John
Sherman Cooper was born in Somerset, Kentucky, on 23rd August, 1901.
After graduating from Yale College in attended
Harvard Law School. He was admitted to
bar in 1928 and worked as a lawyer in Somerset, Kentucky.
A
member of the Republican Party, Cooper
was elected to the House of Representatives in Kentucky in 1928 and
served as judge of Pulaski County (1930-38).
During the Second World War Cooper served in
the United
States Army
where he he attained the rank of captain. In 1946 Cooper was elected
to the Senate.
Cooper
lived in Washington where he associated
with a group of journalists, politicians and government officials
that became known as the Georgetown Set.
This included Frank
Wisner,
George Kennan, Dean
Acheson,
Richard
Bissell,
Desmond
FitzGerald,
Joseph Alsop, Stewart
Alsop,
Tracy
Barnes,
Thomas
Braden,
Philip
Graham,
David
Bruce,
Clark Clifford, Walt
Rostow, Eugene Rostow, Chip
Bohlen, Cord
Meyer, James Angleton, William
Averill Harriman, John
McCloy, Felix Frankfurter,
James Reston, Allen
W. Dulles
and Paul Nitze.
Most men
brought their wives to these gatherings. Members of what was later
called the Georgetown Ladies' Social Club included Katharine
Graham,
Mary Pinchot Meyer, Sally Reston, Polly
Wisner, Joan Braden, Lorraine Cooper, Evangeline
Bruce, Avis Bohlen, Janet Barnes, Tish Alsop, Cynthia Helms, Marietta
FitzGerald, Phyllis Nitze and Annie Bissell.
After
losing his seat in 1949 he returned to his legal practice. Later that
year he was appointed delegate to the General Assembly of the United
Nations and in as adviser to the Council of Ministers of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1950.
In
1952 Cooper was again elected to the Senate. A strong opponent of
McCarthyism Copper
was one of the first senators to attack the tactics of Joseph
McCarthy. After losing his seat he was appointed Ambassador to
India (1955-56).
Cooper
was elected to the Senate for the third time in 1956. Cooper
was a critic of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
In 1969, he joined with Senator Frank Church
to sponsor an amendment prohibiting the use of ground troops in Laos
and Thailand. The two men also joined forces in 1970 to limit the
power of the president during a war.
After
leaving Senate in 1973, Cooper was appointed Ambassador to the German
Democratic Republic (1974-76). John
Sherman Cooper died in Washington
on 21st February, 1991.
John Sherman Cooper: Biographical Directory of Congress
John Sherman Cooper: Wikipedia
John Sherman Cooper: Arlington Biography
John Sherman Cooper: Namebase
Forum Debates
John Sherman Cooper
The Kennedy Assassination
Watergate
(1)
I.
F. Stone, I.
F. Stone's Weekly (15th
March, 1954)
When Ralph Flanders of Vermont attacked McCarthy, the Senate
was as silent as it was some weeks earlier when Ellender of Louisiana
made a lone onslaught and Fulbright of Arkansas cast the sole vote
against his appropriation. Only Lehman of New York and John Sherman
Cooper (R.) of Kentucky rose to congratulate Flanders. Nobody defended
McCarthy, but nobody joined in with those helpful interjections which
usually mark a Senate speech. When the Democratic caucus met in closed
session, the Stevenson speech was ignored. Lyndon Johnson
of Texas, the Democratic floor leader, is frightened of McCarthy's
Texas backers.
(2) C. David Heymann, The Georgetown Ladies' Social Club (2003)
The assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas, brought to an abrupt halt one of Georgetown's most fertile periods of social activity. "There were so many parties during the thousand days of Camelot," said Kennedy White House press secretary Pierre Salinger, who lived in Georgetown, "that they all blend into one. Camelot was one big, endless party." Referring to the encroachment of the Vietnam War, Ambassador Charles Whitehouse called Camelot "a beautiful sunset before an endlessly bitter night." Of JFK's many friends and admirers none was more anguished by his death than John Sherman Cooper. The Kentucky senator subsequently served on both the Warren Commission and on the committee selected by Jacqueline and Robert Kennedy to select a site and raise funds for the John F. Kennedy Library. Regarding his service on the Warren Commission, Senator Cooper publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the commission's findings, terming the group's 1964 report "premature and inconclusive." In no uncertain terms he informed Jack's surviving brothers, Robert and Teddy, that, having personally examined thousands of shreds of documentation, he felt strongly that Lee Harvey Oswald had not acted alone. When he expressed these same sentiments to Jackie, she responded: "What difference does it make? Knowing who killed him won't bring Jack back." "No, it won't," responded Cooper. "But it's important for this nation that we bring the true murderers to justice."
(3) Gerald D. McKnight, Breach of Trust: How the Warren Commission Failed the Nation and Why (2005)
In May 1964, about the midway point in the Warren Commission's investigation, Director J. Edgar Hoover appeared before the commissioners to provide them with his special insights into the Kennedy assassination and the benefit of his forty years as head of the nation's most prestigious and revered law enforcement agency. Hoover was probably America's most renowned and best-recognized public figure, and the Commission wanted to trade on his eclat.
Hoover was scheduled to give his testimony when the Commission was still working under Warren and Rankin's initial time frame and expected to finish up its work by the end of June. Ford and Dulles did most of the early questioning. What they wanted from America's iconic hero was his assurance that the assassination had been the act of a lone nut. Hoover was quick to oblige, assuring the commissioners that there was not "a scintilla of evidence showing any foreign conspiracy or domestic conspiracy that culminated in the assassination of President Kennedy." Hoover told the commissioners they could expect to be second-guessed and violently disagreed with, whatever their ultimate findings were. He pointed out that the FBI was already inundated with crank letters and calls from kooks, weirdos, crazies, and self-anointed psychics, all alleging a monstrous conspiracy behind Kennedy's violent death. Whether orchestrated or not, his testimony before the Commission provided the director an opportunity to launch a preemptive strike against future dissenters and critics of the Warren Commission and, by extension, Hoover's FBI, the Commission's investigative arm.
Whatever the merits, if any, of Hoover's profiling of future Commission dissenters and critics, its first test was a hands-down failure. The Commission's first dissenter was Senator Richard Brevard Russell, Jr., one of the most conservative as well as respected and admired members of the U.S. Senate. Russell wielded great power in the upper chamber and had earned the title "dean of the Senate." During 1963-1964, when the Warren Commission was conducting its business, no U.S. legislator was at the White House as frequently as the senior senator from Georgia.
On September 18, 1964, a Friday evening, President Johnson phoned Russell, his old political mentor and longtime friend, to find out what was in the Commission's report scheduled for release within the week. Johnson was surprised that Russell had suddenly bolted from Washington for a weekend retreat to his Winder, Georgia, home. Russell was quick to clear up the mystery as to why he needed to get out of the nation's capital. For the past nine months the Georgia lawmaker had been trying to balance his heavy senatorial duties with his responsibilities as a member of the Warren Commission, a perfect drudgery that Johnson had imposed upon him despite Russell's strenuous objections. No longer a young man and suffering from debilitating emphysema, Russell was simply played out. But it was the Warren Commission's last piece of business that had prompted his sudden Friday decision to escape Washington.
That Friday, September 18, Russell forced a special executive session of the Commission. It was not a placid meeting. In brief, Russell intended to use this session to explain to his Commission colleagues why he could not sign a report stating that the same bullet had struck both President Kennedy and Governor Connally. Russell was convinced that the missile that had struck Connally was a separate bullet. Senator Cooper was in strong agreement with Russell, and Boggs, to a lesser extent, had his own serious reservations about the single-bullet explanation. The Commission's findings were already in page proofs and ready for printing when Russell balked at signing the report. Commissioners Ford, Dulles, and McCloy were satisfied that the one-bullet scenario was the most reasonable explanation because it was essential to the report's single-assassin conclusion. With the Commission divided almost down the middle, Chairman Warren insisted on nothing less than a unanimous report. The stalemate was resolved, superficially at least, when Commissioner McCloy fashioned some compromise language that satisfied both camps.'
The tension-ridden Friday-morning executive session had worn Russell out. He told Johnson that the "damn Commission business whupped me down." Russell was in such haste to get away that he had forgotten to pack his toothbrush, extra shirts, and the medicine he used to ease his respiratory illness. Although Russell had support from Cooper and Boggs, he was the only one who actively dug in his heels against Rankin and the staff's contention that Kennedy and Connally had been hit by the same nonfatal bullet. Because of Russell's chronic Commission absenteeism he never fully comprehended that the final report's no-conspiracy conclusion was inextricably tied to the validity of what would later be referred to as the "single-bullet" theory. But he had read most of the testimony and was convinced that the staff's contention that the same missile had hit Kennedy and Connally was, at best, "credible" but not persuasive. "I don't believe it," he frankly told the president. Johnson's response -whether patronizing or genuine remains guesswork - was "I don't either." In summing up their Friday-night exchange, Russell and Johnson agreed that the question of the Connally bullet did not jeopardize the credibility of the report. Neither questioned the official version that Oswald had shot President Kennedy.
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