During
the early stages of the American Civil War
the federal government refused to negotiate the exchange of prisoners
as it did not recognize the Confederacy as a nation. In July, 1862,
General John Dix of the Union Army and
General D. H. Hill met and agreed an
exchange. They decided that the rate of exchange was one general for
every 60 enlisted men, a colonel for 15, a lieutenant for 4 and a
sergeant for 2.
In 1863 General Henry Halleck became
the Union representative involved in the exchange of prisoners. Under
pressure from Edwin Stanton, the Secretary
of War, these exchanges became less frequent. When Ulysses
S. Grant became overall commander of the Union
Army in March, 1864, he brought an end to exchanges. He told General
Benjamin F. Butler that "He said
that I would agree with him that by the exchange of prisoners we get
no men fit to go into our army, and every soldier we gave the Confederates
went immediately into theirs, so that the exchange was virtually so
much aid to them and none to us."
The decision of Ulysses S. Grant obviously
increased the suffering of prisoners held by both sides but his defenders
argued that this policy helped to reduce the length of the war. Grant's
policy was also partly responsible for the disaster at Andersonville.
The Confederate Army was so burdened
with Union prisoners that by November, 1864, they began to send them
back to the North without gaining anything in exchange.
After the conflict came to an end the War Department published figures
to show that of the 200,000 members of the Confederate
Army captured, over 26,500 died in captivity. Of the 260,526 prisoners
that the Confederates took, 22,526 members of the Union
Army died. This indicated that 13% of Confederate prisoners died
compared to 8 per cent of Federal prisoners.
(1)
Benjamin F. Butler
met Ulysses
S. Grant
for the first time in April, 1864.
Lieutenant-General
Grant visited Fortress Monroe on the 1st April. To him the state of
the negotiations as to exchange of prisoners was communicated, and
most emphatic verbal directions were received from the lieutenant-general
not to take any steps by which another able-bodied man should be exchanged
until further orders from him.
He then explained to me his views upon these matters. He said that
I would agree with him that by the exchange of prisoners we get no
men fit to go into our army, and every soldier we gave the Confederates
went immediately into theirs, so that the exchange was virtually so
much aid to them and none to us. For we gave them well men who went
directly into their ranks and we had but few others, as the returns
showed. Yet we received none from them substantially but disabled
men, and by our laws and regulations they were to be allowed to go
home and recuperate, which few of them did, and fewer still came back
to our armies.
Now, the coming campaign was to be decided by the strength of the
opposing forces, for the contest would all centre upon the Army of
the Potomac and its immediate adjuncts. His proposition was to make
an aggressive fight upon Lee, trusting to the superiority of numbers
and to the practical impossibility of Lee getting any considerable
reinforcements to keep up his army. We had twenty-six thousand Confederate
prisoners, and if they were exchanged it would give the Confederates
a corps, larger than any in Lee's army, of disciplined veterans better
able to stand the hardships of a campaign and more capable than any
other. To continue exchanging upon parole the prisoners captured on
one side and the other, especially if we captured more prisoners than
they did, would at least add from thirty to perhaps fifty per cent
to Lee's capability for resistance.
(2)
Robert
E. Lee was cross-examined by Jacob Howard, the senator from Michigan,
as a Congressional committee held
on 17th February, 1866. Howard
questioned Lee about what happened at Andersonville
Prison Camp.
I suppose they suffered
from want of ability on the part of the Confederate States to supply
them with their wants. At the very beginning of the war there was
suffering of prisoners on both sides, but as far as I could I did
everything in my power to establish the cartel (of prisoner exchange)
as agreed upon. I made several efforts to exchange the prisons after
the cartel was suspended. I offered to General Grant, around Richmond,
that we should ourselves exchange all the prisoners in our hands.
I offered to send to City Point all the prisoners in Virginia and
North Carolina over which my command extended, provided they returned
an equal number of mine, man for man. I reported this to the War Department,
and received an answer that they could place at my command all the
prisoners at the South if the proposition was accepted. I heard nothing
more on the subject.
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