George
Marshall was born in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, on 31st December, 1880.
He graduated from Virginia Military Institute in 1901. The following
year he received a commission as a second lieutenant and was sent
to the Philippines.
In
1906 Marshall resumed his education at Fort Leavenworth. He graduated
top of the class and qualified for the Army Staff College. When he
completed the course he was kept on for another two years as an instructor.
In the First World War Marshall served on the
Western Front and was involved in the
planning of the Meuse-Argonne offensive
in 1918. Promoted to colonel Marshall served for five years as aide
to General John Pershing (1919-24) and
had a spell of duty in China (1924-27).
This was followed by five years as an instructor at Fort Benning (1927-33).
In June 1933 Marshall was given command of the 8th Infantry and became
responsible for 34 Civilian Conservation Corps
(CCC) camps in Georgia, Florida and South Carolina. Marshall was a
strong believer in the CCC and argued that the US
Army should fully support this social experiment.
Marshall
was promoted to brigadier general in October, 1936, and was given
command of the 5th Brigade at Vancouver Barracks in Washington.
He was responsible for the CCC camps in
the district. Soon afterwards he became seriously ill and had to have
his thyroid gland removed. For a while it was believed that Marshall
would have to be retired from the army but he eventually made a full
recovery.
In
August 1938, Marshall was appointed chief of the War Plans Division
and three months later he became deputy Chief of Staff. This brought
Marshall into contact with President Franklin
D. Roosevelt and members of his administration. Harry
Hopkins was especially impressed with Marshall and suggested to
the president that he should become the new Chief of Staff. Roosevelt
agreed and he assumed office in September 1939.
Marshall directed the United States armed forces
throughout the Second World War. Over the next
four years the US Army grew to a force of
8,300,000 men. Unlike his predecessor, Marshall was a strong advocate
of air power and therefore got on well
with General Henry Arnold. However he
clashed with Admiral Ernest King
over
his policy of using all available resources to defeat Germany
before Japan. As a result some critics have
claimed that his actions prolonged the Pacific
War.
In
1944 Marshall was disappointed not to have been given command of the
Allied D-Day landings. However, Franklin
D. Roosevelt argued that he could not afford to lose him as Chief
of Staff. He was involved in the planning of the invasion and Winston
Churchill later claimed that Marshall's achievements were monumental
and described him as the "organizer of victory".
Marshall
was given the rank of a five-star general in December 1944. Along
with William Leahy he was senior to Ernest
King, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Douglas
MacArthur and Henry Arnold. Marshall
resigned as Chief of Staff on 21st November, 1945, but a few days
later Harry S. Truman persuaded him to
become U.S. ambassador in China.
In
January 1947, Truman, who called Marshall "the greatest living
American", appointed him as his Secretary of State. While in
this position, Marshall devised the European
Recovery Program (ERP). Over the first year the ERP spent $5,300,000,000
and played a decisive role in the reconstruction of war-torn Europe.
In 1949, ill-health forced Marshall to resign from office and he was
replaced by Dean Acheson. However, the
following year, aged sixty-nine, Marshall accepted the post as Secretary
of Defence and helped organize United States forces in the early stages
of the Korean War.
In the summer of 1951 Marshall was attacked by Joe
McCarthy, the right-wing senator from Wisconsin, as being soft
on communism. In a speech that McCarthy gave on 14th June, he accused
the Secretary of Defence of making decisions that "aided the
Communist drive for world domination" and implied that he was
a traitor to his country.
Disillusioned by the smear campaign, Marshall retired from politics.
However, Marshall's talents were appreciated abroad and in 1953 he
was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace for his contribution to the
recovery of Europe after the Second World War.
George Marshall died in Washington
on 16th October, 1959.
(1)
James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly
(1947)
In August 1940, General Marshall appeared before the Senate Appropriations
Committee to testify on a defense appropriation bill. During a recess,
he told me that his greatest difficulty was his inability to promote
younger officers of unusual ability. Possession of such authority,
he said, was essential to the proper reorganization of the Army. He
told me he had requested Chairman May, of the House Military Affairs
Committee, to introduce the necessary legislation some months before
but had been unable to get action on it.
His needs
were so impressive that I requested him to have one of his technicians
draft an amendment that would accomplish the purpose he desired and
stated I would try to help him. Under the rules of the
Senate, the amendment could not be added to an appropriation bill
in committee but when the bill was reported to the floor, I offered
an amendment, adopted without objection, providing that "In time
of war
or national emergency determined by the President, any officer of
the Regular Army may be appointed to higher temporary grade without
vacating his permanent appointment."
When we
met in conference with the members of the House Appropriations Committee,
I explained the urgency of the proposal and they accepted it. On September
9 it became law and under its provisions the War Department began
the task of promoting over the heads of officers of high rank the
younger officers who thereafter led our armies to victory. Before
the end of the year, 4,088 of these promotions were made. Among the
officers advanced were men like General Eisenhower, General George
C. Kenney, General Carl A. Spaatz, General Mark Clark and the late
General George S. Patton. Elsenhower was promoted over 366 senior
officers.
(2)
General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Crusade in Europe (1948)
Washington in wartime has been variously described in numbers of pungent
epigrams, all signifying chaos. Traditionally the government, including
the service departments, has always been as unprepared for war and
its all-embracing problems as the country itself; and the incidence
of emergency has, under an awakened sense of overwhelming responsibility,
resulted in confusion, intensified by a swarming influx of contract
seekers and well-meaning volunteers. This time, however, the War Department
had achieved a gratifying level of efficiency before the outbreak
of war. So far as my own observations during the months I served there
would justify a judgment, this was due to the vision and determination
of one man, General Marshall. Naturally he had support. He was backed
up by the President and by many of our ablest leaders in Congress
and in key positions in the Administration. But it would have been
easy for General Marshall, during 1940-41, to drift along with the
current, to let things slide in anticipation of a normal end to a
brilliant military career - for he had earned, throughout the professional
Army, a reputation for brilliance. Instead he had for many months
deliberately followed the hard way, determined that at whatever cost
to himself or to anyone else the Army should be decently prepared
for the conflict which he daily, almost hourly, expected.
(3)
William Leahy, chief of
staff to the commander in chief of the United States, wrote about
George Marshall in his autobiography, I Was There (1950)
Regular
meetings of the Joint Chiefs took place on Wednesdays, beginning with
luncheon. Special sessions were held at any time, often on Sundays
or even late at night. No one other than the Chiefs of Staff was present
at the meetings, except that when an important theatre commander was
in Washington he would usually be asked to discuss with us the situation
and problems in his area. From time to time representatives of our
allies - China, Australia, the Netherlands and the exiled Poles, for
example-would ask to be allowed to present their case to the Joint
Chiefs. On occasions, these requests were granted.
Throughout
the war, the four of us - Marshall, King, Arnold, and myself - worked
in the closest possible harmony. In the post-war period, General Marshall
and I disagreed sharply on some aspects of our foreign political policy.
However, as a soldier, he was in my opinion one of the best, and his
drive, courage, and imagination transformed America's great citizen
army into the most magnificent fighting force ever assembled.
In numbers
of men and logistic requirements, his army operations were by far
the largest. This meant that more time of the Joint Chiefs was spent
on his problems than on any others - and he invariably presented them
with skill and clarity.
(4)
General Alan Brooke, Chief of Imperial
General Staff (diary entry, 15th June, 1944)
After lunch again the American COS, this time to discuss Burma.
It is quite clear in listening to Marshall's arguments and questions
that he has not even now grasped the true aspect of the Burma Campaign!
After the meeting I approached him about the present Stilwell set
up, suggesting that it was quite impossible for him to continue filling
3 jobs at the same time, necessitating him being in 3 different locations,
namely: Deputy Supreme Commander, Commander Chinese Corps, and Chief
of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek! Marshall flared up and said that Stilwell
was a 'fighter' and that is why he wanted him there, as we had a set
of commanders who had no fighting instincts! Namely Giffard, Peirse
and Somerville, all of which according to him were soft and useless
etc etc. I found it quite useless arguing with him.
Marshall
had originally asked us to accept this mad Stilwell set up to do him
a favour, apparently as he had no one else suitable to fill the gaps.
I was therefore quite justified in asking him to terminate a set up
which had proved itself as quite unsound. I had certainly not expected
him to flare up in the way he did and to start accusing our commanders
of lack of fighting qualities, and especially as he could not have
had any opportunities of judging for himself and was basing his opinions
on reports he had received from Stilwell. I was so enraged by his
attitude that I had to break off the conversation to save myself from
rounding on him and irreparably damaging our relationship.
(5)
George Marshall, Secretary of State, speech at Harvard University
(5th June, 1947)
I need not tell you gentlemen that the world situation is very
serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think
one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity
that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio
make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a
clear appraisement of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this
country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is
hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of
the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their
governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the
world.
In considering
the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe, the physical loss
of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines, and
railroads was correctly estimated; but it has become obvious during
recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious
than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy. For
the past ten years conditions have been highly abnormal. The feverish
preparation for war and the more feverish maintenance of the war effort
engulfed all aspects of national economies. Machinery has fallen into
disrepair or is entirely obsolete. Under the arbitrary and destructive
Nazi rule, virtually every possible enterprise was geared into the
German war machine. Long-standing commercial ties, private institutions,
banks, insurance companies, and shipping companies disappeared through
loss of capital, absorption through nationalization, or by simple
destruction. In many countries, confidence in the local currency has
been severely shaken.
The breakdown
of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete. Recovery
has been seriously retarded by the fact that two years after the close
of hostilities a peace settlement with Germany and Austria has not
been agreed upon. But even given a more prompt solution of these difficult
problems, the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite
evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort than
had been foreseen.
There is
a phase of this matter which is both interesting and serious. The
farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city
dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of labor
is the basis of modern civilization. At the present time it is threatened
with breakdown. The town and city industries are not producing adequate
goods to exchange with the food-producing farmer. Raw materials and
fuel are in short supply. Machinery is lacking or worn out. The farmer
or the peasant cannot find the goods for sale which he desires to
purchase. So the sale of his farm produce for money which he cannot
use seems to him an unprofitable transaction. He, therefore, has withdrawn
many fields from crop cultivation and is using them for grazing. He
feeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an
ample supply of food, however short he may be on clothing and the
other ordinary gadgets of civilization.
Meanwhile
people in the cities are short of food and fuel. So the governments
are forced to use their foreign money and credits to procure these
necessities abroad. This process exhausts funds which are urgently
needed for reconstruction. Thus a very serious situation is rapidly
developing which bodes no good for the world. The modern system of
the division of labor upon which the exchange of products is based
is in danger of breaking down.
The truth
of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or
four years of foreign food and other essential
products - principally from America - are so much greater than her
present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help
or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave
character.
The remedy
lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of
the European people in the economic future of their own countries
and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout
wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for
currencies the continuing value of which is not open to question.
Aside from
the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities
of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people
concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should
be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do
whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic
health in the world, without which there can be no political stability
and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country
or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its
purpose should be the revival of a working
economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and
social conditions in which free institutions can exist.
Such assistance,
I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises
develop. Any assistance that this government may render in the future
should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government
that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation,
I am sure, on the part of the United States government. Any government
which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect
help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups
which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom
politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United
States.
It is logical
that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist
in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which
there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy
is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger,
poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival
of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of
political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.
(6)
Walter Trohan, The American Mercury (March, 1951)
George Marshall was the willing instrument of the tragic policy which
held that Russia was an ally to be trusted, that Joe Stalin was "good
old Joe". He was the willing instrument of the Hisses and the
Achesons, the Lattimores and the Jessups, the misguided men who let
American boys die to make America safe for Communism. Whenever the
American people have depended on him, he has come up with advice or
decisions which have led to disaster.
(7)
Joseph McCarthy, speech in the Senate
(14th June, 1951)
I realize full well, how unpopular it is to lay hands on the laurels
of a man who has been built into a great hero. I very much dislike
it, but I feel that it must be done if we are to intelligently make
the proper decisions in the issues of life and death before us. If
Marshall was merely stupid, the laws of probability would dictate
that part of his decisions would serve America's interests.
Since Marshall resumed his place as major of the palace last September,
with Acheson as captain of the palace guard and that weak, fitful,
bad-tempered and usable Merovingian in their custody, the outlines
of the defeat they mediate have grown plainer.
(8)
Collier's Magazine, commenting
on Joseph McCarthy's speech attacking George Marshall and Dean
Acheson (18th August, 1951)
It is incredible that any American who
is both sane and honest can believe that George Marshall or Dean Acheson
is a traitorous hireling of the Kremlin.
(9)
Dwight D. Eisenhower, speech in Denver
(9th September, 1952)
Let me be specific. I know that charges
of disloyalty have, in the past, been leveled against General George
C. Marshall. I have been privileged for thirty-five years to know
George Marshall personally. I know him, as a man and as a soldier,
to be dedicated with singular selfishness and the profoundest patriotism
to the service of America. And this episode is a sobering lesson in
the way freedom must not defend itself.
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