Henry
Wager Halleck was born in Westernville, New
York, on 16th January, 1815. He was educated at Hudson Academy
and Union College, before graduating from West
Point in 1839. Halleck, who was 3rd in his class of 3, was commissioned
a 2nd lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers.
An expert on fortifications, Halleck's report, The
National Defense, was published by Congress. He served
in the Mexican War and the publication
of books such as Elements of Military Art
and Science (1846) resulted in him acquiring the nickname,
'Old Brains'.
Halleck left the United States Army in 1854
and after moving to San Francisco
established himself as a successful lawyer and businessman. However,
on the outbreak of the American Civil War
he joined the Union Army and in August,
1861, he replaced John C. Fremont as
major general in the the Department of Missouri. An able administrator,
his subordinates such as Ulysses S. Grant
and Don Carlos Buell did well in battle.
However, he was a poor field commander and his attack on Corinth,
exposed his lack of ability.
In July, 1862, Abraham Lincoln named
Halleck as general in chief in Washington.
A defensive strategist, Halleck was opposed to Grant's plan to take
Vicksburg. He once told William
Sherman that it was "little better than murder" to give
command to such men as Benjamin Butler,
Nathaniel Banks, Franz
Siegel, George McClellan, and
Lewis Wallace. Halleck himself criticised
for being too cautious and prolonging the war with his tactics and
as a result was in conflict with the secretary of war, Edwin
M. Stanton.
When Ulysses S. Grant became lieutenant
general and the commander of the Union Army
in March, 1864, Halleck was given the new post of chief of staff.
Henry Wager Halleck died on 9th January, 1873.
(1)
In his autobiography, General Lewis Wallace
criticised the tactics of Henry Halleck at Corinth (1906)
With one hundred and twenty thousand men, he was moving
against fifty thousand, whose recent defeats more than neutralized
their advantage of fortifications. He was moving at the rate of a
mile a day, throwing up works at every halt. That is, he gained a
mile every day to go into besiegement every night. At the end he would
have spent a month doing what General Johnson had done in three days.
Beginning his approaches twenty miles from the town, and confining
them entirely to one side, he left the enemy free to choose which
of the other three sides it would be best to retire by when the time
came, and what all to take away with him. Finally he placed his armies,
all three, under a peremptory order not to bring on an engagement.
"It is better", he instructed them, "to retreat than
to fight".
(2)
New York Times (April, 1862)
The grand army was like a huge serpent large enough
to eat up Beauregard at one mouthful; but Halleck crept forward at
the rate of about three-quarters of a mile per day. Thousands and
thousands of his men died from fevers and diarrhoea. There was great
dissatisfaction. Pope was particularly impatient. General Palmer,
who commanded on the front, reported that he could hold it against
the world, the flesh, and the devil; but Halleck telegraphed to Pope
three times within an hour not to be drawn into a general engagement.
(3)
Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs
of U. S. Grant (1885)
After the capture of Corinth a movable force of eighty
thousand men, besides enough to hold all the territory required, could
have been set in motion for the accomplishment of any great campaign
for the suppression of the rebellion. If Buell had been sent directly
to Chattanooga as rapidly as he could march, leaving two or three
divisions along the line of the railroad from Nashville forward, he
could have arrived with but little fighting, and would have saved
much of the loss of life which was afterwards incurred in gaining
Chattanooga. Bragg would then not have had time to raise an army to
contest the possession of Tennessee and Kentucky; the battles of Stone
River and Chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought. These
are the negative advantages, if the term negative is applicable, which
would probably have resulted from prompt movements after Corinth fell
into the possessions of the National forces. the positive results
might have been: a bloodless advance to Atlanta, to Vicksburg, or
to any other desired point south of Corinth in the interior of Mississippi.
(4)
General Henry Halleck, letter to Benjamin
F. Butler
about the behaviour of Ulysses S.
Grant (4th March, 1862)
A rumour has just reached me that since the taking of Fort Donelson
Grant has resumed his former bad habits. If so, it will account for
his repeated neglect of my often-repeated orders. I do not deem it
advisable to arrest him at present, but have placed General Smith
in command of the expedition up the Tennessee. I think Smith will
restore order and discipline.
(5)
George Gorham, Life and Public Services of Edwin M. Stanton
(1899)
When we consider the vast expenditure of lives, time,
and money made during the ensuing year to secure the capture of Vicksburg
that the whole year could probably have been saved, and the position
taken in July, 1862, instead of July, 1863, if Halleck would but have
extended his hand his failure to do so seems unaccountable and unpardonable.
(6)
Edward Bates diary entry (28th
February, 1863)
It does appear that Halleck is determined that we
shall not take Vicksburg - if he can prevent it. He refused to take
it when Beauregard evacuated Corinth. Then, only 8 or 10,000 men were
needed to ensure the capture. When sharply questioned in Cabinet he
pretended that he had not troops to spare! Yet at the very time, Curtis,
with his 20,000 , lay demoralizing and rotting at Helena.
(7)
George McClellan, McClellan's
Own Story (1887)
Of all the men whom I have encountered in high position
Halleck was the most hopelessly stupid. It was more difficult to get
an idea through his head than can be conceived by any one who never
made the attempt. I do not think he ever had a correct military idea
from beginning to end.
A day or two before Halleck arrived in Washington Stanton came to
caution me against trusting Halleck, who was, he said, probably the
greatest scoundrel and most barefaced villain in America; he said
that he was totally destitute of principle, and that in the Almaden
Quicksilver case he had convicted Halleck of perjury in open court.
When Halleck arrived he came to caution me against Stanton, repeating
almost precisely the same words that Stanton had employed.
(8)
General Henry Halleck, undated letter to a friend during the American
Civil War.
I am satisfied that if the ulta-abolition sentiment of the north should
get the ascendency in the administration of the government, there
will be no peace, but the war will be interminable. Our only hope
is that the President will stand firm in his conservative policy.
(9)
Clarence E. Mccartney, Lincoln and His Generals (1925)
The strange thing is not that Lincoln should have chosen Halleck for
commander in chief in the summer of 1862. The strange thing is that
after his incapacity had been so strikingly demonstrated Lincoln should
have kept him in command. Halleck is a contemptible, almost ridiculous
figure. One would laugh at him, were it not for the fact that his
incompetence was one of the chief factors in the repeated and tragic
reverses which befell the Union armies.
Available
from Amazon Books (order below)
