm or create an endless series of state
monopolies.
We shall try to express
in the most simple and comprehensive fashion our ultimate ideals.
The only official document which now attempts to do this is the Party
Constitution, written over forty years ago. It seems to me that this
needs to be brought
up to date. For instance, can we really be satisfied today with a
statement of fundamentals which makes no reference to colonial freedom,
race relations, disarmament, full employment or planning?
Then, of course, there
is the famous phrase "to secure for the workers by hand or by
brain the full fruits of their industry, the most equitable distribution
thereof that may be possible upon the basis of the common ownership
of the means of production, distribution and exchange and the best
obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry
or service".
Standing as it does on
its own, I think this is misleading. It implies that we propose to
nationalize everything, but do we? Everything? The whole of light
industry, the whole of agriculture, all the shops, every little pub
and garage? Of course not! We have long ago come to accepted a mixed
economy.
(8)
Harold
Wilson,
Memoirs: The Making of a Prime Minister, 1916-64 (1986)
I was in favour of neither
outright nationalization nor a complete ban on all further nationalization.
The question, I told my colleagues, and such of the press as were
listening, is 'daft'. It was a matter of degree and of proving a case.
I was, and still am, an egalitarian and not necessarily a nationalizer.
I looked at each industry to see whether there was a case for taking
it into public ownership. It has never been any part of my political
attitude to tear society up by the roots and replace it with something
entirely different. I do not look at problems from that kind of perspective.
I consider that the best style of government is like rowing - the
ideal solution is to get the boat along as quickly as possible without
turning it over.
(9)
Motion passed by the Labour Party Conference by 4,356,000 to 3,213,000
(November, 1960)
This Congress, believing
that the great majority of the people of this country are earnestly
seeking a lasting peace and recognizing that the present state of
world tension accentuates the great danger of an accidental drift
into war, is convinced that the defence and foreign policy of the
future Labour Government should be based upon:
(1) A complete rejection
of any defence policy based on the threat of the use of strategic
or tactical nuclear weapons.
(2) The permanent cessation
of the manufacture or testing of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.
(3) The continuation of
the opposition to the establishment of missile bases in Great Britain.
(10)
Tony Benn resigned from Hugh Gaitskell's shadow government over the
issues of nationalisation and nuclear disarment. Hugh Gaitskell explained
to Tony Benn why he made these decisions.
Yes, I recognize Clause
IV was a blunder. I went into the Clause IV row without making sure
that I had got the support of the big trade union leaders. I hadn't
got it and that's why I went under. But in this I've got them all
behind me, so this (nuclear disarmanent) is the issue on which to
fight.
(11)
George
Brown, In My Way (1970)
Hugh Gaitskell became
too much the product of other people and the manoeuvring of other
powerful figures and too little himself. Yet his capacity to inspire
other people with his ideals was extraordinary. Had he lived he would
have been a tremendous leader of young people and an enormous bulwark
against the machine politicians, the bureaucrats and everything else
which has tended to debase the currency of modern life. He didn't
live, I think, because he wore himself out in fights, many of which,
while important in themselves, could really have been left to other
people. But Hugh was too high-minded to let other people do the graft.
He was a delicate man, delicate in spirit as well as in health, easily
cast down and hurt, and all this savage in-fighting took its toll.
I have a feeling that he died simply of exhaustion. What kind of Prime
Minister he would have made, I must confess, I am unsure.
(12)
Peter
Wright, Spycatcher (1987)
Much has been written about
Harold Wilson and MI5, some of it wildly inaccurate. But as far as
I am concerned, the story started with the premature death of Hugh
Gaitskell in 1963. Gaitskell was Wilson's predecessor as Leader of
the Labour Party. I knew him personally and admired him greatly. I
had met him and his family at the Blackwater Sailing Club, and I recall
about a month before he died he told me that he was going to Russia.
After he died his doctor
got in touch with MI5 and asked to see somebody from the Service.
Arthur Martin, as the head of Russian Counterespionage, went to see
him. The doctor explained that he was disturbed by the manner of Gaitskell's
death. He said that Gaitskell had died of a disease called lupus disseminata,
which attacks the body's organs. He said that it was rare in temperate
climates and that there was no evidence that Gaitskell had been anywhere
recently where he could have contracted the disease.
Arthur Martin suggested
that I should go to Porton Down, the chemical and microbiological
laboratory for the Ministry of Defense. I went to see the chief doctor
in the chemical warfare laboratory. Dr. Ladell, and asked his advice.
He said that nobody knew how one contracted lupus. There was some
suspicion that it might be a form of fungus and he did hot have the
foggiest idea how one would infect somebody with the disease. I came
back and made my report in these terms.
The next development was
that Golitsin told us quite independently that during the last few
years of his service he had had some contacts with Department 13,
which was known as the Department of Wet Affairs in the KGB. This
department was responsible for organizing assassinations. He said
that just before he left he knew that the KGB were planning a high-level
political assassination in Europe in order to get their man into the
top place. He did not know which country it was planned in but he
pointed out that the chief of Department 13 was a man called General
Rodin, who had been in Britain for many years and had just returned
on promotion to take up the job, so he would have had good knowledge
of the political scene in England.
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