James
Byrnes
was born in Charleston on 2nd May 1879. After a brief formal schooling,
Byrnes became a court reporter while studying law in his spare time.
Byrnes
was admitted to the bar in 1903 and after moving to South Carolina
edited the Journal and Review.
A member of the Democratic
Party he
served in the House of Representatives (1911-25) and the Senate (1931-41).
Initially Byrnes supported the New
Deal but
later joined the Democratic opposition.
In 1941
Byrnes was appointed to the Supreme Court
but resigned on 3rd October 1942 to head the new Office of Economic
Stabilization (OES). He moved to the new post
as head of War Mobilization in April 1943.
Franklin
D. Roosevelt
considered Byrnes as his running-mate in the 1944 presidential election
but eventually chose Harry
S. Truman instead.
He was also considered as the replacement of Cordell
Hull as
Secretary of State but after objections from Harry
Hopkins,
the post went to Edward Stettinus instead.
When Harry
S. Truman became
president he appointed Byrnes as his Secretary of State. In this role
he was a strong advocate of the use of the atom
bomb on Japan and when it was suggested
that the Japanese government should be warned before use, he argued:
"If the Japanese were told that the bomb would be used on a given
locality, they might bring our boys who were prisoners of war to that
area."
After the
war Byrnes became associated with the campaign against communism.
This upset liberals in Washington
who still believed it was possible to develop good relations with
Joseph Stalin and the Soviet
Union. In September 1946 he joined with James
Forrestal to get Henry
Wallace sacked
after he made a speech calling for an end to the Cold War.
As Secretary of State,
Byrnes on behalf of the United States completed
peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland
before being replaced by General George
Marshall as Secretary of State in January 1947.
Byrnes who was governor
of South Carolina (1951-55) published his autobiography All
in One Lifetime (1958). James Byrnes
died in 1972.
(1)
James F. Byrnes visited
the Philippines in 1936.
A large Congressional party, headed by Vice President Garner, had
gone to Manila to witness the inauguration of Manuel Quezon as the
first President of the Philippine Commonwealth. There, Americans in
all walks of life had expressed to us their concern over the increasing
indications of Japan's aggressive intentions. Therefore, when we stopped
in Japan I made a special effort to inquire into Japanese naval appropriations
and naval construction. A study of the Japanese budget for 1936 readily
revealed that at least half of the total was devoted to the army and
navy. Members of our Embassy staff were convinced that the published
budget disclosed only part of the naval appropriations. The published
figures were alarming enough in themselves and when we returned to
this country I urged the President to seek means for acquiring still
more accurate estimates of Japan's naval strength.
(2)
James
F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (1947)
In August 1940, General Marshall appeared before the Senate Appropriations
Committee to testify on a defense appropriation bill. During a recess,
he told me that his greatest difficulty was his inability to promote
younger officers of unusual ability. Possession of such authority,
he said, was essential to the proper reorganization of the Army. He
told me he had requested Chairman May, of the House Military Affairs
Committee, to introduce the necessary legislation some months before
but had been unable to get action on it.
His needs were so impressive
that I requested him to have one of his technicians draft an amendment
that would accomplish the purpose he desired and stated I would try
to help him. Under the rules of the Senate, the amendment could not
be added to an appropriation bill in committee but when the bill was
reported to the floor, I offered an amendment, adopted without objection,
providing that "In time of war or national emergency determined
by the President, any officer of the Regular Army may be appointed
to higher temporary grade without vacating his permanent appointment."
When we met in conference
with the members of the House Appropriations Committee, I explained
the urgency of the proposal and they accepted it. On September 9 it
became law and under its provisions the War Department began the task
of promoting over the heads of officers of high rank the younger officers
who thereafter led our armies to victory. Before the end of the year,
4,088 of these promotions were made. Among the officers advanced were
men like General Eisenhower, General George C. Kenney, General Carl
A. Spaatz, General Mark Clark and the late General George S. Patton.
Elsenhower was promoted over 366 senior officers.
(3)
James
F. Byrnes, was a strong advocate in the Senate of financial
support for the Allies in their fight against Nazi
Germany. In his autobiography he explained the Lend-Lease
Act.
Shortly before Christmas, 1940, President Roosevelt disclosed at a
press conference his plan "to eliminate the dollar sign"
from our aid to those fighting against Hitler. The idea was elaborated
still further by the President when he appeared before the new Congress
on January 8, 1941, to deliver his message on The State of the Union.
Meanwhile, work had begun on drafting legislation to put the plan
into action. A draft prepared by Oscar S. Cox, then an assistant to
the general counsel of the Treasury, was used as a basis for soliciting
advice and suggestions from many people.
On January 10, the bill
was introduced simultaneously in the Senate and House by Senator Alben
W. Barkley and Representative John W. McCormack, the majority leaders.
In the House the symbolic number, H.R. 1776, was attached to what
finally became, on March 11, the Lend-Lease Act.
(4)
James
F. Byrnes, as Secretary of State, attended the Yalta
Conference on 4th February, 1945.
In the fall of 1944 the
Soviet Union and the Provisional Government of France had entered
into a treaty of friendship. It was immediately obvious at Yalta,
however, that the treaty and the friendly words exchanged over it
by the diplomats had not changed in any degree Marshal Stalin's opinion
on the contribution of France to the war. He thought France should
play little part in the control of Germany, and stated that Yugoslavia
and Poland were more entitled to consideration than France.
When Roosevelt and Churchill
proposed that France be allotted a zone of occupation, Stalin agreed.
But it was clear he agreed only because the French zone was to be
taken out of the territory allotted to the United States and the United
Kingdom. And he especially opposed giving France a representative
on the Allied Control Council for Germany. He undoubtedly concurred
in the opinion expressed to the President by Mr. Molotov that this
should be done "only as a kindness to France and not because
she is entitled to it."
"I am in favor of
France being given a zone," Stalin declared, "but I cannot
forget that in this war France opened the gates to the enemy."
He maintained it would create difficulties to give France a zone of
occupation and a representative on the Allied Control Council and
refuse the same treatment to others who had fought more than France.
He said France would soon demand that de Gaulle attend the Big Three's
Conferences.
Churchill argued strongly
in favor of France's being represented on the Council. He said the
British public would not understand if questions affecting France
and the French zone were settled without her participation in the
discussion. It did not follow, as Stalin had suggested, that France
would' demand de Gaulle's participation in the conferences of the
Big Three, he added. And, in his best humor, Mr. Churchill said the
conference was "a very exclusive club, the entrance fee being
at least five million soldiers or the equivalent."
(5)
Henry Wallace, speech in New
York (12th September, 1946)
I plead for an America
vigorously dedicated to peace - just as I plead for opportunities
for the next generation throughout the world to enjoy the abundance
which now, more than ever before, is the birthright of men.
To achieve lasting peace, we must study in detail just how the Russian
character was formed - by invasions of Tarters, Mongols, Germans,
Poles, Swedes, and French; by the intervention of the British, French
and Americans in Russian affairs from 1919 to 1921. Add to all this
the tremendous emotional power with Marxism and Leninism gives to
the Russian leaders - and then we can realize that we are reckoning
with a force which cannot be handled successfully by a "Get tough
with Russia" policy. "Getting tough" never bought anything
real and lasting - whether for schoolyard bullies or businessmen or
world powers. The tougher we get, the tougher the Russians will get.
We must not let our Russian policy be guided or influenced by those
inside or outside the United States who want war with Russia.
(6)
James F. Byrnes found
himself in conflict over foreign policy over the left-wing views of
Henry
Wallace.
My hope for united support of our foreign policies received a serious
setback when, on September 12, 1946, while I was in Paris, Secretary
of Commerce Henry A. Wallace made a speech at Madison Square Garden
contending that the policy which had been approved by the President,
and carried out by me, was too harsh to the Soviet Union and that
a more conciliatory approach to them was necessary. I was not greatly
surprised by the Secretary's action. Previously, he had made a statement
to the New York Times referring to our negotiations with Iceland for
the use of the airfield we had built there. His statement was effectively
used by the Communists in Iceland and it had obstructed the efforts
of the State Department to secure an agreement important to the defense
of this hemisphere.
In Paris, the importance
of Mr. Wallace's Madison Square Garden speech was magnified in the
minds of the representatives of foreign governments by newspaper reports
quoting President Truman as saying at a press conference that he approved
the Wallace speech in its entirety. This report stimulated widespread
discussion among the governmental representatives attending the peace
conference; it inspired inquiries to our representatives in various
capitals. Foreign Ministers wondered whether in my various public
statements I had correctly presented American policy.
(7)
James
F. Byrnes, speech, 6th September 1946.
The United States does not feel that it can deny to France, which
has been invaded three times by Germany in 70 years, its claim to
the Saar territory, whose economy has long been closely linked with
France. Of course, if the Saar territory is integrated with France
she should readjust her reparation claims against Germany.
Except as here indicated,
the United States will not support any encroachment on territory which
is indisputably German or any division of Germany which is not genuinely
desired by the people concerned. So far as the United States is aware
the people of the Ruhr and the Rhineland desire to remain united with
the rest of Germany. And the United States is not going to oppose
their desire.
While the people of the
Ruhr were the last to succumb to Nazism, without the resources of
the Ruhr Nazism could never have threatened the
world. Never again must those resources be used for destructive purposes.
They must be used to rebuild a free, peaceful Germany and a free,
peaceful Europe.
The United States will
favour such control over the whole of Germany, including the Ruhr
and the Rhineland, as may be necessary for security purposes. It will
help to enforce those controls. But it will not favour any controls
that would subject the Ruhr and the Rhineland to political domination
or manipulation of outside powers.
The United States cannot
relieve Germany from the hardships inflicted by the war her leaders
started. But the United States has no desire to increase those hardships
or to deny the German people an opportunity to work their way out
of those hardships so long as they respect human freedom and cling
to the paths of peace. The American people want to return the government
of Germany to the German people. The American people want to help
the German people to win their way back to an
honourable place among the free and peace-loving nations of the world.
(8)
James
F. Byrnes, letter to Harry
S. Truman, after the speech
by Henry
Wallace on 12th September
1946.
If it is not possible for you, for any reason, to keep Mr. Wallace,
as a member of your Cabinet, from speaking on foreign affairs it would
be a grave mistake from every point of view for me to continue in
office, even temporarily. Therefore, if it is not completely clear
in your own mind that Mr. Wallace should be asked to refrain from
criticizing the foreign policy of the United States while he is a
member of your Cabinet, I must ask you to accept my resignation immediately.
At this critical time, whoever is Secretary of State must be known
to have the undivided support of your administration and, so far as
possible, of the Congress.
I shall, of course, remain
here until my successor arrives. In case you are not ready to make
that appointment promptly, you can, of course, appoint someone other
than the Secretary of State to head the United States delegation at
the Peace Conference.
(9)
Dwight
D. Eisenhower, diary entry (24th
July, 1953)
A few days ago I had luncheon
with Governor Byrnes of South Carolina, my great friend, a man in
whose company I always find a great deal for enjoyment.
He came to talk to me about
the possibility of a supreme court ruling that would abolish segregation
in public schools of the country. He is very fearful of the consequences
in the South. He did not dwell long upon the possibility of riots,
resultant ill feeling, and the like. He merely expressed very seriously
the opinion that a number of states would immediately cease support
for public schools.
During the course of this
conversation, the governor brought out several times that the South
no longer finds any great problem in dealing with adult Negroes. They
are frightened at putting the children together. The governor was
obviously afraid that I would be carried away by the hope of capturing
the Negro vote in this country, and as a consequence take a stand
on the question that would forever defeat any possibility of developing
a real Republican or "opposition" party in the South.
I told him that while I
was not going to give in advance my attitude toward a supreme court
opinion that I had not even seen and so could not know in what terms
it would be couched, that my convictions would not be formed by political
expediency. He is well aware of my belief that improvement in race
relations is one of those things that will be healthy and sound only
if it starts locally. I do not believe that prejudices, even palpably
unjustified prejudices, will succumb to compulsion. Consequently,
I believe that federal law imposed upon our states in such a way as
to bring about a conflict of the police powers of the states and of
the nation, would set back the cause of progress in race relations
for a long, long time.
(10)
James
F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (1947)
This generation of Americans
has learned that the United States is a principal trustee of the world's
peace and freedom. What the United States says and does affects the
lives of people in the most remote areas of this earth. The words
and deeds of a member of the Cabinet or of the Congress often reaches
into more homes than those of many Kings and Presidents. Even Generalissimo
Stalin, in his last talks with Harry Hopkins, acknowledged the world-wide
interests and responsibilities of the United States and declared that
our country has more reason to be a world power than any other.
Leadership and its inherent
responsibilities we have accepted with reluctance-reluctance that
two costly wars have not wholly overcome. But without our initiative,
the United Nations probably would not have been created to promote
and maintain international peace and security. Without our determined
effort, it is doubtful whether ravages of war can be removed quickly
enough to give the United Nations a chance to work.
The responsibilities that
clearly are ours will be discharged in the years ahead only if we
develop in international affairs a policy that truly reflects the
will of our people. I am convinced that to build a people's foreign
policy we must pursue three primary objectives.
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