George
Custer, the son of a blacksmith, was
born in New Rumley, Ohio, on 5th December, 1839. The family was poor
and when he was ten Custer was forced to live with his aunt in Monroe.
While at school he met his future wife, Elizabeth Bacon, the daughter
of a judge. Custer did odd jobs for her family, but was never allowed
into the house.
Custer
wanted to become a lawyer but his family could not afford the training
so he decided to become a soldier instead. He attended the Military
Academy at West Point but he was a
poor student and when he finally graduated in 1861 he was placed 34th
out of a class of 34.
After
leaving West Point he joined the staff of General George
B. McClellan and during the American
Civil War he saw action at Bull
Run (August,
1862), Antietam
(September, 1862) and Gettysburg
(June, 1863).
Custer
emerged as an outstanding cavalry leader and at the age of 23, was
given the rank of brigadier general and took command of the Michigan
Brigade.
Custer
developed a reputation for flamboyant behaviour. He led his troops
into battle wearing a black velvet trimmed with gold lace, a crimson
necktie and a white hat. He claimed that he adopted this outfit so
that his men "would recognize him on any part of the field".
In August , 1864, Custer joined Major General Philip
Sheridan in the final Shenandoah
Valley campaign. Sheridan and 40,000 soldiers entered the valley
and soon encountered troops led by Jubal
Early who had just returned from Washington.
After a series of minor defeats the Union
Army eventually gained the upper hand. His men now burnt and destroyed
anything of value in the area and after defeating Early in another
large-scale battle on 19th October, the Union
Army took control of the Shenandoah Valley.
Custer
was a strong supporter of his own abilities. He said of his performance
at Gettysburg:
"I challenge the annals of warfare to produce a more brilliant
or successful charge of cavalry."
He also managed to persuade journalists to share this view. After
Custer took part in the Shenandoah
Valley campaign
E. A. Paul
of the New York Times reported
that "Custer, young as he is, displayed judgment worthy of a
Napoleon."
On 1st April, Philip Sheridan, William
Sherman and Custer attacked at Five
Forks. The Confederates, led by Major General George
Pickett, were overwhelmed and lost 5,200 men. On hearing the news,
Robert E. Lee decided to abandon Richmond
and President Jefferson Davis, his family
and government officials, was forced to flee from the city.
By the end of the war Custer had been breveted for gallant and meritorious
services on five occasions. Although only wounded once he had 11 horses
killed under him.
In January
1866, his commission as major-general expired and he reverted to his
1862 rank of captain in the Regular Army. However, in July, 1866,
he was commissioned lieutenant colonel (he was also given the honorary
rank of major general) and made second in command of the newly created
Seventh Cavalry. He
was posted to Fort Riley in Kansas and spent the winter of 1866-67
preparing his troops to take part in the Indian
Wars.
Custer's
behaviour continued to be erratic. In July 1867 fifteen of his men
deserted during a forced march along the Republican River. Custer
ordered a search party "to shoot the supposed deserters down
dead, and to bring none in alive." Soon afterwards he deserted
his command in order to spend a day with his wife. As a result of
this actions he was arrested and charged with disobeying orders, deserting
his command, failing to pursue Indians who had attacked his escort
and ordering his officers to shoot down deserters. Found guilty he
was suspended for a year without pay.
General
Philip
H. Sheridan
recalled
Custer to duty and on 27th November, 1868, Custer destroyed the Cheyenne
village
of Chief Black Kettle on the banks
of the Washita River. Custer later claimed that his men killed 103
warriors. However, the majority of the victims were women and children.
This action was highly controversial as the Cheyenne
were not
at war against the Americans at this time. General Harney pointed
out: "I have worn the uniform of my country 55 years, and I know
that Black Kettle was as good a friend of the United States as I am."
One of
his own men, Captain Frederick
Benteen,
also criticized Custer's behaviour during this operation. He was mainly
concerned with what happened to Major Joel Elliott and 18 of his men
who had been sent off to pursue fleeing members of the Cheyenne tribe.
They had been cut off and massacred by warriors from neighbouring
villages. Benteen accused Custer of abandoning these men and had been
responsible for their deaths. General Philip
H. Sheridan rejected
these claims and complimented Custer on his "efficient and gallant
services" during the attack.
In August 1873, Custer
was involved in protecting a group of railroad surveyors. The group
were attacked by a Sioux
war party near the mouth
of Tongue River. During the raid two of the surveyors were killed.
Later, Charley Reynolds, an Indian scout, told Custer that Rain
in the Face had
led the attack at Tongue River. Rain in the Face was living on the
Standing Rock Reservation at the
time and so Custer had him arrested. Custer forced Rain in the Face
to confess but before he could appear in court he managed to escape.
In
1873 Custer was a member of General David Stanley's Yellowstone expedition.
Later that year he took command of Fort Abraham Lincoln on the River
Missouri. In 1874 Custer led an expedition into the Black
Hills of Dakota.
Later he published an autobiography, My Life
on the Plains (1874).
Custer
was called to Washington in March,
1876, to testify before a Congressional committee probing frauds in
the Indian Service. President Ulysses
Grant was
furious when Custer's evidence damaged the reputation of his former
War Secretary, William Belknap. Grant
was so angry he deprived Custer of his command. However, after protests
from senior officers in the army, Grant backed down and Custer was
able to return as commander of the 7th Cavalry.
At
this time the Sioux
and
Cheyenne
were
attempting
to resist the advance of white migration. On 17th June 1876 General
George Crook and about 1,000 troops, supported
by 300 Crow
and
Shoshone,
fought against 1,500 members of the Sioux and Cheyenne tribes. The
battle at Rosebud Creek lasted for over six hours. This was the first
time that Native Americans had united together to fight in such large
numbers.
On
22nd June, Custer
and 655 men were sent out to locate the villages of the Sioux
and
Cheyenne
involved
in the battle
at Rosebud Creek. A very large encampment was
discovered three days later. It was over 15 miles away and even with
field glasses Custer was unable to discover the number of warriors
the camp contained.
Instead
of waiting for the arrival of the rest of the army led by General
Alfred Terry,
Custer decided to act straight way. He divided his force into three
battalions in order to attack the camp from three different directions.
One group led by Captain Frederick
Benteen
was ordered to march to the left. A second group led by Major
Marcus
Reno
was sent to attack the encampment via the Little Big Horn River.
Major
Reno was the first to charge the village. When he discovered that
the camp was far larger than was expected he retreated to the other
side of the Little
Big Horn River. He
was later joined by Captain Benteen and although they suffered heavy
casualties they were able to fight off the attack.
Custer and his men rode
north on the east side of the Little Big Horn River. The Sioux
and
Cheyenne
saw Custer's men and swarmed
out of the village. Custer was forced to retreat into the bluffs to
the east where he was attacked by about
4,000 warriors. At the battle of the Little
Bighorn Custer
and all his 231 men were killed. This included his two brothers, Tom
and Boston, his brother-in-law, James Calhoun, and his nephew, Autie
Reed.
The
soldiers under Reno and Benteen continued to be attacked and 47 of
them were killed before they were rescued by the arrival of General
Alfred Terry
and his army. It
was claimed afterwards that Custer had been killed by his old enemy,
Rain
in the Face. However, there
is no hard evidence to suggest that this is true.
General Philip
H. Sheridan concluded
that George
A. Custer
had made several important
mistakes at the Little Big Horn. He argued that after their seventy
mile journey, Custer's men were too tired to fight effectively. Custer
had also made a mistake in developing a plan of attack on the false
assumption that the Sioux
and
Cheyenne
would attempt to escape
rather than fight the soldiers.
Sheridan also criticized
Custer's decision to divide his men into three groups: "Had the
Seventh Cavalry been held together, it would have been able to handle
the Indians on the Little Big Horn." His final mistake was to
attack what was probably the largest group of Native Americans ever
assembled on the North American continent. President
Ulysses
Grant
agreed with this assessment and when interviewed by the New
York Herald he said: "I regard Custer's Massacre
was a sacrifice of troops, brought on by Custer himself, that was
wholly unnecessary".
Despite
this criticism George Custer was
given a hero's burial at West Point.
(1)
Elizabeth Custer, Boots and Saddles (1885)
The general was a figure
that would have fixed attention anywhere. He had marked individuality
of appearance, and a certain unstudied carelessness in the wearing
of his costume that gave a picturesque effect, not the least out of
place on the frontier. He wore troop-boots reaching to his knees,
buckskin breeches fringed on the sides, a dark navy blue shirt with
a broad collar, a red necktie, whose ends floated over his shoulder
exactly as they did when he and his entire division of cavalry had
worn them during the war. On the broad felt hat, that was almost a
sombrero, was fastened a slight mark of his rank.
He was at this time (1874)
thirty-five years of age, weighed one hundred and seventy pounds,
and was nearly six feet in height. His eyes were clear blue and deeply
set, his hair short, wavy, and golden in tint. His mustache was long
and tawny in color; his complexion was florid, except where his forehead
was shaded by his hat, for the sun always burned his skin ruthlessly.
(2)
George Custer, My Life on the Plains (1874)
The Indians, who were
interested spectators of these preparations for their reception, continued
to approach, but seemed willing to delay their attack until the plain
became a little more favorable for their operations. Finally, the
desired moment seemed to have arrived. The Indians had approached
to within easy range, yet not a shot had been fired, the cavalrymen
having been instructed by their officers to reserve their fire for
close quarters. Suddenly, with a wild ringing war whoop, the entire
band of warriors bore down upon the train and its little party of
defenders.
On came the savages, filling
the air with their terrible yells. Their first object, evidently,
was to stampede the horses and draft animals of the train; then, in
the excitement and consternation which would follow, to massacre the
escort and drivers. The wagon master
in immediate charge of the train had been
ordered to keep his two columns of wagons
constantly moving forward and well closed
up. This last injunction was hardly necessary,
as the frightened-teamsters, glancing
at the approaching warriors and hearing their
savage shouts, were sufficiently anxious to
keep well closed upon their leaders.
The first onslaught of
the Indians was made on the flank which was superintended by Colonel
Cook. They rode boldly forward as if to dash over the mere handful
of cavalrymen, who stood in skirmishing order in a circle about the
train. Not a soldier faltered as the enemy came thundering upon them,
but waiting until the Indians were within short rifle range of the
train, the cavalrymen dropped upon their knees, and taking deliberate
aim poured a volley from their Spencer carbines into the ranks of
the savages, which seemed to put a sudden check upon the ardor of
their movements and forced them to wheel off to the right. Several
of the warriors were seen to reel in their saddles, while the ponies
of others were brought down or wounded by the effectual fire of the
cavalrymen.
Those of the savages who
were shot from their saddles were scarcely permitted to fall to the
ground before a score or more of their comrades dashed to their rescue
and bore their bodies beyond the possible reach of our men. This is
in accordance with the Indian custom in battle. They will risk the
lives of a dozen of their best warriors to prevent the body of any
one of their number from falling into the white man's possession.
The reason for this is the belief, which generally prevails among
all the tribes, that if a warrior loses his scalp he forfeits his
hope of ever reaching the happy hunting ground.
(3)
Nelson
Miles, Personal
Recollections and Observations (1896)
At Fort Hayes, the headquarters
of the Fifth Infantry, I found a splendid regiment composed of very
intelligent, efficient officers and strong, brave soldiers. A few
miles away, in a beautiful valley, was the camp of the Seventh United
States Cavalry, commanded by Gen. George A. Custer. He was one of
the most enterprising, fearless cavalry leaders the great war produced.
General Custer left the West Point Military Academy early in the Civil
War. He was most ambitious and enterprising and soon rose to the command
of a regiment and brigade, and later commanded, with great success,
one of the active cavalry divisions.
We were very near the
same age - rivals in the military profession, but the best of friends.
Mrs. Custer, a superior and accomplished young woman, who had "followed
the flag" whenever it was possible, was pleasantly located in
a beautiful camp, and was the constant companion of her gallant husband,
as she afterward proved his devoted champion by voice and pen. Mrs.
Custer and Mrs. Miles became life-long friends. We all enjoyed the
splendid exercise of riding over the plains, and the General and myself
frequently went on buffalo-hunts together, but at that time it was
never safe to venture out of sight of the garrison or command without
a good escort.
(4)
General Alfred
Terry, orders to General George
Custer (22nd June, 1876)
The Brigadier General
commanding directs that as soon as your regiment can be made ready
for the march, you proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians
whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days ago. It is, of
course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard
to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so, the Department
commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy and
ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper
your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however,
indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he
desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient
reason for departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed
up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which
the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found, as it appears
to be almost certain that it will be found, to turn toward the Little
Big Horn he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps
as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little
Big Horn, feeling constantly however, to your left so as to preclude
the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the south or southeast
by passing around your left flank.
(5)
George Custer, letter to his wife, Elizabeth Custer (22nd June, 1876)
I am now going to take
up the trail where the scouting party turned back. I fear their failure
to follow up the Indians has imperilled our plans by giving the village
an intimation of our presence. Think of the valuable time lost! But
I feel hopeful of accomplishing great results.
(6)
The
Chicago Tribune (4th July, 1876)
Since the murder of General
Canby by the Modocs the country has not been more startled than it
was by the announcement that General Custer and five companies of
his regiment, the Seventh Cavalry, had been massacred by the Sioux
Indians in a ravine ... the Indians outnumbering our troops ten to
one. General Custer had personal and soldierly traits which commended
him to the people. He was an officer who did not know the word fear,
and, as is often the case with soldiers of this stamp, he was reckless,
hasty, and impulsive, preferring to make a dare-devil rush and take
risks rather than to move slower and with more certainty. He was a
brave, brilliant soldier, handsome and dashing, with all the attributes
to make him beloved of women and admired of men; but these qualities,
however admirable they may be, should not blind our eyes to the fact
that it was his own madcap haste, rashness, and love of fame that
cost him his own life, and cost the service the loss of many brave
officers and gallant men. They drew him into an ambuscaded ravine....
In this instance, three hundred troops were instantly surrounded by
3,000 Indians, and the fatal ravine became a slaughter-pen from which
but a few escaped.... No account seems to have been taken of numbers,
of the leadership of the Sioux, of their record of courage and military
skill.
(7)
Willard
Carlisle, claimed that he was a survivor of the battle of Little Bighorn.
He wrote a letter to Custer's widow about what he had seen.
When the redskins made
their rush down the valley that morning, I did not know what was going
on, but I climbed a hill and there in full sight was the terrible
battle going on. The Indians rode around in a circle and kept picking
off the horses first. After they had shot all the horses, killed or
wounded them, then they started to close in on the men, and they done
it slow too. Custer and his men then retreated to a small rise of
ground, and there made their last stand.
Those of the redskins
who had lost their horses, closed in on foot and slowly but surely
they picked off the white men, one by one, until at last only the
brave General Custer was left with his comrades dead around him.
One sweep of the saber
and an Indians head was split in two, one flash of his revolver, his
last shot, and a redskin got the bullet between the eyes, then he
fell with a bullet in the breast, the last of that brave band.
I saw him within 15 minutes
after he was shot, and there was still a smile on his face. Perhaps
he was thinking of his home, his beloved wife or Mother. Who can tell.
(8)
General
Alfred
Terry, report to General Philip
H. Sheridan
(July, 1876)
I think I owe it to myself
to put you more fully in possession of the facts of the late operations.
While at the mouth of the Rosebud I submitted my plan to General Gibbon
and to General Custer. They approved it heartily. It was that Custer
with his whole regiment should move up the Rosebud till he should
meet a trail which Reno had discovered a few days before but that
he should not follow it directly to the Little Big Horn; that he should
send scouts over it and keep his main force further to the south so
as to prevent the Indians from slipping in between himself and the
mountains. He was also to examine the headwaters of Tullock's creek
as he passed it and send me word of what he found there. A scout was
furnished him for the purpose of crossing the country to me. We calculated
it would take Gibbon's column until the twenty-sixth to reach the
mouth of the Little Big Horn and that the wide sweep which I had proposed
Custer should make would require so much time that Gibbon would be
able to cooperate with him in attacking any Indians that might be
found on that stream. I asked Custer how long his marches would be.
He said they would be at first about thirty miles a
day. Measurements were made and calculation based on that rate of
progress. I talked with him about his strength and at one time suggested
that perhaps it would be well for me to take Gibbon's cavalry and
go with him. To this suggestion he replied that without reference
to the command he would prefer his own regiment alone. As a homogeneous
body, as much could be done with it as with the two combined and he
expressed the utmost confidence that he had all the force that he
could need, and I shared his confidence. The plan adopted was the
only one that promised to bring the Infantry into action and I desired
to make sure of things by getting up every available man. I offered
Custer the battery of Gatling guns but he declined it saying that
it might embarrass him: that he was strong enough without it. The
movements proposed for General Gibbon's column were carried out to
the letter and had the attack been deferred until it was up I cannot
doubt that we should have been successful. The Indians had evidently
nerved themselves for a stand, but as I learn from Captain Benteen,
on the twenty-second the cavalry marched twelve miles; on the twenty-third,
thirty-five miles;
from five a.m. till eight p.m. on the twenty-fourth, forty-five miles
and then after night ten miles further; then after resting but without
unsaddling, twenty-three miles to the battlefield. The proposed route
was not taken but as soon as the trail was struck it was followed.
I cannot learn that any examination of Tullock's creek was made. I
do not tell you this to cast any reflection upon Custer. For whatever
errors he may have committed he has paid the penalty and you cannot
regret his loss more than I do, but I feel that our plan must have
been successful had it been carried out, and I desire you to know
the facts. In the action itself, so far as I can make out, Custer
acted under a misapprehension. He thought, I am confident, that the
Indians were running. For fear that they might get away he attacked
without getting all his men up and divided his command so that they
were beaten in detail. I do not at all propose to give the thing up
here but I think that my troops require a little time and in view
of the strength which the Indians have developed I propose to bring
up what little reinforcement I can get. I should be glad of any that
you can send me. I can take two companies of Indians from Powder River
and there are a few recruits and detached men whom I can get for the
cavalry. I ought to have a larger mounted force than I now have but
I fear cannot be obtained. I hear nothing from General Crook's operations.
If I could hear I should be able to form plans for the future much
more intelligently.
(9)
Two Moon, interviewed by Hamlin
Garland, McClure's
Magazine (September, 1898).
While I was sitting on
my horse I saw flags come up over the hill to the east like that (he
raised his finger-tips). Then the soldiers rose all at once, all on
horses, like this (he put his fingers behind each other to indicate
that Custer appeared marching in columns of fours). They formed into
three bunches with a little ways between. Then a bugle sounded, and
they all got off horses, and some soldiers led the horses back over
the hill.
Then the Sioux rode up
the ridge on all sides, riding very fast. The Cheyennes went up the
left way. Then the shooting was quick, quick. Pop - pop - pop very
fast. Some of the soldiers were down on their knees, some standing.
Officers all in front. The smoke was like a great cloud, and every
where the Sioux went the dust rose like smoke. We circled all round
him - swirling like water round a stone. We shoot, we ride fast, we
shoot again. Soldiers drop, and horses fall on them. Soldiers in line
drop, but one man rides up and down the line - all the time shouting.
He rode a sorrel horse with white face and white forelegs. I don't
know who he was. He was a brave man.
Indians keep swirling
round and round, and the soldiers killed only a few. Many soldiers
fell. At last all horses killed but five. Once in a while some man
would break out and run toward the river, but he would fall.
At last about a hundred
men and five horsemen stood on the hill all bunched together. All
along the bugler kept blowing his commands. He was very brave too.
Then a chief was killed. I hear it was Long Hair (Custer), I don't
know; and then five horsemen and the bunch of men, may be so forty,
started toward the
river. The man on the sorrel horse led them, shouting all the time.
He wore a buckskin shirt, and had long black hair and mustache. He
fought hard with a big knife. His men were all covered with white
dust. I couldn't tell whether they were officers or not. One man all
alone ran far down toward the river, then round up over the hill.
I thought he was going to escape, but a Sioux fired and hit him in
the head. He was the last man. He wore braid on his arms (sergeant).
All the soldiers were
now killed, and the bodies were stripped. After that no one could
tell which were officers. The bodies were left where they fell. We
had no dance that night. We were sorrowful.
(10)
Lieutenant
Jessie Lee,
Court of Inquiry (March, 1879)
The well-known capacity,
tenacity and bravery of General Custer and the officers and men who
died with him forbid the supposition of a panic and a rout. There
was a desperate and sanguinary struggle in which the Indians must
have suffered heavily. From the evidence that has been spread before
this Court it is manifest that General Custer and his comrades
died a death so heroic that it has but few parallels in history.
Fighting to the last and
against overwhelming odds, they fell on the field
of glory. Let no stigma of rout and panic tarnish their blood-bought
fame. Their deeds of heroism will ever live in the hearts of the American
people, and the painter and poet will vie with each other in commemorating
the world-wide fame of Custer and his men.
(11)
Red Horse, interview, Cheyenne River Reservation, 1881
Before the attack the
Sioux were camped on the Rosebud river. Sioux moved down a river running
into the Little Bighorn river, crossed the Little Bighorn river, and
camped on its west bank.
This day (day of attack)
a Sioux man started to go to Red Cloud agency, but when he had gone
a short distance from camp he saw a cloud of dust rising and turned
back and said he thought a herd of buffalo was coming near the village.
The day was hot. In a short
time the soldiers charged the camp. (This was Major Reno's battalion
of the Seventh Cavalry.) The soldiers came on the trail made by the
Sioux camp in moving, and crossed the Little Bighorn river above where
the Sioux crossed, and attacked the lodges farthest up the river.
The women and children ran down the Little Bighorn river a short distance
into a ravine. The soldiers set fire to the lodges. All the Sioux
now charged the soldiers and drove them in confusion across the Little
Bighorn river, which was very rapid, and several soldiers were drowned
in it. On a hill the soldiers stopped and the Sioux surrounded them.
A Sioux man came and said that a different party of Soldiers had all
the women and children prisoners. Like a whirlwind the word went around,
and the Sioux all heard it and left the soldiers on the hill and went
quickly to save the women and children.
From the hill that the
soldiers were on to the place where the different soldiers [by this
term Red-Horse always means the battalion immediately commanded by
General Custer, his mode of distinction being that they were a different
body from that first encountered] were seen was level ground with
the exception of a creek. Sioux thought the soldiers on the hill [i.e.,
Reno's battalion] would charge them in rear, but when they did not
the Sioux thought the soldiers on the hill were out of cartridges.
As soon as we had killed all the different soldiers the Sioux all
went back to kill the soldiers on the hill. All the Sioux watched
around the hill on which were the soldiers until a Sioux man came
and said many walking soldiers were coming near. The coming of the
walking soldiers was the saving of the soldiers on the hill. Sioux
can not fight the walking soldiers [infantry], being afraid of them,
so the Sioux hurriedly left.
The soldiers charged the
Sioux camp about noon. The soldiers were divided, one party charging
right into the camp. After driving these soldiers across the river,
the Sioux charged the different soldiers [i.e., Custer's] below, and
drive them in confusion; these soldiers became foolish, many throwing
away their guns and raising their hands, saying, "Sioux, pity
us; take us prisoners." The Sioux did not take a single soldier
prisoner, but killed all of them; none were left alive for even a
few minutes. These different soldiers discharged their guns but little.
I took a gun and two belts off two dead soldiers; out of one belt
two cartridges were gone, out of the other five.
The Sioux took the guns
and cartridges off the dead soldiers and went to the hill on which
the soldiers were, surrounded and fought them with the guns and cartridges
of the dead soldiers. Had the soldiers not divided I think they would
have killed many Sioux. The different soldiers that the Sioux killed
made five brave stands. Once the Sioux charged right in the midst
of the different soldiers and scattered them all, fighting among the
soldiers hand to hand.
One band of soldiers was
in rear of the Sioux. When this band of soldiers charged, the Sioux
fell back, and the Sioux and the soldiers stood facing each other.
Then all the Sioux became brave and charged the soldiers. The Sioux
went but a short distance before they separated and surrounded the
soldiers. I could see the officers riding in front of the soldiers
and hear them shooting. Now the Sioux had many killed. The soldiers
killed 136 and wounded 160 Sioux. The Sioux killed all these different
soldiers in the ravine.
The soldiers charged the
Sioux camp farthest up the river. A short time after the different
soldiers charged the village below. While the different soldiers and
Sioux were fighting together the Sioux chief said, "Sioux men,
go watch soldiers on the hill and prevent their joining the different
soldiers." The Sioux men took the clothing off the dead and dressed
themselves in it. Among the soldiers were white men who were not soldiers.
The Sioux dressed in the soldiers' and white men's clothing fought
the soldiers on the hill.
The banks of the Little
Bighorn river were high, and the Sioux killed many of the soldiers
while crossing. The soldiers on the hill dug up the ground [i.e.,
made earthworks], and the soldiers and Sioux fought at long range,
sometimes the Sioux charging close up. The fight continued at long
range until a Sioux man saw the walking soldiers coming. When the
walking soldiers came near the Sioux became afraid and ran away.
(12)
Report on the Court of Inquiry (11th March, 1879)
1. The Court of Inquiry
of which Colonel John H. King, 9th Infantry, is President, instituted
by direction of the President, in
Special Orders No. 255, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General's
Office, November 25, 1878, on the application of Major Marcus A. Reno,
7th Cavalry, for the purpose of inquiring into Major Reno's conduct
at the battle of the Little Big Horn River, on the 25th and 26th days
of June, 1876, has reported the following facts and opinions, viz:—
First. On the morning
of the 25th of June 1876, the 7th Cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel G. A.
Custer commanding, operating against the hostile Indians in Montana
Territory, near the Little Big Horn River, was divided into four battalions,
two of which were commanded by Colonel Custer in person, with the
exception of one company in charge of the pack-train; one by Major
Reno and one by Captain Benteen. This division took place from about
twelve (12) to fifteen (15) miles from the scene of the battle or
battles afterwards fought. The column under Captain Benteen received
orders to move to the left for an indefinite distance (to the first
and second valleys) hunting Indians, with orders to charge any it
might meet with. The battalion under Major Reno received orders to
draw out of the column, and doing so marched parallel with and only
a short distance from, the column commanded by Colonel Custer.
Second. About three or
four miles from what afterwards was found to be the Little Big Horn
River, where the fighting took
place. Major Reno received orders to move forward as rapidly as he
thought prudent, until coming up with the Indians, who were reported
fleeing, he would charge them and drive everything before him, and
would receive the support of the column under Colonel Custer.
Third. In obedience to
the orders given him by Colonel Custer, Captain Benteen marched to
the left (south), at an angle of about forty-five degrees, but, meeting
an impracticable country, was forced by it to march more to his right
than the angle above
indicated and nearer approaching a parallel route to that trail followed
by the rest of the
command.
Fourth. Major Reno, in
obedience to the orders given him, moved on at a fast trot on the
main Indian trail until reaching the Little Big Horn River, which
he forded, and halted for a few minutes to reform his battalion. After
reforming, he marched the battalion forward towards the Indian village,
down stream or in a northerly direction, two companies in line of
battle and one in support, until about half way to the point where
he finally halted, when he brought the company in reserve forward
to the line of battle, continuing the movement at a fast trot or gallop
until after passing over a distance of about two miles, when he halted
and dismounted to fight on foot at a point of timber upon which the
right flank of his battalion rested. After fighting in this formation
for less than half an hour, the Indians passing to his left rear and
appearing in his front, the skirmish line was withdrawn to the timber,
and the fight continued for a short time - half an hour or forty-five
minutes in all - when the command, or nearly all
of it, was mounted, formed, and, at a rapid gait, was withdrawn to
a hill on the opposite side of the river. In this movement one officer
and about sixteen soldiers and citizens were left in the woods, besides
one wounded man or more, two citizens and thirteen soldiers rejoining,
the command
afterwards. In this retreat Major Reno's battalion lost some twenty-nine
men in killed and wounded, and three officers, including Doctor De
Wolf, killed.
Fifth. In the meantime
Captain Benteen, having carried out, as far as was practicable, the
spirit of his orders, turned in the direction of the route taken by
the remainder of the regiment, and reaching the trail, followed it
to near the crossing of the Little Big Horn, reaching there about
the same time Reno's command was crossing the river in retreat lower
down, and finally joined his battalion with that of Reno, on the hill.
Forty minutes or one hour later the pack-train, which had been left
behind on the trail by the rapid movement of the command and the delays
incident to its march, joined the united command, which then consisted
of seven companies, together with about thirty or thirty-five men
belonging to the
companies under Colonel Custer.
Sixth. After detaching
Benteen's columns Colonel Custer moved with his immediate command,
on the trail followed by Reno, to a point within about one mile of
the river, where he diverged to the right (or north-ward), following
the general direction of the river to a point about four miles below
that (afterward taken by Major Reno) where he and his command were
destroyed by the hostiles. The last living witness of this march,
Trumpeter Martin, left Colonel Custer's command when it was about
two miles distant from the field where it afterwards met its fate.
There is nothing more in evidence as to this command, save that firing
was heard proceeding from its direction from about the time Reno retreated
from the bottom up to the time the pack-train was approaching the
position on the hill. All firing which indicated fighting was concluded
before the final preparations were made in Major Reno's command for
the movement which was afterwards attempted.
Seventh. After the distribution
of ammunition and a proper provision for the wounded men, Major Reno's
entire command moved down the river in the direction it was thought
Custer's column had taken, and in which it was known General Terry's
command was to be found. This movement was carried sufficiently far
to discover that its continuance would imperil the entire command,
upon which it returned to the position formerly occupied, and made
a successful resistance till succor reached it. The defense of the
position on the hill was a heroic one against fearful odds.
The conduct of the officers
throughout was excellent, and while subordinates, in some instances,
did more for the safety of the command by brilliant displays of courage
than did Major Reno, there was nothing in his conduct which requires
animadversion from this Court.
(13)
Nelson
Miles, Personal
Recollections and Observations (1896)
We journeyed up the Little
Big Horn to the Custer battlefield. On this visit, just two years
after the battle occurred, I was accompanied by a body of twenty-five
of the principal chiefs and head warriors of the Sioux and Cheyenne
tribes, who had all been prominently engaged in the battle, and later
had surrendered to me. During the time they were under my control
they had become reconciled and reliable. They had proved their loyalty
by valuable military service in the campaigns against hostile Indians.
What the Indians did at
the Little Big Horn, or the Custer Massacre, as it was called, and
how the battle was fought on their side, was perfectly familiar to
them. What our government and people knew concerning the battle was
very vague, for of the two hundred and sixty-two officers and soldiers
who fought under Custer not one lived to tell the story. All that
was known to the other troops in the field was the orders given and
the actions of Custer and his men while they were with them, and the
impressions and surmises made from the evidences of the field, as
well as the position of the dead bodies after the battle.
Unfortunately, in that
campaign the government authorities greatly underestimated the strength
of the hostile Indians. They had little knowledge of the character
of the country, and sent weak exterior columns, five hundred miles
apart, into the field without concert of action against a superior
body. The commands from the East and West united on the Yellowstone
at the mouth of the Rosebud, under General Terry. He even then divided
his force, sending General Custer with the Seventh Cavalry south and
west, while with the remainder he moved on the north side
of the Yellowstone west and then south. Evidently his object was to
inclose the Indians, but he placed at least fifty miles of rough country
and an impassable river between the two columns, necessitating the
giving of discretionary authority to the commander of the column thus
isolated and moving into a country known to be occupied by a powerful
body of Indians. General Custer has often been unjustly accused of
disobedience of orders. The order referred to is in the nature of
a letter of instruction, and not a positive order.
(14)
Chicago Tribune (7th July, 1876)
Custer . . . was a brave,
brilliant soldier, handsome and dashing, but he was reckless, hasty
and impulsive, preferring to make a daredevil rush and take risks
rather than to move slower and with more certainty, and it was his
own mad-cap haste, rashness and love of fame that cost him his own
life, and cost the service the loss of many brave officers and gallant
men. He preferred to make a reckless dash and take the consequences,
in the hope of making a personal victory and adding to the glory of
another charge, rather than wait
for a sufficiently powerful force to make the fight successful and
share the glory with others. He took the risk and he lost.
(15)
President Ulysses
Grant, interviewed by the New York Herald
(2nd September, 1876)
I regard Custer's Massacre
was a sacrifice of troops, brought on by Custer himself, that was
wholly unnecessary - wholly unnecessary.
(16)
New
York Times (8th July, 1876)
The facts as now understood
dispose most people here to lay blame for the slaughter upon General
Custer's imprudence and probably disobedience of orders. But criticism
is kindly and charitable in tone, as it would not be had he not fallen
with his command in the thickest of the battle.
(17)
Bruce A. Rosenberg, Custer and the Epic of Defeat (1974)
All during June 1876,
events and Custer's own mistakes conspired against him. Experience
in the plains wars indicated that the problem in fighting the Indians
was not so much defeating them as it was getting them to stand and
fight at all. This was one of Custer's major worries. Moreover, he
had been led to believe by the Bureau of Indian Affairs not to expect
more than 800 hostile braves; in fact he was probably confronted by
over 4,000. Finally, he was not aware that many of his future foes
were armed with Winchester repeating carbines, whereas his own men
were equipped with single-shot Springfields. Thus of the three major
aspects of military intelligence - the number of the enemy, their
willingness to fight, and their armament - Custer was ignorant and
unprepared.
(18)
General T. L. Rosser, Chicago Tribune (8th July, 1876)
I feel that Custer would
have succeeded had Reno with all the reserve of seven companies passed
through and joined Custer after the first repulse. I think it quite
certain that General Custer had agreed with Reno upon a place of junction
in case of a repulse of either or both of the detachments, and instead
of an effort being made by Reno for such a junction as soon as he
encountered heavy resistance he took refuge in the hills, and abandoned
Custer and his gallant comrades to their fate.
As a soldier I would sooner
today lie in the grave of General Custer and his gallant comrades
alone in that distant wilderness, that when the last trumpet sounds
I could rise to judgment from my post of duty,
than to live in the place of the survivors of the siege on the hills.
(19)
Nelson
Miles, Personal
Recollections and Observations (1896)
The first day General
Custer marched twelve miles, and in four days he moved one hundred
and eight miles, ten of which were to conceal his command. He frequently
called his officers together and urged them to act in harmony and
not become separated. He said he did not expect to fight until the
26th. He scouted the country, saw Indians in the distance, and, knowing
his command would be discovered and fearing the Indians would escape,
he decided to attack on the 25th. He formed his command for action
in three parallel columns, within- deploying and supporting distance;
moving with the right column himself, Major Reno, commanding the center,
following the Indian trail, and Captain Benteen on the left. He rode
forward to a high bluff. Discovering the location of the camp just
before going into action, he sent an order to Benteen, directing the
left column, to alter its course, which would have changed the formation
and brought this command into the center instead of on the left.
When Reno's troops fired
into their village the Uncapapas and Ogalallas rushed for their arms
and war ponies, fought Reno, and chased his command "like buffalo"
across the plains, over the river and up the bluff. Just at that time
the alarm passed among the Indians that another command (Custer's)
was attacking their village. The two tribes then withdrew, and, without
recrossing the river, passed down along the right bank of the Little
Big Horn and massed opposite to the left of Custer's troops. The Minneconjoux
and Sans Arcs had crossed the river and were fighting Custer's troops
back and forth. They said it was a drawn battle up to that time. The
Cheyennes had moved up the valley against Reno's attack without becoming
engaged, but when the alarm of Custer's attack was given they retraced
their steps, moving down the left bank of the Little Big Horn, and,
fording the river, took position behind a ridge near the right flank
of Custer's line.
The Uncapapas and Ogalallas
then charged his left flank, rolling up his line from left to right.
When that point was reached the soldiers killed some of their horses
for defense and let loose the remainder. The Cheyennes said they secured
most of these. The fight continued, and when the Indians had killed
all except forty those who remained rushed in a forlorn hope for the
timber along the Little Big Horn. All were killed before they reached
the river. This accounts for the line of dead bodies on that part
of the field on which no dead horses were found. The Indians said
that they would have fled if Reno's troops had not retreated, for
the troops could not have been dislodged. They also said that, when
they left to attack Custer, had the seven companies under Reno and
Benteen followed them down and fired into their backs they would have
been between two fires and would have had to retreat. Thus the battle
was twice lost. We walked our horses over the ground from Reno's last
position to the extreme right of Custer's line, and were fifty-six
minutes by the watch. Had Reno's command walked half that distance
it would have been in action. Moving at a smart trot or gallop, as
cavalry go into action, it could have attacked the Indians in the
rear easily in fifteen or twenty minutes.
Custer had commanded large
bodies of troops successfully in many desperate battles. How his strong
heart must have felt when he saw from the ridge a part of his own
regiment running from the field and when the major part of his command
failed to come into action! His flag went down in disaster, but with
honor. The greatest military genius could not win victories with five-twelfths
of his command, when seven-twelfths remained away.
Custer had devoted friends
and bitter enemies. His brothers and strongest friends died with him,
while his enemies lived to criticize and cast odium upon his name
and fame; but it is easy to kick a dead lion.
(20)
Frederick Whittaker, The
Life of General George A. Custer (1876)
When he saw that the party
with the General was to be overwhelmed, he went to the General and
begged him to let him show him a way to escape. General Custer dropped
his head on his breast in thought for a moment, in a way he had of
doing. There was a lull in the fight after a charge, the encircling
Indians gathering for a fresh attack. In that moment, Custer looked
at Curly, waved him away and rode back to the little group of men,
to die with them.... Why did he go back to certain death?
Curly the Upsaroka scout
tells us, he the only man who escaped alive... Custer had to go farther
down the river and farther away from Reno than he wished on account
of the steep bank along the north side; but at last he found a ford
and dashed for it. The Indians met him and poured in a heavy fire
from across the narrow river. Custer dismounted to fight on foot,
but could not get his skirmishers over the stream. Meantime hundreds
of Indians, on foot and on ponies, poured over the river, which was
only about three feet deep, and filled the ravine on each side of
Custer's men. Custer then fell back to some high ground behind him
and seized the ravines in his immediate vicinity. The Indians completely
surrounded Custer and poured in a terrible fire on all sides. They
charged Custer on foot in vast numbers, but were again and again driven
back. The fight began about 2 o'clock,
and lasted. Curly says, almost until the sun went down over the hills.
The men fought desperately, and, after the ammunition in their belts
was exhausted, went to their saddlebags, got more and continued the
fight. He also says the big chief (Custer) lived until nearly all
his men had been killed or wounded, and went about encouraging his
soldiers to fight on. Curly says when he saw Custer was hopelessly
surrounded, he watched his opportunity, got a Sioux blanket, put it
on, and worked up a ravine, and when the Sioux charged he got among
them, and they did not know him from one of their own men.
(21)
John
F. Finerty, Warpath and Bivouac
(1890)
The official story of
the Custer disaster was put into a few words, but no account that
I have heard or read, either on or off the Plains, equals in clearness
and succinctness the story of the Crow Indian scout, Curley, who alone
of the immediate command of General Custer survived the memorable
disaster of June 25, 1876. The following is the gist of Curley's statement.
Custer, with his five
companies, after separating from Reno and his seven companies, moved
to the right around the base of a high hill overlooking the valley
of the Little Horn, through a ravine just wide enough to admit his
column of fours. There were no signs of the presence of Indians in
the hills on that side (the right) of the Little Horn, and the column
moved steadily on until it rounded the hill and came in sight of the
village lying in the valley below them. Custer appeared very much
elated, and ordered the bugles to sound a charge, and moved on at
the head of his column, waving his hat to encourage his men. When
they neared the river the Indians, concealed in the undergrowth on
the opposite side of the stream, opened fire on the troops, which
checked the advance. Here a portion of the command were dismounted
and thrown forward to the river, and returned the fire of the Indians.
During this time the warriors
were seen riding out of the village by hundreds and deploying across
Custer's front and to his left, as if with the intention of crossing
the stream on his right, while the women and children were seen hastening
out of the village in large numbers in the opposite direction.
The fight appeared to have
begun, from Curley's description of the situation of the sun, about
2:30 or 3 o'clock P.M., and continued without intermission until nearly
sunset. The Indians had completely surrounded the command, leaving
their horses in ravines well to the rear, themselves pressing forward
to the attack on foot. Confident in the great superiority of their
numbers, they made several charges on all points of Custer's line,
but the troops held their position firmly and delivered a heavy fire
which every time drove them back. Curley said the firing was more
rapid than anything he had ever conceived of, being a continuous roll,
or, as he expressed it, "like the snapping of the threads in
the tearing of a blanket." The troops expended all the ammunition
in their belts and then sought their horses for the reserve ammunition
carried in their saddle pockets.
As long as their ammunition
held out, the troops, though losing considerably in the fight, maintained
their position in spite of all the efforts of the Sioux. From the
weakening of their fire toward the close of the afternoon the Indians
appeared to believe that their ammunition was about exhausted, and
they made a grand final charge, in the course of which the last of
the command was destroyed,
the men being shot where they lay in their positions in the line,
at such close quarters that many were killed with arrows. Curley said
that Custer remained alive throughout the greater part of the engagement,
animating his men to determined resistance, but about an hour before
the close of the fight lie received a mortal wound.
(22)
Milo Milton Quaife, introduction to John F. Finerty's Warpath and
Bivourac, 1955 edition.
Strictly speaking the
destruction of General Custer's command was not a massacre, since
it involved only soldiers fighting in open battle. Yet after the lapse
of almost eighty years it continues to intrigue the popular mind and
to challenge the resources of historians, so that almost no year passes
which does not witness the publication of one
or several articles and books devoted to the subject. The author's
(John F. Finerty) discussion presents one viewpoint which was more
or less prevalent sixty years ago. A convenient more recent and more
authoritative account is Colonel W. A. Graham's The Story of the
Little Big Horn, first published in 1926 and several times reprinted
since then, most recently in 1952. The story told by Curley, the Crow
scout, is no longer seriously credited.
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